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Abstract	  Using	  an	  interdisciplinary	  approach,	  this	  thesis	  explores	  the	  theme	  of	  death	  in	  life.	  This	  thesis	  particularly	  examines	  the	  work	  of	  Phillipe	  Ariès,	  Ernest	  Becker,	  Terror	  Management	  theorists	  (TMT),	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  and	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche.	  These	  thinkers	  are	  united	  in	  their	  diagnosis	  of	  a	  severe	  and	  unhealthy	  contemporary	  denial	  of	  death.	  Death	  has	  never	  been	  repressed	  as	  thoroughly	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  current	  era	  in	  western	  culture,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  the	  exclusion	  of	  death	  may	  well	  be	  the	  characteristic	  that	  centrally	  distinguishes,	  and	  threatens	  the	  welfare	  of,	  our	  age.	  However,	  as	  I	  show	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  in	  a	  number	  of	  previous	  historical	  epochs	  people	  have	  understood	  death	  as	  a	  fundamental	  and	  constitutive	  aspect	  of	  life,	  making	  it	  clear	  that	  death	  need	  not	  be	  denied	  as	  it	  is	  now.	  In	  Chapters	  Two	  and	  Three,	  I	  describe	  the	  psychological	  theory	  and	  experimental	  research	  that	  asserts	  our	  denial	  of	  death	  oftentimes	  leads	  to	  negative	  attitudes	  and	  the	  harming	  of	  others	  who	  are	  different	  from	  us.	  Although	  the	  psychological	  approach	  succeeds	  in	  its	  critique	  of	  our	  rejection	  of	  death,	  I	  argue	  that	  its	  positive	  response	  proves	  less	  than	  satisfying.	  At	  this	  point,	  in	  Chapters	  Four	  and	  Five,	  the	  thesis	  turns	  to	  representatives	  of	  continental	  philosophy,	  who	  advance	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  relating	  to	  death.	  These	  philosophers	  explain	  that	  it	  is	  because	  we	  die	  that	  we	  can	  take	  hold	  of	  the	  possibilities	  of	  our	  lives.	  They	  suggest	  that	  we	  have	  the	  possibility	  of	  authentically	  understanding	  ourselves	  as	  the	  mortal	  creatures	  we	  are,	  affirming	  and	  even	  expressing	  gratitude	  for	  death	  as	  a	  meaning-­‐giving	  element	  in	  life.	  Thus,	  death	  need	  not	  be	  the	  regrettable	  moment	  of	  our	  demise,	  but	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  who	  we	  are	  as	  human	  beings.	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Introduction:	  An	  Interdisciplinary	  Approach	  to	  the	  Theme	  of	  Death	  in	  Life	  	  A	  number	  of	  years	  ago	  I	  stumbled	  upon	  a	  documentary	  titled	  “Flight	  from	  Death:	  The	  Quest	  for	  Immortality.”	  Captivated,	  I	  listened	  to	  various	  intellectuals	  and	  thinkers	  discuss	  how	  humans	  deal	  with	  their	  mortality.	  In	  this,	  it	  was	  the	  scientists	  who	  fascinated	  me	  most,	  for	  nowhere	  before	  had	  I	  heard	  of	  experimental	  scientists	  investigating	  such	  existential	  matters.	  I	  was	  impressed	  by	  the	  courage	  it	  took	  for	  these	  scientists	  to	  confront	  a	  subject	  matter	  typically	  left	  to	  the	  arts	  and	  poetry,	  or	  perhaps	  to	  theology	  and	  philosophy.	  Fascinated	  by	  this	  unique	  existential-­‐scientific	  perspective,	  I	  read	  some	  of	  the	  published	  studies	  conducted	  by	  these	  researchers	  who	  were	  working	  in	  a	  subfield	  of	  psychology	  called	  Terror	  Management	  Theory	  (TMT).	  In	  the	  documentary,	  many	  of	  these	  researchers	  referenced	  an	  anthropologist	  named	  Ernest	  Becker,	  so	  I	  set	  myself	  the	  task	  of	  also	  familiarizing	  myself	  with	  his	  works.	  Interestingly,	  when	  I	  brought	  Becker	  and	  TMT	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  psychology	  professors	  in	  my	  MA	  program,	  I	  was	  met	  with	  hesitation,	  even	  unease.	  The	  few	  people	  who	  had	  heard	  of	  this	  area	  of	  psychology	  seemed	  to	  think	  it	  highly	  questionable,	  and	  they	  recommended	  I	  pursue	  other	  topics	  for	  course	  projects.	  The	  limited	  experiments	  read	  about	  in	  class	  that	  investigated	  anything	  about	  our	  mortality	  usually	  only	  involved	  participants	  in	  the	  elderly	  population	  or	  people	  with	  terminal	  illnesses.	  Furthermore,	  when	  authors	  of	  articles,	  professors,	  and	  fellow	  students	  could	  not	  avoid	  talking	  about	  death,	  I	  noticed	  them	  using	  indirect	  language	  such	  as	  “pass	  away”	  or	  “perish.”	  I	  was	  shocked	  that	  no	  one	  in	  the	  psychology	  department	  seemed	  to	  care	  to	  acknowledge,	  let	  alone	  investigate,	  this	  aspect	  of	  our	  existence,	  an	  aspect	  that	  affects	  every	  single	  human	  being	  and	  does	  so	  in	  such	  a	  profound	  way.	  Considering	  that	  psychology	  is	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  human	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functioning,	  the	  topic	  of	  death	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  life,	  including	  the	  revolutionary	  work	  of	  Becker	  and	  TMT,	  seemed	  to	  me	  in	  need	  of	  much	  more	  consideration	  than	  it	  was	  receiving.	  	  Despite	  my	  excitement	  for	  the	  ingenuity	  of	  the	  scientific	  examination	  of	  death	  in	  life,	  as	  I	  better	  familiarized	  myself	  with	  the	  work,	  I	  came	  up	  against	  what	  I	  saw	  as	  a	  significant	  limitation	  of	  the	  scientific	  approach.	  Through	  Becker	  and	  TMT’s	  descriptions	  of	  how	  our	  mortality	  influences	  our	  everyday	  thoughts,	  behaviors,	  and	  emotions,	  I	  began	  to	  see	  how	  I	  am	  constantly	  affected	  by	  my	  finitude.	  However,	  Becker	  and	  TMT	  were	  unable	  to	  help	  me	  understand	  what,	  if	  anything,	  could	  or	  should	  be	  done	  about	  it.	  As	  I	  continued	  my	  interdisciplinary	  education,	  my	  studies	  in	  continental	  philosophy	  seemed	  to	  address	  the	  gap	  left	  by	  Becker	  and	  TMT.	  In	  particular,	  Martin	  Heidegger’s	  rigorous	  ontological	  study	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  Dasein,	  something	  like	  ‘human	  existence,’	  and	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche’s	  lived	  and	  embodied	  philosophical	  methodology	  seemed	  to	  me	  to	  speak	  about	  death	  in	  the	  way	  that	  was	  required,	  namely	  as	  a	  part	  of	  who	  I	  am	  as	  a	  human	  being.	  As	  I	  pursued	  the	  topic	  of	  mortality,	  I	  was	  introduced	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Phillipe	  Ariès,	  which	  helped	  me	  gain	  a	  historical	  context	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  death	  in	  the	  Western	  world.	  	  This	  project	  was	  not	  started	  in	  attempt	  to	  fully	  elucidate	  the	  massive,	  elusive	  concept	  of	  death,	  but	  is	  offered	  as	  a	  discussion	  that	  recognizes	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  death	  is	  not	  situated	  within	  any	  particular	  discipline.	  Each	  field	  examines	  mortality	  on	  different	  levels,	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  approaches	  and	  methodologies.	  When	  taken	  together,	  Becker,	  TMT,	  Ariès,	  Heidegger,	  and	  Nietzsche	  are	  able	  to	  say	  much	  more	  about	  our	  death,	  my	  death,	  than	  if	  they	  remained	  isolated	  in	  their	  own	  disciplinary	  perspectives.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  work	  takes	  an	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  to	  flesh	  out	  these	  preliminary	  theses	  about	  death	  in	  life.	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Chapter	  One:	  Phillipe	  Ariès,	  Historian:	  Modern	  Problem	  of	  Death	  
I.	  Introduction	  to	  Ariès	  Philippe	  Ariès	  (1914-­‐1984)	  examined	  the	  historical	  transformation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  death	  in	  the	  Western	  world	  in	  the	  last	  few	  millennia.	  He	  breaks	  the	  perspectives	  down	  into	  four	  major	  periods	  with	  their	  own	  fairly	  distinct	  conceptualizations	  of	  our	  mortality.	  The	  first	  three	  periods	  Ariès	  delineates	  span	  from	  over	  a	  millennium	  ago	  through	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  he	  describes	  them	  as	  fundamentally	  similar.	  Ariès	  says	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  death	  “resisted	  the	  pressures	  of	  evolution	  for	  about	  two	  thousand	  years.	  In	  a	  world	  subject	  to	  change,	  the	  traditional	  attitude	  toward	  death	  is	  like	  a	  bulwark	  of	  inertia	  and	  continuity”	  (HOD	  28).	  While	  there	  was	  some	  transformation	  across	  these	  first	  three	  periods,	  it	  occurred	  slowly	  over	  hundreds	  of	  years	  until	  contemporary	  times	  when	  “a	  complete	  reversal	  of	  customs	  seems	  to	  have	  occurred	  in	  one	  generation”	  (HOD	  560).	  The	  previous	  ways	  we	  have	  conceptualized	  our	  perishing	  have	  been	  “so	  obliterated	  from	  our	  culture	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  for	  us	  to	  imagine	  or	  understand”	  (HOD	  28).	  Since	  the	  20th	  century,	  we	  perceive	  death	  as	  terrifying	  and	  wild,	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  should	  be	  rejected	  and	  banished	  from	  thought.	  Even	  though	  we	  feel	  our	  responses	  are	  natural	  and	  could	  not	  be	  different,	  they	  have	  been	  so	  throughout	  recorded	  history.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  distinctly	  modern	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	  death,	  this	  chapter	  unpacks	  the	  general	  differences	  between	  how	  we	  have	  previously	  conceived	  of	  death	  and	  how	  we	  approach	  it	  now.	  	  
II.	  Previous	  Conceptions	  of	  Death	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Ariès	  began	  his	  historical	  investigation	  in	  the	  early	  Middle	  Ages,	  and	  titles	  this	  first	  period	  “tame	  death”	  (HOD	  5).	  Although	  people	  did	  not	  want	  to	  die	  nor	  were	  they	  apathetic	  towards	  their	  demise,	  during	  this	  period	  death	  was	  familiar	  and	  accepted	  as	  a	  part	  of	  life.	  In	  this	  way,	  people	  did	  not	  reject	  and	  rebel	  against	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  and	  their	  loved	  ones	  would	  eventually	  die.	  Ariès	  references	  Alexander	  Solzhenitsyn	  who	  describes,	  “‘they	  didn’t	  puff	  themselves	  up	  or	  fight	  against	  it	  and	  brag	  that	  they	  weren’t	  going	  to	  die-­‐	  they	  took	  death	  calmly’”	  (qtd.	  in	  WA	  13).	  Similarly,	  Ariès	  illustrates,	  “Naturally,	  the	  dying	  man	  feels	  sad	  about	  the	  loss	  of	  his	  life,	  the	  things	  he	  has	  possessed,	  and	  the	  people	  he	  has	  loved.	  But	  his	  regret	  never	  goes	  beyond	  a	  level	  of	  intensity	  that	  is	  very	  slight”	  (HOD	  15).	  Death	  was	  anticipated	  and	  considered	  a	  part	  of	  life	  that	  one	  should	  come	  to	  terms	  with.	  People	  of	  this	  era	  wanted	  forewarning	  so	  they	  could	  make	  the	  necessary	  ritualistic	  preparations	  themselves.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  sudden	  death	  was	  considered	  disgusting,	  ugly,	  and	  terrifying,	  which	  is	  quite	  different	  today	  when	  a	  sudden	  death	  often	  seems	  sensational	  (HOD	  11).	  Considering	  it	  was	  typical	  to	  have	  foreknowledge	  of	  one’s	  death,	  dying	  in	  bed	  was	  commonplace.	  The	  transition	  of	  dying	  also	  often	  took	  place	  publically.	  Children	  were	  expected	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  rituals,	  and	  sometimes	  strangers	  would	  even	  come	  to	  the	  bedside	  (WA	  12).	  	  Ariès	  defines	  “One’s	  own	  death”	  as	  the	  second	  period	  spanning	  the	  late	  Middle	  Ages	  and	  Renaissance,	  from	  the	  eleventh	  through	  the	  fifteenth	  centuries	  (WA	  26).	  Just	  as	  in	  the	  first	  period,	  death	  was	  a	  generally	  accepted	  fact,	  forewarning	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  normal,	  dying	  took	  place	  at	  home,	  and	  the	  dying	  person	  orchestrated	  the	  rituals	  of	  their	  passing.	  Ariès	  states,	  the	  “man	  of	  the	  late	  Middle	  Ages	  [in	  the	  second	  period]	  was	  very	  acutely	  conscious	  that	  he	  had	  merely	  been	  granted	  a	  stay	  of	  execution,	  that	  this	  delay	  would	  be	  a	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brief	  one,	  and	  that	  death	  was	  always	  present	  within	  him”	  (WA	  44).	  As	  such,	  this	  perspective	  was	  not	  drastically	  different	  from	  the	  first	  period.	  However,	  there	  were	  some	  distinct	  modifications	  in	  the	  second	  period,	  especially	  an	  increased	  concern	  over	  the	  personal	  and	  particular	  meaning	  of	  one’s	  own	  life	  and	  death.	  People	  came	  to	  believe	  that	  what	  they	  did	  during	  their	  lives	  would	  eventually	  be	  judged	  and	  would	  impact	  their	  afterlife.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  biography	  of	  each	  individual	  became	  important.	  In	  the	  moments	  before	  death,	  people	  began	  to	  see	  their	  lives	  flash	  before	  their	  eyes.	  They	  started	  to	  care	  about	  how	  they	  felt	  on	  their	  deathbed	  because	  they	  thought	  that	  this	  feeling	  would	  give	  their	  lives	  its	  “final	  meaning,	  its	  conclusion”	  (WA	  38).	  As	  such,	  people	  came	  to	  think	  it	  was	  through	  death	  that	  they	  would	  come	  to	  understand	  who	  they	  were	  as	  individuals.	  Ariès	  maintains,	  “Death	  became	  the	  occasion	  when	  man	  was	  most	  able	  to	  reach	  an	  awareness	  of	  himself”	  (WA	  46).	  Said	  differently,	  “In	  the	  mirror	  of	  his	  own	  death	  each	  man	  would	  discover	  the	  secret	  of	  his	  individuality”	  (WA	  51).	  Therefore,	  while	  death	  was	  not	  sought	  after,	  death	  in	  this	  second	  period	  did	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  affect	  on	  how	  people	  viewed	  their	  time	  on	  earth.	  Ariès	  describes	  that	  people	  had	  a	  profound	  gratitude	  and	  love	  for	  their	  short	  existence,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  he	  asserts	  this	  perspective	  would	  be	  incredibly	  difficult	  for	  us	  to	  grasp	  today	  (WA	  45).	  During	  this	  second	  period	  people	  accepted	  the	  eventuality	  of	  their	  death,	  and	  this	  increased	  the	  valuation	  of	  life	  and	  altered	  how	  one	  conducted	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  existence.	  	  The	  third	  period	  Ariès	  titles	  “Thy	  death,”	  occurring	  from	  the	  eighteenth	  to	  the	  twentieth	  centuries	  (WA	  54).	  It	  was	  during	  this	  phase	  that	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  death	  started	  to	  drastically	  change.	  Instead	  of	  revolving	  around	  one’s	  own	  individual	  death,	  from	  this	  point	  forward,	  death	  came	  to	  be	  defined	  through	  the	  death	  of	  the	  Other	  (WA	  68).	  At	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this	  time	  people	  began	  to	  reject	  the	  separation	  that	  occurred	  when	  someone	  died,	  so	  they	  began	  to	  form	  relationships	  with	  the	  dead.	  Previously	  remains	  were	  buried	  in	  common	  graves,	  but	  in	  this	  period	  the	  deceased	  began	  to	  be	  laid	  to	  rest	  in	  places	  where	  they	  could	  easily	  be	  visited,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  family	  backyard	  or	  in	  cemeteries	  (WA	  70).	  Ariès	  proposes	  the	  main	  reason	  behind	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  prevalence	  of	  tombs	  was	  not	  the	  spread	  of	  Christianity,	  but	  because	  of	  “the	  survivors’	  unwillingness	  to	  accept	  the	  departure	  of	  their	  loved	  one”	  (WA	  70).	  Furthermore,	  death	  became	  romanticized,	  dramatized,	  and	  much	  more	  emotionally	  charged.	  Therefore,	  while	  people	  partook	  in	  rituals	  similar	  to	  the	  previous	  periods,	  the	  rituals	  now	  became	  reinvigorated	  with	  meaning	  and	  seemed	  as	  if	  they	  had	  been	  newly	  created.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  simple	  and	  direct	  response	  to	  death	  of	  the	  first	  and	  second	  period,	  the	  third	  period	  involved	  an	  excess	  of	  emotion,	  which	  sometimes	  led	  to	  hysterical	  mourning	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  madness	  (WA	  67).	  	  Both	  the	  increased	  importance	  for	  loved	  ones	  to	  visit	  remains	  and	  the	  increased	  emotional	  reactions	  of	  the	  loved	  ones	  contribute	  to	  the	  third	  period’s	  distinct	  focus	  on	  how	  the	  survivors	  experienced	  death.	  That	  is,	  at	  this	  time	  the	  conception	  of	  death	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  dying’s	  hands	  and	  transferred	  to	  the	  hands	  of	  those	  left	  behind.	  Through	  this	  process,	  the	  dying	  lost	  the	  agency	  they	  once	  had	  over	  the	  rituals	  of	  their	  own	  death.	  People	  in	  this	  third	  period	  began	  to	  lose	  trust	  that	  their	  relatives	  would	  do	  as	  they,	  the	  dying,	  wished,	  and	  so	  people	  began	  to	  write	  wills	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  maintain	  some	  determination	  over	  the	  rituals	  of	  their	  passing.	  As	  the	  perspective	  of	  death	  moved	  its	  locus	  from	  the	  individuals	  to	  the	  loved	  ones,	  death	  became	  an	  abstract	  concept.	  Removed	  from	  the	  actual	  experience	  of	  dying,	  mortality	  came	  to	  have	  symbolic	  meaning,	  and	  the	  mere	  thought	  of	  death	  moved	  people	  (WA	  60).	  In	  the	  third	  period	  death	  ceased	  to	  be	  a	  neutrally	  accepted	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part	  of	  existence,	  and	  instead	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  adverse	  tearing,	  breaking,	  and	  rupturing	  of	  daily	  life.	  	  
III.	  The	  Modern	  Conception	  of	  Death	  Beginning	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  and	  continuing	  to	  this	  day,	  the	  fourth	  period	  Ariès	  defines	  involves	  the	  belief	  that	  death	  is	  forbidden	  and	  wild	  (WA	  84).	  As	  previously	  explained,	  in	  the	  third	  period,	  death	  was	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  dying	  and	  placed	  under	  the	  power	  of	  the	  survivors.	  In	  the	  fourth	  period,	  death	  was	  further	  removed	  from	  the	  person	  experiencing	  it	  and	  placed	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  society.	  Furthermore,	  under	  this	  societal	  management,	  death	  was	  implicitly	  effaced	  and	  kept	  silent	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  comfort	  of	  society	  at	  large.	  Ariès	  states	  that	  in	  modern	  times,	  [O]ne	  must	  avoid—no	  longer	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  dying	  person,	  but	  for	  society’s	  sake,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  those	  close	  to	  the	  dying	  person—the	  disturbance	  and	  the	  overly	  strong	  and	  unbearable	  emotion	  caused	  by	  the	  ugliness	  of	  dying	  and	  by	  the	  very	  presence	  of	  death	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  happy	  life,	  for	  it	  is	  henceforth	  given	  that	  life	  is	  always	  happy	  or	  should	  always	  seem	  to	  be	  so.	  (WA	  87)	  	  Ariès	  proposes	  that	  happiness	  is	  the	  supreme	  value	  of	  contemporary	  society,	  and	  every	  individual	  is	  expected	  to	  try	  to	  protect	  and	  contribute	  to	  this	  collective	  happiness.	  He	  describes	  that	  modern	  people	  are	  supposed	  to	  “[appear]	  to	  be	  always	  happy,	  even	  in	  the	  depths	  of	  despair”	  (WA	  94).	  Therefore,	  the	  distress,	  pain,	  loss,	  and	  mourning	  involved	  in	  the	  dying	  process	  are	  now	  hushed	  up	  and	  covered	  over	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  maintain	  a	  semblance	  of	  perfect,	  pleasant	  happiness.	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   In	  conjunction	  with	  happiness,	  Ariès	  points	  out	  that	  contemporary	  society	  also	  highly	  values	  cleanliness.	  He	  illustrates,	  “Rapid	  advances	  in	  comfort,	  privacy,	  personal	  hygiene,	  and	  ideas	  about	  asepsis	  have	  made	  everyone	  more	  delicate.	  Our	  senses	  can	  no	  longer	  tolerate	  the	  sights	  and	  smells	  that	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  were	  part	  of	  daily	  life”	  (HOD	  570).	  We	  feel	  physically	  sickened	  and	  repulsed	  by	  death,	  which	  is	  now	  experienced	  as	  foul	  and	  dirty.	  Ariès	  says,	  “Access	  to	  [the	  room	  of	  the	  dying]	  must	  be	  forbidden,	  except	  to	  a	  few	  intimates	  capable	  of	  overcoming	  their	  disgust”	  (HOD	  569).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  modern	  revulsion,	  starting	  in	  the	  1930s	  the	  dying	  were	  placed	  in	  hospitals	  in	  order	  to	  both	  hide	  the	  unhappiness	  of	  dying	  and	  to	  manage	  its	  uncleanliness.	  The	  trained	  hospital	  personnel	  have	  become	  the	  only	  people	  who	  are	  capable	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  ugliness	  of	  the	  biological	  process	  of	  dying.	  Death	  has	  become	  sanitized,	  technical,	  and	  medicalized.	  Given	  that	  death	  in	  the	  modern,	  fourth	  period	  occurs	  in	  the	  hospital,	  it	  is	  not	  as	  typical	  as	  it	  was	  in	  previous	  times	  for	  entire	  families	  to	  be	  at	  the	  deathbed.	  In	  addition,	  ceremonies	  are	  kept	  to	  a	  minimum	  and	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  discreet	  and	  avoid	  emotion.	  People	  do	  their	  best	  to	  make	  it	  seem	  as	  if	  nothing	  has	  happened	  and	  no	  one	  has	  died	  (WA	  90).	  An	  industry	  of	  professionals	  now	  has	  the	  responsibility	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  aftermath	  of	  a	  death,	  so	  that	  in	  the	  weeks	  following	  the	  perishing	  of	  a	  loved	  one,	  the	  family	  can	  go	  about	  their	  daily	  lives	  without	  interruption	  or	  much	  acknowledgement	  that	  death	  has	  occurred	  (HOD	  571).	  Françoise	  Dastur,	  a	  contemporary	  scholar	  of	  phenomenology	  and	  existential	  philosophy,	  reaffirms	  Ariès	  perspective	  and	  explains	  that	  instead	  of	  providing	  psychological	  relief	  through	  social	  demonstration,	  funerals	  have	  become	  a	  tool	  for	  neutralizing	  death	  (9).	  Dastur	  adds	  that	  society	  also	  “[orders]	  the	  grieving	  to	  ‘do’	  their	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mourning”	  (10).	  If	  necessary,	  “experts”	  help	  mourners	  “cope”	  as	  quickly	  and	  painlessly	  as	  possible,	  which	  assists	  in	  maintaining	  the	  public	  semblance	  that	  there	  has	  not	  been	  a	  death.	  Modern	  death	  is	  purposefully	  forgotten,	  removed	  from	  everyday	  life,	  hidden	  away	  in	  sanitized	  hospitals,	  often	  takes	  place	  alone,	  and	  intentionally	  does	  not	  involve	  many	  emotions	  and	  rituals.	  This	  modern	  conceptualization	  of	  death	  as	  forbidden	  is	  almost	  a	  complete	  reversal	  of	  previous	  perspectives	  where	  death	  was	  a	  visible	  part	  of	  life,	  took	  place	  at	  home	  surrounded	  by	  family,	  and	  involved	  emotions	  as	  a	  necessary	  aspect	  of	  the	  ritualistic	  process.	  	  Another	  major	  change	  in	  the	  modern	  view	  of	  death	  is	  that	  people	  no	  longer	  want	  to	  see	  or	  feel	  death	  coming.	  Ariès	  explains,	  “What	  today	  we	  call	  the	  good	  death,	  the	  beautiful	  death,	  corresponds	  exactly	  to	  what	  used	  to	  be	  the	  accursed	  death	  […]	  the	  death	  that	  gives	  no	  warning.	  ‘He	  died	  tonight	  in	  his	  sleep:	  He	  just	  didn’t	  wake	  up.	  It	  was	  the	  best	  possible	  way	  to	  die’”	  (HOD	  587).	  Furthermore,	  Ariès	  points	  out	  that	  it	  is	  now	  the	  norm	  to	  sedate	  the	  dying	  with	  drugs,	  so	  they	  will	  not	  be	  conscious	  of	  their	  approaching	  death.	  This	  induced	  tranquilization	  also	  serves	  to	  dull	  the	  pains	  and	  cries	  of	  the	  dying	  to	  help	  conceal	  the	  fatal	  reality	  for	  the	  loved	  ones.	  Additionally,	  people	  try	  to	  convince	  the	  dying	  that	  they	  are	  not	  actually	  dying.1	  Ariès	  describes	  that	  the	  “dying	  [have	  come]	  to	  be	  treated	  like	  someone	  recovering	  from	  a	  major	  surgery”	  (HOD	  584).	  Loved	  ones	  persuade	  the	  dying	  that	  if	  they	  fight	  hard	  enough,	  they	  will	  be	  healthy	  again;	  they	  reassure	  them	  that	  they	  are	  going	  to	  be	  just	  fine	  and	  everything	  will	  go	  back	  to	  how	  it	  was	  before.	  In	  our	  current	  period,	  Ariès	  proposes	  that	  people	  do	  not	  want	  foreknowledge	  of	  death,	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  sober	  and	  awake	  as	  they	  die,	  and	  do	  not	  want	  to	  believe	  and	  admit	  they	  will	  die.	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   Ariès	  points	  out	  two	  primary	  examples	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Western	  rejection	  of	  death,	  with	  the	  popularity	  of	  cremation	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  embalming	  in	  America.	  At	  least	  since	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  cremation	  has	  become	  commonplace	  in	  Europe.	  Ariès	  rationalizes	  the	  incineration	  of	  the	  dead	  body	  gives	  people	  a	  way	  out	  of	  experiencing	  and	  logistically	  dealing	  with	  the	  physicality	  of	  death	  (HOD	  576).	  Furthermore,	  cremation	  enables	  families	  to	  separate	  themselves	  from	  death	  because	  there	  are	  no	  remains	  that	  could	  be	  visited,	  thus	  freeing	  those	  left	  behind	  of	  post-­‐funeral	  obligations	  to	  the	  deceased	  (HOD	  576).	  While	  it	  appears	  that	  destroying	  the	  body	  in	  cremation	  is	  opposite	  to	  preserving	  the	  body	  through	  embalming,	  Ariès	  sees	  both	  of	  these	  processes	  as	  a	  rejection	  of	  death.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  embalming	  and	  holding	  wakes	  have	  risen	  to	  prevalence	  in	  America,	  practices	  that	  are	  rare	  in	  modern	  Europe	  (WA	  98).	  Ariès	  suggests	  preserving	  and	  viewing	  the	  dead	  allows	  Americans	  to	  deny	  death	  before	  and	  during	  the	  funeral	  process	  because	  they	  can	  pretend	  the	  dead	  are	  still	  partially	  alive	  (WA	  102).	  He	  states,	  “embalming	  serves	  less	  to	  preserve	  or	  honor	  the	  dead	  than	  it	  does	  temporarily	  to	  maintain	  the	  appearance	  of	  life	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  living”	  (HOD	  600).	  While	  there	  are	  other	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  Europeans	  and	  Americans	  ritualistically	  handle	  the	  dead	  body,	  Ariès	  highlights	  the	  prominence	  of	  cremation	  in	  Europe	  and	  embalming	  in	  America	  to	  show	  that	  the	  motivation	  behind	  these	  typical	  modern	  Western	  practices	  is	  a	  severe	  denial	  of	  death.	  	  	   Our	  societal	  management	  of	  keeping	  death	  happy,	  clean,	  non-­‐disruptive,	  sedated,	  masked,	  and	  unburdening	  all	  point	  to	  our	  present	  perspective	  of	  death	  as	  a	  problem	  instead	  of	  a	  condition.	  Ariès	  explains,	  “Death	  has	  ceased	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  a	  natural,	  necessary	  phenomenon.	  Death	  is	  a	  failure	  […]	  an	  accident,	  a	  sign	  of	  helplessness	  or	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clumsiness	  that	  must	  be	  put	  out	  of	  mind”	  (HOD	  586).	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  Dastur	  argues	  that	  death	  and	  sickness	  have	  become	  defined	  as	  ‘objective’	  processes	  that	  happen	  to	  a	  person	  instead	  of	  as	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  human	  existence	  (11).	  Within	  the	  last	  few	  hundred	  years,	  death	  has	  transformed	  from	  an	  accepted	  fact	  of	  life	  to	  something	  we	  feel	  can	  be	  fixed	  and	  prevented,	  something	  that	  will	  not	  actually	  happen	  to	  us.	  Ariès	  describes	  that	  even	  though	  we	  admit	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  we	  will	  die,	  we	  actually	  feel	  that	  we	  are	  non-­‐mortals	  (WA	  106).	  Moreover,	  Ariès	  asserts	  that	  this	  modern	  denial	  of	  death	  and	  belief	  in	  our	  immortality	  has	  become	  “a	  significant	  trait	  of	  our	  culture”	  (HOD	  580).	  In	  our	  contemporary	  world,	  there	  exists	  a	  pervasive	  severe	  denial	  of	  all	  things	  relating	  to	  death,	  a	  death	  that	  has	  become	  wild,	  forbidden,	  and	  harmful	  to	  life.	  	  
	  
IV.	  Modern	  Denial	  of	  Death	  as	  Problematic	  	   Furthermore,	  Ariès	  believes	  this	  modern	  opinion	  of	  death	  as	  problematic	  is	  itself	  dangerous.	  He	  asserts	  that	  while	  we	  ceaselessly	  cling	  to	  our	  denial	  of	  death	  as	  if	  it	  is	  the	  key	  to	  preserving	  and	  promoting	  life,	  in	  actuality,	  “Our	  life	  is	  not	  as	  a	  result	  gladdened!”	  (WA	  106).	  Ariès	  explains	  that	  the	  way	  we	  conceptualize	  our	  death	  detrimentally	  affects	  how	  we	  perceive	  ourselves.	  In	  his	  adamant	  concern	  about	  the	  problems	  of	  our	  present	  formulation	  of	  death,	  Ariès	  goes	  beyond	  providing	  a	  fact-­‐based	  historical	  account.	  Specifically,	  he	  claims	  that	  the	  modern	  denial	  of	  death	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  “contemporary	  man’s	  recoil	  from	  the	  desire	  to	  exist”	  (WA	  107,	  also	  see	  HOD	  602).	  Ariès	  also	  expresses	  worry	  over	  the	  lack	  of	  social	  codes,	  expected	  rituals,	  and	  processes	  of	  dealing	  with	  emotion	  in	  our	  modern	  silencing	  of	  anything	  related	  to	  death.	  We	  no	  longer	  have	  a	  way	  to	  proactively	  deal	  with	  the	  major	  transitions	  involved	  with	  dying,	  so	  we	  now	  have	  no	  way	  to	  psychologically	  handle	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the	  mourning	  process,	  let	  alone	  a	  way	  to	  reconcile	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  too	  will	  die.	  Ariès	  proposes	  the	  covering	  over	  of	  death	  leads	  to	  unhealthy	  repression	  and	  sometimes	  even	  violent	  emotional	  outbursts	  (HOD	  579).	  	  Ariès	  finds	  support	  for	  his	  assertions	  about	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  denial	  of	  death	  in	  psychologists	  who,	  he	  claims,	  have	  always	  spoken	  out	  against	  the	  denial	  of	  death	  as	  psychologically	  damaging	  and	  problematic	  (HOD	  580).	  Ariès	  even	  postulates	  that	  our	  extreme	  denial	  is	  becoming	  so	  detrimental	  that	  it	  might	  lead	  to	  future	  social	  movements	  against	  our	  culture’s	  current	  erasure	  of	  death	  (HOD	  593).	  Through	  his	  detailed	  history	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  death,	  Ariès	  has	  illustrated	  that	  in	  our	  modern,	  Western	  world,	  death	  has	  become	  a	  severe	  taboo,	  and	  he,	  even	  as	  a	  historian,	  expresses	  deep	  concern	  about	  the	  sweeping	  implications	  of	  our	  denial.	  	   In	  terms	  of	  this	  thesis,	  Ariès’	  historical	  investigation	  of	  death	  in	  the	  Western	  world	  begins	  a	  conversation	  about	  how	  death	  affects	  our	  life.	  Most	  importantly,	  Ariès	  reveals	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  our	  concept	  of	  death	  in	  our	  modern	  society.	  We	  now	  perceive	  of	  death	  as	  unspeakable	  and	  wild,	  a	  problem	  instead	  of	  a	  basic	  aspect	  of	  existence.	  While	  fleeing	  from	  death	  may	  feel	  to	  us	  as	  if	  it	  is	  a	  permanent	  trait	  of	  our	  humanity,	  Ariès	  shows	  through	  his	  decades	  of	  research	  that	  we	  have	  not	  always	  rejected	  our	  mortality	  as	  we	  do	  now.	  In	  this	  way,	  Ariès	  exposes	  that	  perhaps	  our	  modern	  formulation	  could	  be	  changed.	  Indeed,	  Ariès	  even	  goes	  so	  far	  to	  say	  that	  our	  current	  denial	  of	  death	  is	  detrimental	  to	  how	  we	  deal	  with	  mourning,	  confront	  our	  mortality,	  conceive	  of	  ourselves,	  and	  live	  our	  lives.	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Chapter	  Two:	  Ernest	  Becker,	  Interdisciplinary	  Anthropologist:	  Denial	  of	  our	  Death	  
I.	  Introduction	  to	  Becker	  Anthropologist	  Ernest	  Becker	  (1924-­‐1974)	  is	  another	  academic	  who	  has	  focused	  on	  how	  our	  dealings	  with	  death	  greatly	  affect	  our	  lives.	  In	  1973	  Ernest	  Becker	  won	  the	  Pulitzer	  Prize	  for	  his	  book	  The	  Denial	  of	  Death	  in	  which,	  as	  the	  title	  suggests,	  he	  argues	  the	  most	  fundamental	  human	  motivation	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  our	  mortality.	  Becker	  believes	  that	  our	  thoughts,	  feelings,	  behaviors,	  and	  beliefs,	  both	  individually	  and	  culturally,	  are	  the	  result	  of	  our	  innate	  fleeing	  from	  our	  weak	  impermanent	  bodies	  and	  ultimate	  perishing.	  While	  Ariès	  highlights	  that	  our	  rejection	  of	  death	  is	  a	  fairly	  modern	  reaction,	  Becker	  makes	  a	  much	  broader	  claim	  that	  this	  fleeing	  from	  death	  is	  a	  constitution	  of	  the	  human	  condition.	  Despite	  this	  major	  difference,	  both	  of	  these	  thinkers	  are,	  at	  the	  most	  fundamental	  level,	  trying	  to	  expose	  the	  danger	  of	  denying	  death,	  whether	  it	  is	  an	  aspect	  of	  who	  we	  are	  today	  or	  who	  we	  are	  as	  a	  human	  species.	  Becker	  describes	  his	  work	  as	  an	  attempted	  synthesis	  of	  various	  areas	  of	  modern	  research	  in	  the	  social	  sciences.	  In	  his	  work	  he	  references	  a	  multitude	  of	  different	  types	  of	  thinkers	  and	  he	  himself	  approaches	  the	  topic	  of	  our	  mortality	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines.	  In	  particular,	  this	  thesis	  will	  look	  at	  how	  Becker	  uses	  the	  perspectives	  of	  developmental	  psychology,	  anthropology,	  abnormal	  psychology,	  personality	  psychology,	  social	  psychology,	  religion,	  and	  philosophy	  in	  his	  attempt	  to	  understand	  our	  denial	  of	  death.	  Becker’s	  interdisciplinary	  perspective	  was	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  hyper-­‐specialization	  Becker	  saw	  growing	  in	  academia	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s.	  Becker	  aimed	  to	  get	  “some	  kind	  of	  grip	  on	  the	  accumulation	  of	  thought	  [so]	  we	  [will	  not]	  continue	  to	  wallow	  helplessly,	  to	  starve	  amidst	  plenty”	  (EE	  xix).	  Becker	  knew	  he	  was	  taking	  a	  big	  risk	  in	  postulating	  such	  a	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large	  theory,	  but	  instead	  of	  presenting	  clean	  data	  and	  discovering	  immaculately	  objective	  scientific	  facts,	  Becker	  wanted	  to	  try	  to	  get	  more	  of	  a	  grasp	  on	  the	  question	  of	  who	  we	  are	  as	  human	  beings	  and	  what	  we	  can	  and	  should	  do	  about	  it.	  	  Because	  Becker	  is	  making	  broad	  declarations	  about	  humanity	  at	  large,	  he	  has	  not	  been	  the	  most	  accepted	  and	  praised	  thinker.	  There	  are	  many	  academics	  who	  criticize	  Becker	  for	  being	  irrelevant,	  un-­‐scientific,	  or	  too	  negative.	  Becker	  himself	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  criticism	  that	  his	  bold	  and	  wide-­‐ranging	  claims	  would	  provoke.	  In	  an	  introduction	  to	  one	  of	  his	  books	  he	  even	  confesses,	  “I	  have	  reached	  far	  beyond	  my	  competence”	  (EE	  xix).	  While	  it	  is	  problematic	  to	  make	  an	  over-­‐arching	  claim	  regarding	  human	  nature,	  Becker’s	  basic	  ideas	  challenge	  and	  lead	  credence	  to	  Ariès’	  conceptualization	  of	  our	  denial	  of	  death.	  	  Despite	  the	  debatable	  aspects	  of	  his	  theory,	  Becker’s	  work	  has	  made	  an	  impact	  in	  many	  fields.	  Daniel	  Liechty	  suggests	  that	  while	  Becker	  is	  not	  the	  first	  to	  postulate	  the	  theory	  of	  Generative	  Death	  Anxiety,	  he	  is	  the	  primary	  theorist	  who	  has	  elucidated	  and	  pushed	  this	  theory	  forward	  (xi).	  Liechty	  describes,	  “In	  every	  field	  of	  the	  humanities	  and	  social	  sciences,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  Becker’s	  ideas”	  (xi).	  Indeed,	  an	  Ernest	  Becker	  Foundation	  was	  founded	  in	  1993,	  which	  is	  still	  actively	  discussing	  Becker’s	  ideas	  and	  influences	  (see	  ernestbecker.org).	  Therefore,	  even	  though	  Becker	  has	  been	  completely	  dismissed	  by	  many	  academics,	  many	  others	  have	  fallen	  so	  in	  love	  with	  his	  ideas	  that	  they	  have	  placed	  them	  at	  the	  center	  of	  their	  own	  life’s	  work.	  This	  chapter	  describes	  the	  basics	  of	  Becker’s	  theory	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  what	  about	  his	  work	  resonates	  across	  the	  disciplines	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  shed	  further	  light	  on	  how	  death	  affects	  life.	  	  	  
II.	  Denial	  of	  Death	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A.	  Existential	  Tension	  The	  basis	  of	  Becker’s	  theory,	  like	  the	  theories	  of	  many	  other	  thinkers	  before	  him,	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  humans	  are	  creatures	  fundamentally	  in	  tension.	  However,	  Becker’s	  theory	  is	  distinctive	  in	  the	  claim	  that	  this	  tension	  stems	  from	  our	  mortality.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  humans	  have	  an	  extraordinary	  brain,	  which	  enables	  them	  to	  be	  conscious	  of	  the	  fact	  they	  will	  someday	  die.	  As	  far	  as	  we	  know,	  this	  awareness	  of	  our	  death	  sets	  humans	  apart	  from	  other	  animals.	  Becker	  postulates	  that	  our	  foreknowledge	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  evolutionary	  advantageous	  fear	  of	  dying	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  better	  avoid	  life-­‐threatening	  situations.	  Yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  brain	  also	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  limit	  the	  overwhelming	  aspect	  of	  the	  awareness	  of	  death.	  In	  other	  words,	  just	  as	  there	  is	  adaptive	  value	  in	  having	  anxiety	  of	  our	  mortality,	  Becker	  asserts	  this	  anxiety	  must	  also	  be	  kept	  under	  enough	  control	  for	  us	  to	  go	  about	  our	  daily	  lives	  (BDM	  42).	  He	  explains,	  “[T]he	  fear	  of	  death	  must	  be	  present	  behind	  all	  our	  normal	  functioning,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  organism	  to	  be	  armed	  toward	  self-­‐preservation.	  But	  the	  fear	  of	  death	  cannot	  be	  present	  constantly	  in	  one’s	  mental	  functioning,	  else	  the	  organism	  could	  not	  function”	  (DD	  16).	  Coming	  primarily	  from	  the	  discipline	  of	  anthropology,	  the	  foundation	  of	  Becker’s	  theory	  proposes	  that	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  propagating	  the	  species,	  humans	  have	  biologically	  evolved	  into	  animals	  fundamentally	  in	  tension:	  we	  must	  both	  uncover	  that	  we	  will	  die	  and	  must	  also	  cover	  the	  fact	  we	  will	  die.	  Another	  way	  Becker	  illustrates	  our	  existential	  tension	  is	  by	  describing	  humans	  as	  “gods	  with	  anuses”	  (DD	  51).	  Regardless	  of	  who	  we	  are	  or	  what	  we	  do	  in	  our	  lives,	  we	  must	  all	  defecate.	  Becker	  suggests	  that,	  as	  a	  result,	  our	  anus	  proves	  to	  each	  of	  us	  that	  we	  have	  limited	  control	  over	  ourselves.	  Every	  day	  when	  we	  excrete	  our	  waste,	  we	  confront	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  bound	  to	  a	  finite	  animal	  body	  (DD	  31).	  Yet,	  Becker	  argues	  that	  we	  also	  have	  a	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perceived	  sense	  of	  godliness.	  He	  claims	  that	  we	  feel	  we	  are	  distinct	  from	  and	  superior	  to	  other	  animals,	  that	  we	  are	  not	  mere	  mortal	  defecating	  creatures.	  In	  this	  way,	  Becker	  sees	  our	  existential	  tension	  as	  this	  push	  and	  pull	  between	  our	  actual	  creatureliness	  and	  assumed	  godliness.	  He	  states,	  “The	  tragedy	  of	  evolution	  is	  that	  it	  created	  a	  limited	  animal	  with	  unlimited	  horizons”	  (EE	  153).	  Becker	  believes	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  constantly	  reconcile	  the	  desire	  to	  heighten	  our	  sense	  of	  immortal	  specialness	  with	  the	  confining	  demands	  of	  our	  animal	  condition,	  and	  that	  this	  helps	  us	  to	  necessarily	  deny	  our	  death.	  	  
B.	  Developmental	  Psychology:	  Socialization	  Yet,	  how	  do	  we	  deal	  with	  our	  existential	  tension?	  How	  do	  we	  reconcile	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  constrained	  to	  our	  body?	  How	  do	  we	  limit	  the	  overwhelming	  foreknowledge	  of	  our	  mortality?	  In	  short,	  how	  do	  we	  deny	  our	  death?	  Becker	  understands	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  as	  an	  adoption	  of	  a	  particular	  culture	  through	  socialization.	  Socialization	  is	  the	  process	  whereby	  a	  person	  comes	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  an	  adult	  in	  society,	  which,	  according	  to	  Becker,	  occurs	  when	  a	  child	  gives	  up	  their	  bodily	  freedom	  and	  adopts	  the	  symbolic	  system	  of	  their	  culture	  (BDM	  52).	  Becker	  explains,	  “[The	  baby’s]	  ego	  develops	  by	  learning	  to	  regulate	  [their]	  own	  food	  intake	  and	  feces	  evacuation:	  [they	  have]	  to	  learn	  to	  adapt	  to	  a	  social	  schedule,	  to	  an	  external	  measure	  of	  time,	  in	  place	  of	  a	  biological	  schedule	  of	  internal	  urges”	  (BDM	  40).	  Once	  a	  person	  pushes	  down	  and	  limits	  their	  animality,	  they	  can	  become	  a	  part	  of	  the	  cultural	  immortality.	  Becker	  says,	  “If	  [they	  are]	  to	  expand	  and	  grow	  in	  such	  a	  world	  [they	  have]	  to	  replace	  [their]	  own	  authentic	  movement	  with	  a	  fictional	  framework	  of	  value”	  (BDM	  61),	  and,	  as	  such,	  “[practice]	  self-­‐deceit”	  (DD	  46).	  An	  adult	  is	  someone,	  according	  to	  Becker,	  who	  tries	  to	  free	  themselves	  from	  their	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overwhelming	  foreknowledge	  of	  death	  by	  imprisoning	  themselves	  within	  a	  cultural	  system	  that	  helps	  to	  cover	  over	  their	  awareness.	  	  Because	  the	  socialization	  process	  involves	  deceiving	  oneself,	  Becker	  explains	  “the	  
humanization	  process	  itself	  is	  […]	  neurosis:	  the	  limitation	  of	  experience,	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  perception,	  the	  dispossession	  of	  genuine	  internal	  control”	  (BDM	  56).	  In	  this	  way,	  Becker	  sees	  socialization	  as	  a	  process	  of	  becoming	  mad,	  of	  accepting	  the	  “shared	  madness”	  of	  one’s	  culture	  (DD	  27).	  On	  top	  of	  the	  neurotic	  adoption	  of	  a	  cultural	  system	  to	  deny	  our	  death,	  Becker	  points	  out	  we	  are	  even	  more	  insane	  for	  still	  knowing	  we	  will	  die.	  In	  other	  words,	  Becker	  argues	  that	  we	  could	  all	  be	  considered	  crazy	  for	  feeling	  that	  we	  can	  overcome	  death	  and	  yet	  also	  know	  that	  we	  cannot.	  However,	  Becker	  views	  this	  madness	  as	  a	  requirement	  for	  life.	  He	  asserts	  the	  “essence	  of	  normality	  is	  the	  refusal	  of	  reality”	  (DD	  178),	  and	  he	  describes	  the	  cultural	  system	  as	  a	  necessary	  fiction,	  “a	  vital	  lie”	  (DD	  47).2	  While	  Becker	  gives	  credit	  to	  Freud	  for	  first	  proclaiming	  that	  neurosis	  and	  denial	  are	  normal,	  Becker	  proposes	  Freud	  was	  mistaken	  in	  thinking	  that	  neurosis	  and	  denial	  are	  caused	  by	  sexual	  instincts.	  Instead,	  Becker	  insists	  that	  what	  we	  consider	  healthy	  socialization	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  shared	  madness,	  for	  it	  is	  centrally	  a	  denial	  of	  death.	  	  	  
C.	  Anthropology:	  Culture	  Essentially,	  Becker	  understands	  that	  culture	  facilitates	  our	  denial	  of	  death	  in	  that	  it	  heightens	  our	  feeling	  of	  immortality.	  A	  particular	  way	  that	  culture	  increases	  our	  assumed	  godliness	  is	  through	  an	  identity	  with	  an	  immortal	  being	  that	  lives	  beyond	  our	  physical	  bodies.	  Becker	  explains	  that	  culture	  provides	  “an	  antidote	  to	  terror	  by	  giving	  [its	  members]	  a	  new	  and	  durable	  life	  beyond	  that	  of	  the	  body”	  (EE	  92).	  Culture	  acts	  as	  a	  transcendent	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organism	  that	  we	  become	  a	  part	  and	  which	  continues	  to	  exist	  long	  after	  we	  as	  individuals	  die	  (EE	  3).	  In	  this	  way,	  “Culture	  means	  that	  which	  is	  supernatural;	  all	  culture	  has	  the	  basic	  mandate	  to	  transcend	  the	  physical,	  to	  permanently	  transcend	  it”	  (EE	  64).	  Through	  culture,	  we	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  despite	  our	  bodily	  death,	  we	  will	  continue	  to	  live	  on	  in	  the	  immortality	  of	  our	  society.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  symbolic	  perpetuation	  after	  death,	  Becker	  asserts	  that	  culture	  also	  provides	  a	  more	  personal	  sense	  of	  immortality	  by	  enabling	  its	  members	  to	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  living	  on	  a	  godly,	  righteous,	  heroic	  path.	  Becker	  defines	  culture	  as	  “a	  symbolic	  action	  system,	  a	  structure	  of	  statuses	  and	  roles,	  customs	  and	  rules	  for	  behavior”	  (DD	  4;	  also	  see	  BDM	  78).	  In	  other	  words,	  culture	  creates	  a	  system	  of	  meaning	  that	  a	  person	  needs	  in	  order	  to	  act	  at	  all,	  to	  engage	  and	  navigate	  their	  world,	  and	  to	  know	  what	  and	  how	  to	  do	  anything.	  Most	  basically,	  Becker	  defines	  culture	  as	  a	  system	  of	  meaning	  that	  prescribes	  a	  right	  way	  to	  live,	  and	  in	  this	  way	  is	  a	  “codified	  hero	  system”	  (DD	  7).	  Culture	  imbues	  its	  members	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  heroism,	  so	  they	  come	  to	  feel	  they	  are	  heroes	  fighting	  Evil	  and	  promoting	  Good.	  Being	  a	  hero	  exaggerates	  a	  person’s	  feeling	  that	  they	  are	  immortal	  and	  godly,	  and	  provides	  them	  with	  a	  sense	  that	  their	  lives	  are	  meaningful	  and	  significant	  (DD	  7).	  Furthermore,	  feeling	  like	  a	  hero	  allows	  people	  to	  view	  themselves	  as	  superior	  and	  more	  civilized	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  animal	  kingdom,	  which	  enables	  them	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  their	  mortal	  animality	  (DD	  159).	  In	  total,	  Becker	  proposes	  that	  the	  heroic	  path	  of	  culture	  enables	  people	  to	  deal	  with	  their	  existential	  tension	  by	  providing	  a	  way	  to	  deny	  one’s	  death	  in	  an	  exaggeration	  of	  one’s	  special,	  immortal,	  righteous,	  godliness	  and	  thus	  a	  repressing	  of	  one’s	  meaningless,	  mortal,	  animality.	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Beyond	  describing	  the	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  as	  the	  general	  way	  in	  which	  we	  deny	  our	  death,	  Becker	  illustrates	  that	  we	  fetishize	  specific	  cultural	  heroes	  in	  order	  to	  flee	  from	  the	  awareness	  of	  our	  death.	  Becker	  says,	  “Whatever	  idols	  [people	  remain]	  rooted	  to	  are	  idols	  designed	  precisely	  to	  hide	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  despair	  of	  [their]	  condition;	  all	  the	  frantic	  and	  obsessive	  activity	  of	  daily	  life,	  in	  whatever	  country,	  under	  whatever	  ideology,	  is	  a	  defense	  against	  full	  self-­‐consciousness”	  (BDM	  194).	  Becker	  clarifies	  that	  through	  transference,	  we	  place	  our	  perceived	  godliness	  onto	  a	  fetish	  object,	  so	  in	  our	  attachment	  to	  the	  fetishization,	  we	  can	  enhance	  our	  feeling	  that	  we	  are	  immortal,	  which	  in	  turn	  also	  helps	  us	  to	  repress	  our	  finite	  animality.	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  person	  fetishizes	  a	  charismatic	  political	  leader,	  they	  come	  view	  the	  politician	  as	  god-­‐like.	  Then,	  in	  serving	  the	  goals	  of	  this	  god-­‐like	  politician,	  people	  will	  feel	  that	  they	  too	  are	  on	  a	  cosmically	  righteous	  path.	  This	  connection	  to	  an	  entity	  they	  believe	  is	  like	  a	  god	  enhances	  their	  own	  sense	  of	  immortality.	  Furthermore,	  in	  promoting	  the	  political	  leader,	  they	  also	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  their	  god-­‐like	  hero	  will	  be	  able	  to	  protect	  them	  from	  death,	  thus	  downplaying	  their	  animal	  mortality.	  In	  this	  way,	  having	  an	  idol	  or	  fetish	  denies	  death	  in	  a	  process	  similar	  to	  culture	  in	  general.	  Fetishizing	  specific	  cultural	  heroes	  exaggerates	  one’s	  connection	  to	  the	  immortal	  cosmos,	  which	  allows	  a	  person	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  their	  creatureliness,	  thus	  assisting	  in	  the	  denial	  of	  their	  death	  (DD	  155).	  	  	  
D.	  Abnormal	  Psychology:	  Mental	  Illness	  As	  previously	  explained,	  Becker	  claims	  that	  we	  are	  all	  generally	  mad	  because	  we	  deny	  our	  death.	  Moreover,	  he	  also	  asserts	  that	  everyone	  will,	  at	  some	  point	  in	  their	  lives,	  experience	  a	  tear	  in	  the	  protective	  covering	  of	  their	  heroic	  cultural	  system	  and	  also	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breakdown	  into	  personal	  mental	  instability.	  Becker	  explains	  that	  no	  matter	  what	  kind	  of	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  is	  adopted,	  everyone’s	  form	  of	  a	  denial	  of	  death	  will	  eventually	  falter	  (DD	  179).	  These	  moments	  of	  being	  overwhelmed	  and	  debilitated	  by	  the	  truths	  of	  existence	  are	  usually	  brief,	  and	  a	  person	  is	  often	  able	  to	  reinvigorate	  their	  old	  solution	  or	  find	  new	  ways	  to	  cope	  with	  their	  existential	  tension.	  	   If	  a	  person	  cannot	  remedy	  his	  or	  her	  neurotic	  break	  quickly,	  then	  they	  risk	  becoming	  mentally	  ill.	  Becker	  sees	  abnormal	  psychology	  as	  “the	  failures	  of	  death	  transcendence”	  in	  that	  those	  who	  are	  mentally	  ill	  are	  “unable	  to	  exercise	  the	  ‘normal	  cultural	  heroism’”	  (DD	  248;	  see	  also	  DD	  209).	  In	  other	  words,	  Becker	  understands	  mental	  illness	  as	  an	  inability	  to	  cover	  over	  the	  truth	  of	  existence,	  which	  is	  necessary	  to	  be	  fully	  integrated	  into	  a	  culture.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  realize	  that	  Becker	  does	  not	  think	  the	  lack	  or	  deficiency	  of	  a	  system	  to	  deny	  one’s	  death	  is	  a	  conscious	  decision.	  Instead,	  he	  sees	  mental	  illness	  as	  an	  imbalance	  of	  one’s	  existential	  tension,	  likely	  resulting	  from	  issues	  in	  childhood	  socialization	  (DD	  182).	  	  Depression	  is	  one	  example	  of	  a	  mental	  illness	  Becker	  explains	  that	  results	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  way	  to	  deny	  one’s	  death.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  denial	  in	  depression	  results	  because	  the	  depressed	  person	  is	  trying	  to	  deny	  their	  need	  for	  a	  denial.	  In	  attempt	  to	  limit	  the	  overwhelming	  aspects	  of	  their	  existence,	  they	  restrict	  their	  engagement	  with	  the	  world	  and	  thus	  are	  unable	  to	  adequately	  function.	  In	  short,	  the	  depressed	  person	  tries	  not	  to	  live,	  so	  they	  will	  not	  die.	  	  In	  addition,	  Becker	  describes	  the	  mental	  illness	  of	  schizophrenia,	  which	  he	  also	  sees	  as	  involving	  a	  rejection	  of	  any	  form	  of	  death	  denial.	  Becker	  believes	  schizophrenics	  oftentimes	  reject	  a	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  because	  they	  do	  not	  consider	  themselves	  mortal	  humans	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that	  require	  denial.	  Becker	  states,	  “The	  full-­‐blown	  schizophrenic	  is	  abstract,	  ethereal,	  unreal;	  he	  billows	  out	  of	  the	  earthly	  categories	  of	  space	  and	  time,	  floats	  out	  of	  his	  body,	  dwells	  in	  an	  eternal	  now,	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  death	  and	  destruction”	  (DD	  76).	  In	  the	  way	  that	  Becker	  understands	  depression	  as	  an	  excessive	  embracing	  of	  mortality	  and	  perceiving	  too	  much	  limitation,	  he	  believes	  schizophrenia	  is	  an	  excessive	  sense	  of	  immortality	  and	  perceiving	  too	  much	  freedom.	  Therefore,	  Becker	  views	  both	  depression	  and	  schizophrenia	  as	  an	  inability	  to	  adequately	  reconcile	  existential	  tension.	  Said	  differently,	  Becker	  understands	  these	  mental	  illnesses	  as	  resulting	  from	  an	  incapacity	  to	  balance	  between	  a	  necessary	  sense	  of	  immortality	  and	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  our	  mortality.	  In	  this	  way,	  Becker	  claims	  that	  mental	  illness	  is	  representative	  of	  an	  inadequate	  denial	  of	  death.	  Becker	  argues	  that	  the	  insufficient	  denial	  involved	  in	  depression	  and	  schizophrenia	  is	  problematic	  in	  that	  it	  disables	  a	  person	  from	  moving	  forward,	  growing,	  making	  choices	  and	  functioning	  in	  society	  (DD	  179).	  However,	  Becker	  also	  claims	  that	  this	  lack	  of	  adequate	  death	  denial	  in	  mental	  illness	  means	  that	  people	  with	  mental	  illness	  are	  more	  honest	  about	  their	  mortal	  condition	  than	  people	  who	  adopt	  a	  healthier	  cultural	  heroic	  system.	  Becker	  agrees	  with	  Otto	  Rank	  that	  these	  psychological	  ailments	  are,	  “much	  nearer	  to	  the	  actual	  truth	  psychologically	  than	  the	  others	  and	  it	  is	  just	  that	  from	  which	  [they	  suffer]’”	  (qtd.	  in	  DD	  176).	  Because	  they	  are	  too	  honest,	  either	  about	  their	  animal	  nature	  or	  their	  extraordinary	  god-­‐like	  ability	  or	  both,	  Becker	  believes	  that	  people	  who	  suffer	  from	  mental	  illness	  are	  unable	  to	  navigate	  the	  complex	  need	  to	  both	  be	  aware	  of	  death	  and	  also	  deny	  it.	  	  	  
E.	  Personality	  Psychology:	  Personalities	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Interestingly,	  Becker	  defines	  various	  types	  of	  personalities	  in	  a	  way	  that	  seems	  as	  if	  he	  sees	  them	  on	  a	  continuum	  with	  mental	  illness.	  He	  illustrates	  certain	  everyday	  kinds	  of	  people	  as	  acting	  similar	  to	  but	  milder	  versions	  of	  schizophrenia	  and	  depression.	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  seems	  Becker	  views	  personality	  as	  also	  fundamentally	  affected	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  people	  deny	  their	  death.	  As	  a	  result,	  Becker	  views	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  our	  socialization	  into	  a	  specific	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  in	  general	  (i.e.	  culture),	  we	  also	  individually	  interact	  with	  our	  cultural	  system	  (i.e.	  personality).	  He	  views	  both	  our	  cultural	  and	  personality	  identities	  as	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  navigate	  the	  complexity	  of	  knowing	  about	  our	  death	  and	  simultaneously	  covering	  over	  our	  awareness.	  	  One	  way	  in	  which	  it	  seems	  Becker	  sees	  a	  continuum	  between	  personality	  and	  mental	  illness	  is	  his	  description	  of	  the	  “automatic	  cultural	  man”	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  them	  sound	  like	  a	  person	  with	  less	  severe	  depression.	  Becker	  explains	  the	  “automatic	  cultural	  man”	  is	  a	  typical	  person	  who	  thoughtlessly	  adopts	  their	  culture’s	  pre-­‐made	  heroes.	  He	  states	  “people	  need	  a	  ‘beyond,’	  but	  they	  reach	  first	  for	  the	  nearest	  one;	  this	  gives	  them	  the	  fulfillment	  they	  need	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  limits	  and	  enslaves	  them”	  (DD	  169).	  In	  this	  way,	  Becker	  thinks	  people	  tend	  to	  automatically	  surrender	  to	  what	  their	  culture	  prescribes	  as	  the	  right	  way	  to	  live.	  He	  describes	  that	  the	  automatic	  cultural	  person	  keeps	  their	  heads	  down,	  does	  not	  ask	  questions,	  and	  robotically	  engages	  with	  their	  world	  (DD	  73).	  Similar	  to	  a	  person	  with	  depression,	  this	  “normal”	  person	  is	  “[tranquilized]	  with	  the	  trivial”	  (DD	  79).	  Furthermore,	  Becker	  understands	  that	  the	  automatic	  cultural	  man,	  also	  like	  a	  person	  with	  depression,	  limits	  life	  in	  order	  to	  flee	  from	  the	  terror	  of	  death	  (DD	  81).3	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  seems	  that	  Becker	  understands	  depression	  as	  an	  extreme	  version	  of	  the	  automatic	  cultural	  man.	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Considering	  the	  similarity,	  this	  might	  also	  mean	  the	  automatic	  cultural	  man	  might	  be	  more	  prone	  to	  slipping	  into	  depression	  if	  their	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  falters.	  	  	   Another	  way	  it	  seems	  that	  Becker	  views	  personality	  as	  a	  milder	  version	  of	  mental	  illness	  is	  through	  his	  similar	  explanations	  of	  creative	  people	  and	  schizophrenics.	  In	  his	  description	  of	  cultural	  heroes,	  Becker	  titles	  our	  specific	  fetishizations	  as	  types	  of	  ‘solutions’	  to	  our	  existential	  tension	  in	  that	  they	  limit	  the	  overwhelming	  knowledge	  of	  our	  death	  by	  providing	  us	  with	  the	  vital	  delusion	  we	  will	  not	  die.	  One	  primary	  ‘solution’	  Becker	  delineates	  is	  the	  creative	  solution.	  The	  creative	  solution	  is	  defined	  by	  Becker	  as	  the	  rejection	  of	  any	  premade	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  and	  construction	  of	  one’s	  own.	  Becker	  explains	  that	  a	  creative	  person	  is	  “separated	  out	  of	  the	  common	  pool	  of	  shared	  meanings.	  There	  is	  something	  in	  [their]	  life	  experience	  that	  makes	  [them]	  take	  in	  the	  world	  as	  a	  
problem;	  as	  a	  result	  [they	  have]	  to	  make	  personal	  sense	  out	  of	  it”	  (DD	  171).	  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  creative	  person	  deals	  with	  their	  existential	  tension	  is	  by	  making	  themselves	  their	  fetishization.	  Because	  the	  creative	  solution	  involves	  being	  one’s	  own	  hero,	  the	  creative	  individual	  burdens	  themself	  with	  the	  role	  of	  the	  immortal.	  That	  is,	  the	  creative	  person	  must	  construct	  a	  system	  that	  highlights	  their	  own	  assumed	  godliness	  in	  order	  to	  exaggerate	  their	  feeling	  of	  immortality	  so	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  deny	  their	  death.	  	  The	  task	  of	  the	  creative	  solution	  is	  no	  easy	  feat,	  and	  even	  when	  it	  is	  accomplished,	  it	  is	  incredibly	  difficult	  to	  maintain.	  Becker	  states,	  the	  creative	  solution	  “takes	  a	  strength	  and	  courage	  the	  average	  man	  doesn’t	  have	  and	  couldn’t	  even	  understand”	  (DD	  171).	  Considering	  how	  challenging	  it	  is,	  Becker	  asserts	  that	  the	  creative	  solution	  is	  the	  most	  uncommon	  and	  dangerous	  form	  of	  death	  denial.	  In	  particular,	  because	  it	  is	  so	  hard	  to	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perpetuate	  the	  creative	  solution,	  the	  creative	  person	  is	  always	  at	  risk	  of	  falling	  into	  mental	  instability,	  perhaps	  even	  becoming	  schizophrenic.	  	  As	  previously	  explained,	  Becker	  views	  schizophrenics	  as	  people	  who	  do	  not	  create	  forms	  of	  death	  denial	  because	  they	  do	  not	  think	  they	  require	  one.	  Even	  though	  the	  creative	  person	  does	  adopt	  another	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  their	  existential	  tension,	  they	  are	  similar	  to	  schizophrenics	  in	  that	  they	  feel	  capable	  enough	  to	  handle	  facing	  their	  life	  in	  their	  own	  way.	  Given	  that	  Becker	  describes	  both	  as	  involving	  agency	  over	  one’s	  denial,	  it	  seems	  that	  Becker	  understands	  schizophrenia	  as	  a	  failed	  attempt	  at	  the	  creative	  solution.	  Therefore,	  in	  this	  way	  it	  also	  seems	  that	  if	  a	  creative	  person	  were	  ever	  to	  fail	  at	  constructing	  a	  new	  form	  of	  death	  denial,	  they	  could	  potentially	  fall	  into	  schizophrenia.	  	  A	  different	  outcome	  of	  a	  malfunctioning	  creative	  solution	  seems	  to	  be	  what	  Becker	  calls	  the	  person	  of	  “demoniac	  rage”	  (DD	  84).	  He	  explains	  a	  person	  of	  demoniac	  rage	  as	  someone	  who	  tries	  to	  both	  make	  themselves	  their	  own	  God	  and	  also	  reasserts	  the	  vitality	  of	  their	  animality.	  Their	  demoniac	  system	  does	  not	  fully	  work	  to	  deny	  death	  because	  the	  extremeness	  makes	  it	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  maintain	  the	  balanced	  tension	  between	  one’s	  creatureliness	  and	  assumed	  godliness,	  thus	  putting	  them	  at	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  schizophrenia.	  A	  milder	  result	  of	  a	  failed	  creative	  solution	  appears	  to	  be	  what	  Becker	  titles	  the	  “introvert	  man”	  (DD	  82).	  He	  describes	  the	  introvert	  person	  as	  someone	  who	  looks	  inwardly	  to	  try	  to	  deal	  with	  life	  and	  death	  with	  their	  own	  solution.	  Becker	  explains	  that	  teenagers	  often	  try	  this	  more	  authentic	  route,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  so	  hard	  to	  sustain,	  they	  eventually	  fall	  into	  the	  normal	  premade	  heroic	  system	  and	  become	  thoughtless	  automatic	  cultural	  people.	  	  In	  short,	  Becker	  seems	  to	  understand	  different	  personality	  types	  as	  arising	  from	  the	  attempt	  to	  balance	  one’s	  existential	  tension.	  Sometimes	  people	  heighten	  one’s	  assumed	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godliness	  and/or	  enhance	  one’s	  mortal	  animality	  either	  too	  much	  or	  too	  little.	  Taking	  together	  his	  theory	  of	  mental	  illness	  and	  his	  perspective	  of	  personality,	  it	  seems	  that	  Becker	  sees	  a	  continuum	  from	  normal	  tendencies	  to	  severe	  mental	  illness,	  such	  as	  from	  common	  teenage	  transitions	  to	  schizophrenia	  or	  the	  typical	  automatic	  adopting	  of	  a	  premade	  cultural	  system	  to	  depression.	  A	  person	  will	  fall	  at	  any	  point	  along	  this	  continuum	  depending	  on	  the	  magnitude	  of	  their	  rejection/acceptance	  of	  a	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  and	  their	  ability/inability	  to	  construct	  an	  adequate	  new	  form	  of	  death	  denial.	  Becker	  states,	  “Once	  you	  accept	  the	  truly	  desperate	  situation	  that	  man	  is	  in,	  you	  come	  to	  see	  not	  only	  that	  neurosis	  is	  normal,	  but	  that	  even	  psychotic	  failure	  represents	  only	  a	  little	  additional	  push	  in	  the	  routine	  stumbling	  along	  life’s	  way”	  (DD	  269).	  Every	  form	  of	  death	  denial	  eventually	  falters,	  so	  each	  of	  us	  sometimes	  experiences	  existential	  turmoil.	  We	  often	  can	  remedy	  this	  break	  in	  our	  protective	  covering.	  However,	  if	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  construct	  or	  repair	  our	  form	  of	  death	  denial,	  then	  our	  personality	  might	  become	  more	  extreme	  or	  perhaps	  we	  will	  become	  more	  severely	  mental	  ill.	  In	  this	  way,	  Becker	  believes	  an	  adequate	  denial	  of	  death	  is	  necessary	  for	  psychological	  health.4	  	  
	  
III.	  Protection	  of	  Death	  Denial	  
A.	  Opposing	  Others	  to	  Maintain	  our	  Death	  Denial	  Considering	  the	  psychological	  importance	  of	  our	  death	  of	  denial,	  Becker	  also	  spends	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  his	  theorizing	  describing	  the	  necessity	  of	  bolstering	  and	  protecting	  our	  particular	  cultural	  heroic	  systems	  that	  help	  us	  to	  necessarily	  deny	  our	  death.	  If	  our	  system	  is	  threatened,	  then	  our	  vital	  sense	  of	  immortality	  is	  threatened.	  Becker	  explains,	  “No	  wonder	  [people]	  go	  into	  a	  rage	  over	  fine	  points	  of	  belief:	  if	  your	  adversary	  wins	  the	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argument	  about	  truth,	  you	  die.	  Your	  immortality	  system	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  fallible,	  your	  life	  becomes	  fallible”	  (EE	  64).	  Consequently,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  continue	  fleeing	  from	  death,	  we	  aggress,	  evangelize,	  or	  annihilate	  any	  other	  ideology	  that	  goes	  against	  our	  own.	  We	  play	  the	  role	  of	  the	  hero,	  battling	  against	  all	  who	  threaten	  our	  cultural	  system.	  Becker	  asserts,	  “man’s	  natural	  and	  inevitable	  urge	  to	  deny	  mortality	  and	  achieve	  a	  heroic	  self-­‐image	  are	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  human	  evil”	  (EE	  xvii).	  In	  this	  way,	  Becker	  proposes	  that	  evil	  comes	  from	  an	  insecurity	  of	  our	  mortal	  vulnerability.	  Our	  heroic	  projects	  aimed	  at	  destroying	  ‘evil’,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  our	  creatureliness	  and	  death,	  have	  the	  paradoxical	  effect	  of	  bringing	  more	  ‘evil’	  into	  the	  world,	  through	  the	  harming	  of	  others	  (EE	  136).5	  	  
B.	  How	  we	  Protect	  our	  Denial	  of	  Death	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  Becker	  believes	  we	  create	  a	  solution	  to	  our	  existential	  tension	  by	  constructing	  a	  transference	  fetish	  object,	  typically	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  God,	  a	  beloved,	  an	  authority,	  or	  ourselves.	  Although	  he	  does	  not	  clearly	  explain	  it,	  it	  seems	  Becker	  also	  believes	  we	  have	  another	  transference	  object.	  The	  previously	  explained	  idol	  fetish	  works	  positively	  to	  achieve	  death	  denial	  through	  connection	  to	  a	  God-­‐like	  entity,	  which	  enables	  a	  feeling	  of	  immortality.	  However,	  this	  additional	  transference	  object	  works	  negatively	  to	  accomplish	  death	  denial	  by	  rejecting	  an	  animal-­‐like	  Other,	  which	  enables	  a	  feeling	  that	  one	  is	  not	  mortal.	  Becker	  says,	  “It	  is	  precisely	  the	  split-­‐off	  sense	  of	  inferiority	  and	  animality	  which	  is	  projected	  onto	  the	  scapegoat	  and	  then	  destroyed	  symbolically	  with	  him”	  (EE	  95).	  We	  can	  distance	  ourselves	  from	  our	  terrifying	  demise	  by	  acting	  against	  our	  mortality	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  transference	  object	  Other.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  Other	  becomes	  the	  fallible,	  creaturely	  mortal,	  and	  we	  become	  the	  righteous,	  immortal	  heroes.	  Becker	  says,	  “all	  those	  who	  join	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together	  under	  one	  banner	  are	  alike	  and	  so	  qualify	  for	  the	  privilege	  of	  immortality;	  all	  those	  who	  are	  different	  and	  outside	  that	  banner	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  blessings	  of	  eternity”	  (EE	  113).	  In	  order	  to	  protect	  our	  cultural	  system,	  Becker	  argues	  that	  we	  must	  justify	  to	  ourselves	  that	  our	  system	  is	  the	  correct	  one.	  We	  come	  to	  think	  I	  am	  just	  and	  they	  are	  unjust,	  I	  know	  and	  they	  do	  not,	  I	  am	  right	  and	  they	  are	  wrong,	  I	  am	  good	  and	  they	  are	  evil.	  In	  this	  oppositional	  way,	  we	  come	  to	  push	  the	  Other	  down	  in	  order	  to	  raise	  ourselves	  up.	  	   Oftentimes	  this	  spurn	  manifests	  through	  the	  view	  that	  the	  Other	  is	  “animalistic,”	  “barbaric,”	  and	  “uncivilized.”	  Becker	  does	  not	  go	  into	  much	  detail	  about	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  constructing	  an	  Other,	  but	  contemporary	  social	  psychological	  research	  supplements	  his	  basic	  idea.	  In	  particular,	  social	  psychology	  proposes	  we	  especially	  reject	  Others	  through	  cognitive	  biases.	  For	  example,	  the	  fundamental	  attribution	  error	  is	  the	  tendency	  to	  attribute	  someone’s	  behavior	  to	  permanent	  personality	  traits	  and	  underestimate	  the	  effects	  of	  situational	  factors.6	  Therefore,	  if	  a	  person	  behaves	  in	  a	  way	  we	  find	  immoral,	  then	  we	  likely	  believe	  these	  Others	  are	  essentially	  and	  permanently	  morally	  corrupt.	  We	  come	  to	  think	  that	  they	  are	  “evil,”	  “terrorists,”	  or	  “psychopaths.”	  Then,	  according	  to	  Becker,	  in	  our	  opposition	  to	  this	  irrational,	  destructive	  Other,	  we	  feel	  that	  we	  are	  helping	  make	  the	  world	  more	  just,	  beautiful,	  and	  peaceful.	  Becker	  proposes	  that	  once	  we	  view	  the	  Other	  as	  the	  evil	  animal,	  then	  we	  can	  view	  ourselves	  as	  the	  righteous	  immortal	  in	  order	  to	  deny	  our	  death.	  	   In	  addition,	  Becker	  states	  that	  having	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  out-­‐group	  strengthens	  the	  identity	  and	  bond	  of	  an	  in-­‐group,	  which	  reassures	  and	  further	  solidifies	  our	  sense	  of	  immortality	  (EE	  116).	  Again,	  while	  Becker	  does	  not	  describe	  the	  mechanism	  underlying	  this	  phenomenon,	  contemporary	  social	  psychology	  research	  helps	  to	  elucidate	  this	  process.	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Cognitive	  dissonance	  is	  another	  cognitive	  bias	  defined	  by	  social	  psychology,	  and	  is	  the	  tendency	  for	  humans	  to	  reduce	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  how	  they	  act	  and	  what	  they	  believe.7	  More	  specifically,	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  cognitive	  tension	  of	  doing	  one	  thing	  and	  believing	  another,	  social	  psychology	  shows	  that	  we	  will	  alter	  what	  we	  believe	  in	  order	  to	  coincide	  with	  what	  we	  did.	  Becker	  and	  social	  psychology	  align	  together	  to	  suggest	  that	  when	  we	  oppose	  an	  evil	  Other,	  our	  identity	  with	  and	  our	  belief	  in	  the	  righteousness	  of	  our	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  is	  strengthened	  through	  cognitive	  dissonance,	  thus	  assisting	  us	  in	  the	  denial	  of	  our	  death.	  	   Furthermore,	  Becker	  explains	  that	  going	  against	  an	  Other	  also	  distracts	  us	  from	  thinking	  about	  our	  terrifying	  death.	  Becker	  says,	  “by	  actively	  manipulating	  and	  hating	  we	  keep	  our	  organism	  absorbed	  in	  the	  outside	  world;	  this	  keeps	  self-­‐reflection	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  death	  in	  a	  state	  of	  low	  tension”	  (EE	  113).8	  If	  we	  focus	  on	  defining	  Others	  as	  animals,	  then	  it	  is	  easier	  for	  us	  to	  forget	  that	  we	  too	  are	  mortal	  animals.	  In	  sum,	  transferring	  our	  animality	  onto	  an	  Other	  that	  we	  can	  oppose	  enables	  us	  to	  distance	  ourselves	  from	  our	  mortal	  creatureliness,	  psychologically	  fortify	  our	  identity	  with	  our	  immortal	  in-­‐group,	  and	  distract	  us	  from	  the	  terror	  of	  our	  inevitable	  perishing.	  	  
C.	  Necessary	  Protection	  of	  our	  Denial	  of	  Death	  Given	  that	  an	  Other	  transference	  object	  is	  one	  part	  of	  necessarily	  covering	  over	  our	  death,	  Becker	  believes	  we	  cannot	  stop	  from	  creating	  harm.	  He	  says,	  “Life	  cannot	  go	  on	  without	  the	  mutual	  devouring	  of	  organisms”	  (EE	  2).	  In	  other	  words,	  Becker	  claims	  that	  in	  order	  to	  survive	  we	  must	  nullify,	  or	  “devour,”	  the	  identity	  of	  Others.	  This	  opposition	  to	  Others	  feeds	  our	  need	  for	  righteousness	  and	  self-­‐esteem,	  which	  we	  need	  to	  necessarily	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deny	  our	  mortality.	  Becker	  understands	  this	  symbolic	  food	  to	  be	  just	  as	  necessary	  for	  survival	  as	  material	  food,	  suggesting	  our	  opposition	  to	  Others	  is	  physiologically	  motivated,	  and	  thus	  is	  fundamentally	  part	  of	  being	  human	  (EE	  144).	  Therefore,	  even	  if	  a	  person	  made	  the	  central	  tenet	  of	  their	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  to	  not	  harm	  others,	  they	  would	  still	  not	  be	  able	  to	  escape	  the	  need	  for	  defending	  their	  vital	  denial	  of	  death.	  This	  value	  of	  not	  harming	  others	  and	  accepting	  all	  cultural	  systems	  would	  be	  another	  form	  of	  a	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  that	  one	  sets	  out	  to	  bolster	  and	  protect.	  Becker	  explains,	  “One	  culture	  is	  always	  a	  potential	  menace	  to	  another	  because	  it	  is	  a	  living	  example	  that	  life	  can	  go	  on	  heroically	  within	  a	  value	  framework	  totally	  alien	  to	  one’s	  own”	  (BDM	  140).	  Our	  denial	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  that	  denial	  are	  not	  escapable,	  incorrect,	  or	  immoral,	  but	  are	  rather	  a	  part	  of	  who	  we	  are	  as	  humans.	  Becker	  argues,	  “[We]	  must	  at	  all	  times	  
defend	  the	  utter	  fragility	  of	  [our]	  delicately	  constituted	  fiction,	  deny	  its	  artificiality,”	  and,	  indeed,	  “this	  is	  how	  this	  animal	  must	  act	  if	  [it]	  is	  to	  function	  as	  this	  animal”	  (BDM	  139).	  According	  to	  Becker,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  psychologically	  healthy	  humans,	  and	  to	  physically	  survive,	  everyone	  is	  required	  to	  fortify	  their	  systems	  of	  denying	  death.	  	  	  
IV.	  Limitations	  of	  Becker’s	  Theory	  in	  his	  Promotion	  of	  Religion	  
A.	  Hierarchy	  of	  Different	  Forms	  of	  Death	  Denial	  Even	  though	  Becker	  proposes	  that	  we	  all	  need	  to	  deny	  our	  death	  and	  protect	  our	  particular	  form	  of	  death	  denial,	  he	  argues	  not	  all	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  do	  so	  are	  equal	  in	  value.	  In	  other	  words,	  Becker	  asserts	  that	  there	  is	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  cultural	  heroic	  systems.	  However,	  Becker	  himself	  and	  we,	  his	  readers,	  are	  situated	  within	  our	  own	  particular	  cultural	  heroic	  systems,	  which	  makes	  it	  incredibly	  challenging	  to	  validly	  claim	  that	  one	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form	  of	  death	  denial	  is	  better	  than	  another.	  Nevertheless,	  throughout	  his	  work	  Becker	  adamantly	  promotes	  the	  religious	  solution	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  deny	  our	  death.	  	  	  
B.	  Reduction	  of	  Harm	  Becker	  claims	  that	  we	  can	  evaluate	  forms	  of	  death	  denial	  through	  an	  empirical	  ranking.	  Essentially,	  he	  argues	  that	  even	  though	  all	  our	  forms	  of	  death	  denial	  require	  opposition	  to	  others,	  there	  are	  varying	  degrees	  of	  harming	  others.	  He	  says,	  “These	  costs	  can	  be	  tallied	  roughly	  in	  two	  ways:	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  tyranny	  practiced	  within	  the	  society,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  victimage	  practiced	  against	  aliens	  or	  ‘enemies’	  outside	  it”	  (EE	  125).	  According	  to	  Becker,	  the	  least	  harmful	  and	  thus	  best	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  is	  religion,	  or	  a	  fetish	  transference	  object	  of	  a	  God.	  	  	   Perhaps	  different	  forms	  of	  death	  denial	  can	  indeed	  be	  ranked	  according	  to	  the	  harm	  they	  cause,	  but	  Becker	  does	  not	  explain	  how	  religion	  reduces	  opposition	  to	  others,	  let	  alone	  why	  it	  is	  the	  most	  peaceful	  cultural	  heroic	  system.	  It	  is	  possible	  Becker	  thinks	  religion	  deals	  with	  our	  existential	  tension	  so	  well	  that	  worshippers	  will	  have	  less	  of	  a	  need	  to	  bolster	  their	  system	  and,	  thus,	  will	  oppose	  others	  less.	  However,	  if	  he	  does	  understand	  religion	  as	  such,	  Becker	  leaves	  it	  unsaid	  and	  invalidated.	  Not	  to	  mention	  a	  brief	  consideration	  of	  the	  death	  and	  destruction	  caused	  by	  religious	  wars	  throughout	  history	  and	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day	  would	  tend	  to	  argue	  against	  such	  a	  claim	  that	  religion	  promotes	  peace	  between	  different	  peoples.	  Becker	  also	  claims	  that	  a	  form	  of	  death	  denial	  could	  be	  constructed	  that	  results	  in	  the	  opposition	  of	  ‘evil’	  ideas	  instead	  of	  harming	  other	  people.	  	  Becker	  argues	  the	  enemy	  Other	  transference	  object,	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  [N]eed	  not	  be	  any	  special	  class	  or	  race	  or	  even	  human	  enemy,	  but	  could	  be	  things	  that	  take	  impersonal	  but	  real	  forms,	  like	  poverty,	  disease,	  oppression,	  natural	  disasters,	  etc.	  Or,	  if	  we	  know	  that	  evil	  takes	  human	  form	  in	  oppressors	  and	  hangmen,	  then	  we	  could	  at	  least	  try	  to	  make	  our	  hatreds	  of	  men	  intelligent	  and	  informed:	  we	  could	  work	  against	  the	  enemies	  of	  freedom.	  (EE	  145)	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  Becker	  understands	  religion	  as	  the	  least	  harmful	  system	  in	  that	  it	  involves	  this	  mechanism	  of	  opposing	  impersonal	  forms.	  However,	  Becker	  does	  not	  directly	  describe	  religion	  as	  working	  in	  this	  manner,	  and	  even	  if	  he	  did,	  Becker	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  validation	  to	  support	  this	  proposition.	  In	  addition,	  Becker	  contradicts	  himself	  because,	  as	  previously	  explained,	  he	  also	  argues	  no	  one	  can	  stop	  from	  harming	  other	  people	  (BDM	  139).	  Furthermore,	  Becker	  is	  lobbing	  out	  debatable	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘poverty’	  and	  ‘oppression’	  without	  beginning	  to	  clarify	  what	  he	  means,	  and	  the	  definitions	  of	  these	  terms	  are	  not	  self-­‐evident.	  In	  total,	  Becker	  claims	  religion	  as	  superior	  because	  he	  understands	  it	  to	  be	  the	  least	  harmful	  system,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  offer	  any	  adequate	  explanation	  of	  how	  religion	  accomplishes	  this	  reduction	  of	  harm.	  	  
C.	  Cannot	  Construct	  Our	  Own	  Heroic	  System	  	   Becker	  also	  views	  religion	  as	  superior	  because	  he	  believes	  that	  humans	  cannot	  truly	  supply	  an	  adequate	  heroic	  system	  on	  their	  own.	  He	  finds	  confirmation	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Rank,	  Augustine,	  and	  Kierkegaard	  who	  also	  think,	  “[humans]	  cannot	  fashion	  an	  absolute	  from	  within	  [their]	  condition,	  that	  cosmic	  heroism	  must	  transcend	  human	  relationships”	  (DD	  169;	  see	  also	  DD	  203).	  Becker	  rationalizes	  that	  all	  other	  transference	  objects	  are	  human,	  so	  they	  have	  their	  own	  agendas	  and	  needs,	  and	  will	  therefore	  eventually	  fail	  at	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maintaining	  their	  God-­‐like	  facade.	  He	  says,	  “No	  human	  relationship	  can	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  godhood	  and	  the	  attempt	  has	  to	  take	  its	  toll	  in	  some	  way	  on	  both	  parties”	  (DD	  166).	  When	  the	  human	  transference	  object	  is	  exposed	  as	  a	  cosmic	  fraud	  and	  loses	  their	  immortal	  power,	  then	  their	  worshipper	  cannot	  connect	  to	  and	  exaggerate	  their	  own	  godliness	  that	  is	  required	  to	  deny	  death.	  Furthermore,	  Becker	  believes	  that	  God	  “does	  not	  limit	  our	  development	  by	  His	  own	  personal	  will	  and	  needs”	  (DD	  166).	  In	  other	  words,	  because	  He	  is	  a	  non-­‐physical	  entity,	  God	  can	  be	  whatever	  we	  need	  Him	  to	  be.	  Becker	  claims	  having	  a	  God	  as	  a	  transference	  fetish	  object	  assures	  that	  one	  will	  always	  be	  able	  to	  maintain	  a	  necessary	  connection	  with	  the	  immortal.	  Therefore,	  because	  God	  transcends	  human	  relations,	  Becker	  understands	  religion	  as	  being	  the	  most	  consistent	  and	  strongest	  solution.	  	   Considering	  that	  this	  argument	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  religious	  solution	  does	  in	  fact	  transcend	  human	  relationships,	  it	  logically	  requires	  the	  existence	  of	  God.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  understand	  religion	  as	  superior	  in	  this	  way	  if	  God	  is	  a	  human	  construct.	  Consequently,	  Becker	  is	  making	  a	  massive	  assumption	  that	  God	  does	  exist	  in	  order	  to	  argue	  that	  through	  His	  transcendence,	  we	  can	  best	  maintain	  our	  denial	  of	  death.	  	  
D.	  Animality	  but	  Transcendence	  In	  addition	  to	  promoting	  the	  religious	  solution,	  Becker	  also	  encourages	  his	  readers	  in	  their	  flight	  from	  death	  to	  not	  reject	  their	  animality	  in	  attempt	  to	  feel	  wholly	  immortal.	  Becker	  believes	  that	  we	  should	  never	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  animals,	  and	  he	  asserts	  we	  should	  accept	  our	  weakness	  and	  mortality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  energy	  and	  growth.	  Becker	  states,	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  [W]hatever	  man	  does	  on	  this	  planet	  [should]	  be	  done	  in	  the	  lived	  truth	  of	  the	  terror	  of	  creation,	  of	  the	  grotesque,	  of	  the	  rumble	  of	  panic	  underneath	  everything.	  Otherwise	  it	  is	  false.	  Whatever	  is	  achieved	  must	  be	  achieved	  from	  within	  the	  subjective	  energies	  of	  creatures,	  without	  deadening,	  with	  the	  full	  exercise	  of	  passion,	  of	  vision,	  of	  pain,	  of	  fear,	  and	  of	  sorrow.	  (DD	  284)	  Similarly,	  Becker	  suggests,	  “behind	  it	  all	  would	  be	  the	  same	  type	  of	  evolutionary	  creature”	  (DD	  277).	  Becker	  does	  not	  want	  us	  to	  completely	  demolish	  our	  humanity	  to	  metamorphose	  into	  something	  entirely	  transcendent.	  Rather,	  he	  promotes	  a	  utilization	  of	  what	  we	  are,	  that	  we	  face	  our	  existential	  tension,	  which	  includes	  our	  mortal	  animality.	  Furthermore,	  Becker	  supports	  someone	  who	  “takes	  more	  of	  the	  world	  into	  himself	  and	  develops	  new	  forms	  of	  courage	  and	  endurance”	  (DD	  279).	  It	  is	  not	  enough	  that	  we	  embrace	  ourselves	  as	  creatures,	  Becker	  also	  wants	  us	  to	  sustain	  this	  perspective.	  	  Therefore,	  another	  reason	  why	  Becker	  promotes	  the	  religious	  solution	  over	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  death	  denial	  is	  because	  he	  believes	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  a	  complete	  rejection	  of	  one’s	  animality	  (DD	  160).	  Religion,	  according	  to	  Becker,	  provides	  “Faith	  that	  one’s	  very	  creatureliness	  has	  some	  meaning	  to	  a	  Creator;	  that	  despite	  one’s	  true	  insignificance,	  weakness,	  death,	  one’s	  existence	  has	  meaning”	  (DD	  90).	  Becker	  argues	  that	  in	  Christianity,	  one’s	  mortal	  creatureliness	  is	  actually	  the	  condition	  for	  cosmic	  heroism	  (DD	  160).	  Becker	  advocates	  religion	  that	  embraces	  our	  weak,	  mortal	  bodies	  as	  the	  requisite	  for	  connecting	  to	  an	  immortal	  God,	  thus	  enabling	  believers	  to	  embrace	  themselves	  as	  creatures	  in	  existential	  tension.	  	   Unfortunately,	  Becker	  seems	  to	  undermine	  his	  own	  clarity	  because	  in	  addition	  to	  proposing	  an	  acceptance	  of	  animality,	  Becker	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  religious	  solution	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involves	  self-­‐transcendence.	  Becker	  references	  Kierkegaard	  who	  believes	  “The	  ‘healthy’	  person,	  the	  true	  individual,	  the	  self-­‐realized	  soul,	  the	  ‘real’	  [human],	  is	  the	  one	  who	  has	  
transcended	  [themselves]”	  (DD	  86).	  His	  proposition	  that	  one	  should	  go	  beyond	  themselves	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  direct	  contradiction	  to	  Becker’s	  earlier	  statement	  that	  one	  should	  remain	  the	  creatures	  they	  are	  and	  not	  try	  to	  metamorphosis	  into	  a	  new	  type	  of	  entity.	  However,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  by	  ‘transcending’	  Becker	  is	  suggesting	  we	  remain	  the	  creaturely	  humans	  we	  are,	  but	  experience	  growth	  beyond	  our	  typical	  unawareness	  about	  how	  the	  denial	  of	  death	  affects	  our	  lives.	  This	  idea	  is	  supported	  when	  Becker	  describes	  a	  person	  transcends	  themselves	  by	  “realizing	  the	  truth	  of	  [their]	  situation,	  by	  dispelling	  the	  lie	  of	  [their]	  character,	  by	  breaking	  [their]	  spirit	  out	  of	  its	  conditioned	  prison”	  (DD	  86).	  Even	  if	  Becker	  is	  only	  promoting	  improvement,	  by	  using	  the	  word	  ‘transcendence’	  he	  is	  communicating	  more	  of	  an	  idea	  of	  complete	  transformation.	  Given	  the	  complicated	  nature	  of	  the	  word	  ‘transcendence,’	  using	  it	  as	  a	  key	  word	  without	  clear	  definition	  could	  easily	  lead	  to	  misinterpretation	  and	  confusion	  by	  Becker’s	  readers,	  especially	  regarding	  how	  transcendence	  is	  reconciled	  with	  an	  embracing	  of	  one’s	  animality.	  	  	  
E.	  Not	  Traditional	  Institutionalized	  Religion	  Beyond	  the	  complicated	  details	  of	  how	  religion	  can	  involve	  both	  an	  embracing	  of	  our	  creatureliness	  and	  also	  a	  transcending	  beyond	  our	  humanity,	  Becker’s	  readers	  are	  still	  left	  with	  the	  question	  of	  what	  he	  exactly	  means	  by	  religion.	  Becker	  describes	  institutionalized	  religion	  often	  falls	  into	  the	  trap	  of	  being	  “automatic,	  reflexive,	  obsessive”	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  promotes	  the	  vicious	  harming	  of	  others	  (BDM	  197).	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  seems	  that	  Becker	  is	  not	  promoting	  traditional	  institutionalized	  religion,	  although	  he	  never	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defines	  his	  conception	  directly	  in	  contrast	  to	  this	  typical	  understanding	  of	  religion.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  never	  a	  point	  in	  any	  of	  Becker’s	  books	  where	  he	  straightforwardly	  defines	  his	  idea	  of	  religion.	  Given	  that	  Becker	  fails	  to	  adequately	  elucidate	  what	  he	  means	  by	  religion,	  his	  readers	  must	  weed	  through	  confusing	  hints	  and	  ultimately	  guess	  about	  what	  Becker	  is	  proposing	  we	  should	  do	  to	  best	  cope	  with	  the	  overwhelming	  fear	  of	  our	  inevitable	  perishing.	  	  
F.	  Superior	  in	  Openness	  and	  Critical	  Thinking	  While	  Becker	  may	  not	  give	  a	  direct	  definition	  of	  religion,	  he	  nevertheless	  does	  describe	  religion	  as	  involving	  openness.	  Becker	  illustrates	  the	  religious	  person	  as	  the	  Kierkegaardian	  knight	  of	  faith	  who	  “represents	  what	  we	  might	  call	  an	  ideal	  of	  mental	  health,	  the	  continuing	  openness	  of	  life	  out	  of	  the	  death	  throes	  of	  dread”	  (DD	  258).	  Becker	  encourages	  his	  readers	  to	  “continually	  broaden	  and	  expand	  [their]	  horizons,	  allegiances,	  the	  quality	  of	  [their]	  preoccupations”	  (BDM	  191).	  He	  asserts	  that	  maintaining	  openness	  is	  particularly	  challenging,	  and	  claims	  “[t]he	  most	  one	  can	  achieve	  is	  a	  certain	  relaxedness,	  an	  openness	  to	  experience	  that	  makes	  him	  less	  of	  a	  driven	  burden	  on	  others”	  (DD	  259).	  Moreover,	  Becker	  makes	  the	  bold	  claim	  that	  “religion	  alone	  gives	  us	  hope,	  because	  it	  holds	  open	  the	  dimension	  of	  the	  unknown”	  (DD	  203).	  It	  seems	  Becker	  valorizes	  a	  religion	  that	  promotes	  maintaining	  strength	  to	  hold	  oneself	  open	  towards	  what	  one	  is	  not,	  does	  not	  grasp,	  and	  cannot	  control	  in	  life	  and	  death.	  Alongside	  his	  advocacy	  of	  religion,	  Becker	  seems	  to	  sometimes	  indirectly	  praise	  critical	  thinking,	  perhaps	  suggesting	  a	  connection	  between	  his	  understanding	  of	  religion	  and	  critical	  thought.	  For	  example,	  as	  previously	  explained,	  Becker	  views	  the	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thoughtlessness	  of	  the	  automatic	  cultural	  person	  as	  a	  harmful	  way	  to	  deny	  death.	  In	  this	  way,	  Becker	  might	  favor	  the	  opposite	  of	  thoughtlessness,	  as	  in	  critical	  thinking.	  Similarly,	  Becker	  views	  blindness	  as	  the	  fundamental	  reason	  for	  evil	  in	  the	  world	  (EE	  136).	  Becker	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  more	  we	  become	  conscious	  of	  our	  mortal	  condition,	  the	  better	  we	  will	  deal	  with	  our	  denial	  and	  the	  less	  we	  will	  harm	  others	  (EE	  90).	  In	  these	  ways,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Becker	  believes	  religion	  involves	  critically	  thinking	  about	  our	  need	  to	  deny	  death.	  	  	  	   Even	  though	  Becker	  provides	  his	  readers	  with	  some	  explanation	  of	  religion	  through	  his	  promotion	  of	  openness	  and	  critical	  thinking,	  he	  does	  not	  elucidate	  how	  religion	  involves	  these	  qualities.	  It	  is	  left	  unsaid	  how	  Becker	  thinks	  religion	  is	  better	  than	  philosophy	  and	  science	  at	  encouraging	  openness	  and	  critical	  thinking,	  disciplines	  typically	  considered	  to	  excel	  at	  these	  processes.	  As	  such,	  Becker	  treads	  on	  dangerous	  waters	  in	  his	  unsupported	  claim	  that	  religion,	  more	  than	  any	  other	  approach,	  leads	  to	  openness	  and	  critical	  thinking.	  	  	  
G.	  Leap	  of	  Faith	  but	  Not	  Mystical	  Another	  positive	  description	  of	  Becker’s	  idea	  of	  religion	  is	  that	  it	  involves	  a	  leap	  of	  faith.	  Specifically,	  Becker	  praises	  the	  Kierkegaardian	  knight	  of	  faith	  who	  has	  “given	  over	  the	  meaning	  of	  [their]	  life	  to	  [their]	  Creator”	  in	  a	  leap	  of	  faith	  (DD	  257).	  However,	  Becker	  uses	  the	  phrase	  “leap	  of	  faith”	  without	  any	  explanation.	  In	  attempt	  to	  squeeze	  any	  meaning	  out	  of	  what	  Becker	  might	  be	  advocating,	  when	  examined	  in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  aspects	  of	  what	  he	  says,	  the	  idea	  of	  “leap	  of	  faith”	  becomes	  even	  more	  muddled.	  In	  particular,	  Becker	  seems	  to	  be	  opposed	  to	  a	  mystic	  union	  with	  God.	  He	  says	  a	  person	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  function	  in	  this	  world	  if	  they	  “[gave]	  in	  completely	  to	  the	  thrill	  of	  the	  miraculous”	  (BDM	  143).	  However,	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  the	  difference	  is	  between	  Becker’s	  praised	  leap	  of	  faith	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through	  giving	  oneself	  over	  to	  God	  and	  his	  rejected	  mystical	  giving	  oneself	  over	  to	  the	  miraculous.	  The	  reader	  is	  left	  to	  guess	  at	  what	  exactly	  Becker	  proposes	  as	  the	  right	  way	  to	  courageously	  bind	  with	  God.	  Becker’s	  promotion	  of	  a	  leap	  and	  rejection	  of	  unification	  is	  further	  hard	  to	  grasp	  because	  he	  also	  praises	  primitive	  religion.	  Becker	  explains	  primitive	  religion	  as	  having	  an	  exceptional	  ability	  to	  imbue	  every	  aspect	  of	  one’s	  life	  with	  cosmic	  heroism	  through	  an	  immense	  number	  of	  rituals,	  the	  celebration	  of	  magic,	  and	  the	  belief	  in	  an	  invisible	  realm	  (EE	  15).	  Becker	  says,	  “those	  who	  lived	  in	  primitive	  and	  traditional	  society	  could	  achieve	  even	  in	  the	  smallest	  daily	  tasks	  that	  sense	  of	  cosmic	  heroism	  that	  is	  the	  highest	  ambition	  of	  man”	  (DD	  124).	  Perhaps	  Becker	  sees	  a	  stark	  contrast	  between	  primitive	  religion	  and	  mystic	  unification.	  Or	  maybe	  his	  celebration	  of	  primitive	  religion	  is	  only	  meant	  to	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  rituals	  to	  best	  connect	  one	  to	  the	  transcendent.	  Regardless,	  Becker’s	  lack	  of	  explanation	  leaves	  the	  reader	  unable	  to	  clarify	  how	  a	  religious	  connecting	  to	  God	  in	  a	  bold,	  intense	  leap	  of	  faith	  does	  not	  mean	  completely	  mystically	  unifying	  with	  Him	  but	  likely	  does	  have	  similarities	  to	  primitive	  religion.	  	  	  
H.	  Creative	  and	  Superior	  to	  Creative	  Solution	  An	  additional	  way	  Becker	  indirectly	  defines	  his	  religious	  solution	  is	  through	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  creative	  solution.	  As	  previously	  explained,	  the	  creative	  solution	  involves	  constructing	  one’s	  own	  heroic	  system	  to	  deny	  death.	  While	  Becker	  initially	  described	  the	  creative	  solution	  as	  a	  valid	  but	  risky	  possibility	  (see	  DD	  171),	  elsewhere	  he	  seems	  to	  be	  adamantly	  against	  it	  as	  a	  healthy	  option	  for	  anyone.	  For	  example,	  he	  claims,	  “one	  cannot	  generate	  a	  self-­‐created	  hero	  system	  unless	  he	  is	  mad”	  (EE	  157).	  At	  other	  times	  Becker	  seems	  to	  be	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  not	  even	  possible	  for	  an	  individual	  to	  construct	  their	  own	  way	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to	  deal	  with	  death,	  suggesting	  one	  cannot	  adopt	  a	  truly	  creative	  solution	  (DD	  162).	  Becker’s	  ideas	  might	  not	  be	  contradictory	  if	  he	  believes	  the	  creative	  solution	  is	  indeed	  attainable,	  but	  only	  through	  the	  guiding	  help	  of	  a	  God.	  This	  alternative	  is	  supported	  through	  Becker’s	  agreement	  with	  Rank	  that	  “even	  the	  highest,	  most	  individuated	  creative	  type	  can	  only	  manage	  autonomy	  to	  some	  extent”	  (EE	  161).	  Nevertheless,	  if	  Becker	  is	  proposing	  that	  the	  creative	  solution	  involves	  the	  hand	  of	  God,	  this	  exposes	  that	  Becker’s	  personal	  heroic	  system	  is	  likely	  influencing	  his	  evaluations	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  death	  denial.	  Perhaps	  Becker	  sees	  his	  own	  heroic	  system	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  other	  heroic	  systems	  in	  order	  to	  bolster	  his	  beliefs	  to	  assist	  his	  personal	  need	  for	  a	  denial	  of	  death.	  If	  he	  has	  other	  reasons	  why	  there	  cannot	  be	  a	  truly	  creative	  solution,	  Becker	  does	  not	  elucidate	  them.	  	  Becker’s	  stance	  towards	  the	  creative	  solution	  is	  further	  complicated	  because	  he	  also	  sees	  creativity	  as	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  the	  religious	  solution.	  For	  example	  he	  says,	  “The	  
creative	  person	  becomes,	  then,	  in	  art,	  literature,	  and	  religion	  the	  mediator	  of	  natural	  terror	  and	  the	  indicator	  of	  a	  new	  way	  to	  triumph	  over	  it.	  He	  reveals	  the	  darkness	  and	  the	  dread	  of	  the	  human	  condition	  and	  fabricates	  a	  new	  symbolic	  transcendence	  over	  it	  [italics	  added]”	  (DD	  220).	  Similarly	  Becker	  explains	  the	  knight	  of	  faith	  of	  the	  religious	  solution	  is	  “like	  all	  ideals	  [in	  that]	  it	  is	  a	  creative	  illusion,	  meant	  to	  lead	  men	  on,	  and	  leading	  men	  on	  is	  not	  the	  easiest	  thing	  [italics	  added]”	  (DD	  258).	  Both	  of	  these	  quotes	  suggest	  that	  Becker	  understands	  the	  religious	  solution	  as	  a	  creative	  process.	  Furthermore,	  Becker	  perceives	  his	  own	  task	  as	  an	  interdisciplinary	  anthropologist	  as	  a	  creative	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  heroic	  system.	  He	  states,	  “the	  task	  of	  social	  theory	  is	  not	  to	  explain	  guilt	  [or	  existential	  tension]	  away	  or	  to	  absorb	  it	  unthinkingly	  in	  still	  another	  destructive	  ideology,	  but	  to	  neutralize	  it	  and	  give	  it	  expression	  in	  truly	  creative	  and	  life-­‐enhancing	  ideologies	  [italics	  added]”	  (EE	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162).	  In	  all	  of	  these	  ways	  it	  seems	  that	  Becker	  sees	  creativity	  and	  religion	  as	  fundamentally	  intertwined.	  However,	  it	  is	  left	  unclear	  why	  Becker	  does	  not	  promote	  the	  creative	  solution	  alongside	  the	  religious	  solution	  or	  why	  he	  does	  not	  directly	  explain	  the	  religious	  solution	  as	  a	  creative	  process.	  	  If	  Becker	  is	  speaking	  to	  a	  particular	  audience,	  it	  could	  explain	  why	  he	  verbally	  defines	  the	  religious	  solution	  as	  superior	  to	  the	  creative	  solution,	  but	  also	  indirectly	  describes	  them	  as	  interconnected.	  Perhaps	  Becker	  is	  catering	  his	  message	  to	  the	  masses	  because	  he	  does	  not	  believe	  most	  people	  are	  strong	  enough	  to	  handle	  the	  risk	  involved	  in	  constructing	  their	  own	  creative	  solution.	  Instead,	  he	  could	  be	  directly	  promoting	  religion	  because	  he	  wants	  to	  steer	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  towards	  a	  safer	  route.	  This	  idea	  is	  supported	  when	  Becker	  explains	  the	  highest	  form	  of	  a	  creative	  person	  as	  a	  genius	  who	  “has	  the	  resources	  of	  a	  strong	  ego,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  sufficient	  one,	  to	  give	  [their]	  own	  personal	  meanings	  a	  creative	  form”	  (DD	  221).	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  seems	  that	  Becker	  believes	  it	  takes	  a	  very	  rare	  and	  particular	  type	  of	  person	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  creative	  solution	  in	  a	  healthy	  manner.	  In	  this	  way,	  perhaps	  Becker	  understands	  certain	  people	  as	  able	  to	  bypass	  religion	  to	  accomplish	  creativity,	  while	  the	  masses	  can	  only	  embrace	  creativity	  through	  religion.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  hypothesis	  is	  a	  shot	  in	  the	  dark.	  Becker	  provides	  certain	  descriptions	  to	  hint	  that	  there	  is	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  creative	  and	  religious	  solutions,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  communicate	  the	  relation	  and	  why	  he	  believes	  it	  to	  be	  such.9	  	  
I.	  Inadequate	  Definition	  of	  Religious	  Solution	  All	  of	  these	  issues	  with	  Becker’s	  promotion	  of	  the	  religious	  solution	  thus	  far	  described	  stem	  from	  his	  lack	  of	  direct	  and	  clear	  definition	  of	  his	  concept	  of	  religion.	  Even	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when	  Becker	  does	  provide	  partial	  explanation,	  he	  seems	  to	  completely	  contradict	  himself	  elsewhere	  in	  his	  work.	  Because	  Becker	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  adequate,	  comprehensive	  elucidation	  of	  the	  religious	  solution	  he	  so	  adamantly	  promotes,	  his	  readers	  are	  unable	  to	  apprehend	  the	  alleged	  benefits	  of	  this	  form	  of	  death	  denial.10	  	  
	  
J.	  Unaware	  of	  Influence	  from	  Personal	  Beliefs	  Beyond	  the	  issues	  with	  his	  promotion	  of	  the	  religious	  solution,	  within	  the	  description	  of	  his	  theory	  more	  generally,	  Becker	  also	  seems	  unaware	  his	  conceptions	  are	  affected	  by	  his	  personal	  beliefs.	  In	  his	  explanations,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  Becker	  comes	  from	  a	  Western,	  male,	  heterosexual,	  white,	  democratic,	  Christian	  perspective.	  In	  particular,	  Becker	  takes	  many	  of	  his	  foundational	  ideas	  for	  granted	  such	  as	  his	  dualistic	  perspectives	  of	  body	  versus	  mind,	  internal	  versus	  external,	  and	  visible	  versus	  invisible.	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  he	  often	  uses	  misleading	  and	  loaded	  words	  such	  as	  “transcendent,”	  “evil,”	  “fiction,”	  “lie,”	  “real,”	  and	  “faith.”	  While	  a	  person	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  step	  outside	  of	  a	  particular	  cultural	  heroic	  system,	  Becker	  seems	  to	  quickly	  and	  easily	  give	  up	  the	  attempt	  to	  think	  critically	  about	  what	  may	  be	  influencing	  his	  ideas.	  Becker	  challenges	  us	  to	  question	  our	  own	  perspectives,	  but	  he	  himself	  does	  not	  ever	  reference	  his	  own	  cultural	  heroic	  system	  and	  how	  it	  could	  be	  affecting	  his	  theory	  and	  the	  way	  he	  presents	  it.	  	  
	  
K.	  Unanswered	  Question	  of	  What	  to	  Do	  about	  Our	  Denial	  of	  Death	  Although	  Becker	  should	  be	  regarded	  for	  trying	  to	  push	  science	  in	  order	  to	  say	  something	  about	  our	  mortal	  condition,	  the	  lack	  of	  carefulness	  in	  his	  propositions	  is	  dangerous	  to	  his	  readers.	  Because	  he	  is	  promoting	  a	  particular	  solution,	  Becker	  needs	  to	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investigate	  his	  own	  presuppositions	  and	  take	  into	  consideration	  how	  they	  might	  be	  affecting	  his	  theory.	  Given	  that	  he	  fails	  to	  adequately	  question	  and	  describe	  what	  he	  means	  by	  the	  religious	  solution	  he	  proposes,	  Becker’s	  readers	  are	  given	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  problem	  and	  no	  tangible	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  it.	  In	  other	  words,	  his	  readers	  come	  to	  understand	  that	  Becker	  believes	  they	  deny	  their	  death,	  this	  leads	  to	  harming	  others,	  and	  they	  should	  adopt	  the	  religious	  solution,	  but	  they	  are	  left	  to	  guess	  at	  what	  the	  religious	  solution	  entails.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  lack	  of	  clarity,	  it	  is	  likely	  many	  of	  Becker’s	  Western	  readers	  would	  fall	  back	  onto	  their	  traditional	  perspectives	  of	  religion	  as	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  Christian	  church.	  However,	  as	  previously	  explained,	  Becker	  does	  not	  define	  his	  religion	  in	  line	  with	  that	  of	  institutionalized	  religion,	  which	  he	  views	  as	  problematic.	  Therefore,	  through	  his	  lack	  of	  sufficient	  explanation	  about	  the	  religious	  solution,	  Becker	  might	  inadvertently	  be	  guiding	  his	  readers	  towards	  the	  automatic	  cultural	  perspective	  that	  concerned	  him.	  In	  total,	  Becker’s	  readers	  are	  left	  uprooted	  not	  knowing	  what	  they	  should	  do	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  must	  bolster	  their	  denial	  of	  death	  or	  how	  its	  even	  possible	  to	  not	  harm	  others	  in	  the	  process.	  Becker	  criticizes	  other	  thinkers	  who	  do	  not	  synthesize	  the	  social	  sciences	  to	  say	  something	  meaningful,	  but	  it	  could	  be	  easily	  argued	  he	  also	  does	  not	  say	  something	  straightforward	  or	  coherent	  enough	  to	  help	  guide	  future	  behavior.	  Even	  though	  Becker’s	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  has	  led	  him	  to	  go	  beyond	  anthropology	  and	  psychology	  to	  take	  a	  philosophical	  or	  religious	  approach	  in	  postulating	  the	  possible	  and	  beneficial	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  approach	  our	  denial	  of	  death,	  his	  bewildering	  propositions	  are	  inadequate	  to	  uncover	  what	  we	  can	  and	  should	  do	  about	  the	  necessary	  protection	  of	  our	  denial	  of	  death.	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Chapter	  Three:	  Terror	  Management	  Theorists,	  Experimental	  Psychologists:	  Support	  for	  Becker	  
I.	  Introduction	  to	  TMT	  Despite	  the	  leaps	  and	  holes	  in	  Becker’s	  argument,	  his	  basic	  theory	  that	  our	  denial	  of	  death	  affects	  our	  everyday	  lives	  is	  supported	  by	  modern	  experimental	  psychological	  research	  called	  Terror	  Management	  Theory	  (1970s-­‐present).	  Terror	  Management	  Theory	  (TMT)	  emerged	  from	  Jeff	  Greenberg,	  Tom	  Pyszczynski,	  and	  Sheldon	  Solomon.	  As	  psychologists	  working	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Kansas	  in	  1978,	  they	  bonded	  over	  frustrations	  that	  psychology	  seemed	  to	  be	  increasingly	  removed	  from	  what	  people	  were	  actually	  doing	  in	  their	  daily	  lives	  (Greenberg,	  Pyszczynski,	  and	  Solomon	  4).	  After	  stumbling	  upon	  Becker’s	  work,	  they	  became	  enthusiastically	  inspired	  because	  his	  theories	  attempted	  to	  explain	  the	  motivations	  of	  our	  everyday	  existence.	  In	  line	  with	  Becker,	  they	  formulated	  Terror	  Management	  Theory,	  which	  proposes	  the	  awareness	  of	  our	  mortality	  and	  our	  instinctual	  desire	  for	  self-­‐preservation	  create	  a	  potential	  sense	  of	  terror	  that	  “is	  managed	  by	  a	  two	  component	  cultural	  anxiety-­‐buffer:	  1)	  faith	  in	  a	  culturally	  derived	  worldview	  which	  imbues	  subjective	  reality	  with	  order,	  meaning,	  permanence,	  and	  the	  promise	  of	  literal	  or	  symbolic	  death	  transcendence	  […];	  and	  2)	  the	  belief	  that	  one	  is	  meeting	  those	  standards	  of	  value	  (self-­‐esteem)”	  (Greenberg,	  Pyszczynski,	  and	  Solomon	  5).	  Said	  simply,	  TMT	  claims	  that	  people	  deny	  the	  overwhelming	  knowledge	  of	  their	  inevitable	  death	  by	  bolstering	  their	  cultural	  worldview	  and	  self-­‐esteem,	  or	  what	  Becker	  generally	  labels	  as	  one’s	  cultural	  heroic	  system.	  However,	  TMT	  researchers	  have	  gone	  much	  further	  than	  postulations.	  From	  the	  1980s	  through	  today,	  dozens	  of	  researchers	  have	  conducted	  over	  350	  psychology	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experiments	  within	  the	  branch	  of	  TMT,	  providing	  experimental	  validity	  for	  and	  building	  upon	  Becker’s	  primary	  ideas	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Arndt	  117).	  	  
II.	  Prototypical	  TMT	  Experiment	  
A.	  General	  Outline	  A	  meta-­‐analysis,	  or	  a	  summation	  of	  data	  from	  hundreds	  of	  experiments,	  revealed	  that	  most	  TMT	  experiments	  were	  performed	  with	  American	  undergraduate	  students	  as	  participants	  (Burke,	  Martens,	  and	  Faucher	  177-­‐179).	  In	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  actual	  intention	  of	  the	  experiment	  unknown,	  the	  participants	  usually	  begin	  by	  filling	  out	  one	  or	  two	  filler	  questionnaires.	  Following	  this	  initial	  task,	  the	  participants	  are	  exposed	  to	  the	  independent	  variable,	  which	  in	  most	  TMT	  experiments	  is	  Mortality	  Salience	  (MS),	  a	  reminder	  of	  one’s	  death.	  Typically	  inducing	  MS	  involves	  asking	  participants	  to	  write	  two	  essays	  about	  their	  death:	  one	  about	  what	  they	  think	  will	  happen	  to	  them	  as	  they	  physically	  die	  and	  the	  other	  to	  describe	  the	  emotions	  they	  feel	  when	  thinking	  about	  dying.	  Additional	  types	  of	  MS	  manipulations	  include	  watching	  videos	  of	  car	  crashes,	  viewing	  documentaries	  about	  the	  holocaust,	  thinking	  about	  the	  9/11	  World	  Trade	  Center	  attacks,	  reading	  a	  story	  about	  a	  person	  who	  dies,	  or	  viewing	  slide	  shows	  that	  have	  a	  theme	  of	  death.	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  group	  of	  participants	  who	  are	  exposed	  to	  MS,	  there	  is	  also	  another	  group	  of	  participants	  exposed	  to	  a	  control	  condition.	  Typically,	  the	  control	  condition	  involves	  completing	  an	  essay	  task	  similar	  to	  that	  used	  in	  the	  MS	  condition,	  but	  instead	  of	  being	  about	  death,	  the	  content	  in	  the	  control	  essay	  is	  a	  different	  negative	  experience.	  Specific	  control	  conditions	  involve	  thinking	  about	  dental	  pain,	  contemplating	  paralysis,	  arousing	  general	  anxieties	  and	  worries,	  being	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socially	  rejected,	  or	  having	  to	  give	  a	  speech	  in	  public	  (Greenberg,	  Pyszczynski,	  and	  Solomon	  9).	  	   After	  exposure	  to	  MS	  or	  the	  control	  condition,	  participants	  in	  a	  prototypical	  experiment	  complete	  a	  filler	  task,	  such	  as	  another	  questionnaire	  survey	  or	  word	  search,	  in	  order	  to	  create	  an	  intentional	  delay.	  Following	  the	  MS	  or	  control	  manipulation	  and	  the	  delay,	  the	  next	  phase	  in	  the	  prototypical	  TMT	  experiment	  is	  the	  collection	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  by	  measuring	  the	  participant’s	  thoughts,	  beliefs,	  or	  behavioral	  response.	  In	  most	  TMT	  experiments,	  this	  stage	  of	  measuring	  the	  psychological	  response	  involves	  asking	  participants	  to	  express	  their	  attitude	  toward	  the	  author	  of	  an	  essay	  who	  disagrees	  with	  their	  worldview.	  However,	  there	  are	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  other	  ways	  to	  examine	  a	  participant’s	  response,	  such	  as	  cognitive	  measures	  to	  test	  for	  prejudicial	  or	  stereotypical	  beliefs.	  Additional	  ways	  to	  test	  responses	  to	  MS	  include	  behavior	  measures,	  such	  as	  seat	  choice,	  driving	  speed,	  hand	  strength,	  immersing	  one’s	  hand	  in	  cold	  water,	  or	  donating	  to	  a	  charity.	  After	  all	  of	  the	  data	  is	  compiled,	  the	  experiment	  is	  concluded	  by	  running	  statistical	  analyses	  to	  understand	  whether	  MS	  had	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  thoughts,	  beliefs,	  or	  behaviors	  of	  the	  participants	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  control	  participants.	  In	  other	  words,	  TMT	  experiments	  test	  the	  difference	  in	  reactions	  of	  a	  person	  who	  is	  reminded	  of	  their	  death	  as	  compared	  to	  a	  person	  who	  is	  reminded	  of	  another	  negative	  experience.	  	  
B.	  Control	  Condition	  The	  examination	  of	  data	  from	  hundreds	  of	  TMT	  experiments	  illustrates	  that	  control	  participants	  exposed	  to	  painful	  or	  terrifying	  experiences	  are	  consistently	  not	  affected	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  those	  exposed	  to	  awareness	  of	  their	  death	  (Burke,	  Martens,	  and	  Faucher	  182).	  
	   48	  
For	  example,	  a	  prototypical	  experiment	  might	  include	  Participant	  A	  who	  writes	  an	  essay	  contemplating	  their	  death	  (MS	  condition)	  and	  Participant	  B	  who	  writes	  an	  essay	  contemplating	  paralysis	  (control	  condition).	  Following	  a	  delay,	  Participants	  A	  and	  B	  then	  might	  each	  be	  asked	  how	  they	  view	  an	  author	  of	  an	  essay	  who	  disagrees	  with	  their	  worldview.	  According	  to	  the	  theory	  and	  the	  demonstrated	  results	  collected	  thus	  far,	  Participant	  A	  would	  likely	  respond	  with	  harsher	  judgments	  and	  a	  greater	  dislike	  for	  the	  author	  who	  disagrees	  with	  their	  worldview	  than	  Participant	  B.	  By	  using	  control	  conditions	  that	  involve	  negative	  experiences,	  TMT	  research	  represents	  strong	  evidence	  against	  the	  possibility	  that	  people	  are	  affected	  by	  MS	  simply	  because	  it	  is	  a	  highly	  negative	  experience.	  As	  a	  result,	  TMT	  researchers	  argue	  “[T]here	  is	  something	  qualitatively	  different	  about	  the	  threat	  of	  death”	  (Burke,	  Martens,	  and	  Faucher	  182);	  “death	  is	  of	  unique	  psychological	  importance”	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Pyszczynski	  121).	  TMT	  researchers	  understand	  their	  experiments	  as	  demonstrating	  that	  reminders	  of	  death	  alter	  a	  person’s	  thoughts,	  behaviors,	  and	  beliefs	  in	  a	  more	  influential	  and	  distinct	  way	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  negative	  aspects	  of	  an	  individual’s	  life.	  	  
C.	  Delay	  After	  Exposure	  to	  MS	  Another	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  prototypical	  experiment	  is	  the	  delay	  included	  after	  exposure	  to	  MS.	  This	  delay	  is	  used	  because	  it	  has	  been	  consistently	  shown	  to	  result	  in	  an	  increased	  impact	  of	  MS	  on	  the	  particular	  reaction(s)	  being	  tested	  by	  a	  given	  experiment	  (Burke,	  Martens,	  and	  Faucher	  182).	  For	  example,	  after	  Participant	  A	  contemplates	  death	  and	  Participant	  B	  contemplates	  paralysis,	  they	  might	  each	  complete	  a	  word	  search.	  This	  word	  search	  is	  a	  filler	  task	  that	  is	  used	  to	  create	  a	  delay	  before	  their	  reactions	  are	  tested.	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Perhaps	  there	  is	  also	  another	  condition	  in	  which,	  Participant	  C	  contemplates	  his	  or	  her	  death	  but	  does	  not	  complete	  any	  filler	  tasks,	  and	  thus	  does	  not	  experience	  a	  delay	  before	  his	  or	  her	  reactions	  are	  tested.	  According	  to	  research	  conducted	  thus	  far,	  Participant	  A	  would	  have	  harsher	  judgments	  and	  a	  greater	  dislike	  for	  an	  author	  who	  disagrees	  with	  their	  worldview	  than	  Participant	  B	  and	  Participant	  C.	  	  A	  prominent	  way	  in	  which	  TMT	  researchers	  explain	  these	  results	  is	  by	  proposing	  a	  dual-­‐process	  model,	  where	  death	  is	  first	  processed	  on	  a	  conscious	  level	  and	  then	  again	  on	  a	  non-­‐conscious	  level.	  In	  particular,	  these	  researchers	  claim	  that	  after	  a	  person	  is	  reminded	  of	  their	  death,	  they	  will	  try	  to	  repress,	  hide,	  and	  remove	  this	  consciousness	  of	  death	  from	  their	  immediate	  thoughts	  (Vail	  et	  al.	  307).	  Vail	  et.	  al	  explains,	  “conscious	  thoughts	  of	  death	  trigger	  pseudorational	  efforts	  to	  cope	  with	  one’s	  vulnerability	  to	  mortality	  and	  thus	  push	  the	  topic	  out	  of	  focal	  awareness”	  (Vail	  et	  al.	  306).	  Researchers	  claim	  that	  these	  thoughts	  do	  not	  disappear	  fully	  from	  the	  person’s	  mind.	  Rather,	  after	  a	  period	  of	  time,	  these	  death	  thoughts	  are	  believed	  to	  re-­‐emerge	  on	  a	  non-­‐conscious	  level	  where	  death	  is	  still	  highly	  activated.	  	  Therefore,	  awareness	  of	  death	  is	  triggered	  in	  a	  second	  and	  non-­‐conscious	  mode	  of	  processing.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  believed	  this	  non-­‐conscious	  processing	  is	  even	  more	  impactful	  on	  emotions,	  thoughts,	  and	  behaviors	  than	  if	  awareness	  death	  were	  to	  remain	  in	  consciousness.	  Specifically,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  this	  non-­‐conscious	  processing	  is	  especially	  symbolic	  and	  cultural,	  which	  leads	  to,	  for	  example,	  a	  heightened	  defense	  of	  one’s	  worldview	  (Vail	  et	  al.	  307).	  	  Therefore,	  the	  dual-­‐process	  model	  explains	  in	  our	  example	  why	  Participant	  C,	  who	  did	  not	  have	  enough	  time	  to	  push	  death	  out	  of	  their	  consciousness,	  did	  not	  react	  as	  negatively	  to	  the	  oppositional	  worldview	  as	  Participant	  A.	  It	  is	  thought	  that	  because	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Participant	  A	  completed	  the	  filler	  task	  before	  they	  reacted,	  Participant	  A	  had	  enough	  time	  to	  push	  their	  thoughts	  of	  death	  onto	  a	  more	  impactful,	  non-­‐conscious	  level.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  it	  is	  the	  non-­‐conscious	  processing	  of	  Participant	  A,	  which	  resulted	  in	  Participant	  A’s	  harsher	  judgments	  and	  a	  greater	  dislike	  for	  an	  author	  who	  disagrees	  with	  their	  worldview.	  Many	  experiments	  have	  given	  validation	  to	  the	  dual-­‐process	  model	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  longer	  the	  delay	  following	  MS	  (i.e.	  the	  more	  filler	  tasks),	  the	  greater	  the	  effect	  of	  MS	  (Burke,	  Martens,	  and	  Faucher	  184).	  This	  dual-­‐process	  model	  is	  further	  substantiated	  by	  experiments	  that	  non-­‐consciously	  prime	  death,	  such	  as	  subliminally	  flashing	  death-­‐related	  words	  on	  a	  computer	  screen,	  locating	  the	  experiment	  within	  proximity	  to	  a	  cemetery	  or	  funeral	  home,	  or	  exposing	  participants	  to	  MS	  while	  they	  are	  distracted	  with	  cognitively	  straining	  tasks.	  Because	  these	  experiments	  directly	  activate	  death	  on	  the	  more	  impactful	  non-­‐conscious	  level,	  unlike	  experiments	  that	  consciously	  activate	  death,	  these	  non-­‐conscious	  experiments	  do	  not	  require	  a	  delay	  to	  greatly	  affect	  the	  reactions	  of	  the	  participants.	  In	  total,	  this	  dual-­‐process	  model	  of	  TMT	  proposes	  that	  MS	  creates	  the	  greatest	  effect	  on	  our	  worldview	  and	  self-­‐esteem	  only	  after	  death	  has	  been	  pushed	  out	  of	  consciousness	  and	  reaches	  a	  non-­‐conscious	  level.	  As	  a	  result,	  TMT	  experiments	  typically	  attempt	  to	  test	  how	  non-­‐conscious	  awareness	  of	  our	  death	  affects	  our	  everyday	  choices,	  reactions,	  and	  interactions.	  
	  
III.	  Examples	  of	  the	  Variety	  of	  TMT	  Research	  	  Through	  the	  completion	  of	  hundreds	  of	  studies	  similar	  to	  the	  prototypical	  experiment	  just	  described,	  TMT	  research	  has	  investigated	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  ways	  in	  which	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we	  are	  affected	  by	  reminders	  of	  our	  death.	  Some	  experiments	  even	  directly	  map	  onto	  and	  support	  Becker’s	  theories.	  For	  example,	  experiments	  have	  confirmed	  that	  reminders	  of	  our	  death	  lead	  us	  to	  more	  adamantly	  reject	  our	  animality.	  Specifically,	  MS	  increases	  disgust	  reactions	  to	  essays	  emphasizing	  that	  we	  are	  animals.	  Similarly,	  MS	  also	  strengthens	  preference	  for	  an	  essay	  celebrating	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  humans	  over	  an	  essay	  highlighting	  our	  similarities	  to	  other	  animals	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Arndt	  118).	  Another	  line	  of	  experiments	  demonstrates	  that	  thoughts	  of	  death	  expand	  our	  desire	  for	  self-­‐esteem.	  More	  specifically,	  MS	  increases	  displays	  of	  driving	  skill	  and	  physical	  strength	  in	  people	  who	  base	  their	  self-­‐esteem	  partially	  on	  such	  abilities	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Arndt	  118).	  In	  addition,	  thinking	  about	  mortality	  heightens	  a	  person’s	  appeal	  for	  immortality	  in	  various	  ways,	  such	  as	  increasing	  the	  desire	  to	  have	  children	  and	  be	  famous	  (Jonas	  and	  Fritsche	  549;	  Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Arndt	  118).	  	  Beyond	  the	  research	  that	  directly	  coincides	  with	  Becker’s	  theories,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  wide	  assortment	  of	  other	  types	  of	  TMT	  research	  conducted.	  In	  particular,	  other	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  conscious	  reminders	  of	  death	  can	  lead	  a	  person	  to	  displace	  their	  fear	  of	  death	  onto	  smaller	  threats	  like	  spiders	  and	  germs.	  For	  example,	  MS	  increases	  hand	  washing	  by	  participants	  who	  rank	  high	  in	  compulsive	  hand	  washing	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Arndt	  128).	  Still	  other	  experiments	  expose	  the	  impact	  of	  MS	  on	  many	  different	  types	  of	  preferences,	  from	  what	  types	  of	  art	  we	  enjoy	  to	  what	  political	  candidate	  receives	  our	  vote	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Arndt	  124;	  130).	  These	  experiments	  are	  just	  a	  few	  illustrations	  of	  the	  breadth	  of	  TMT	  research	  conducted	  thus	  far.	  	  
IV.	  Defensive	  Results	  of	  MS	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  broad	  variety	  of	  experiments	  just	  described,	  the	  majority	  of	  TMT	  research	  has	  more	  narrowly	  focused	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  MS	  impacts	  our	  perception	  of	  and	  interaction	  with	  others.	  TMT	  experiments	  have	  displayed	  how	  MS	  intensifies	  in-­‐group	  identity	  in	  that	  it	  leads	  participants	  to	  increase	  the	  value	  they	  place	  on	  their	  romantic	  partner	  and	  parents	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Arndt	  119).	  Many	  other	  experiments	  confirm	  heightened	  disdain	  for	  people	  who	  are	  deemed	  outsiders,	  whose	  different	  beliefs	  threaten	  one’s	  worldview	  and	  self-­‐esteem.	  For	  example,	  following	  MS,	  people	  administered	  more	  of	  a	  spicy	  hot	  sauce	  to	  a	  person	  who	  criticized	  their	  political	  beliefs	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  amount	  they	  gave	  a	  person	  who	  shared	  their	  beliefs	  (Jonas	  and	  Fritsche	  545).	  Another	  experiment	  showed	  that	  judges	  who	  were	  reminded	  of	  their	  mortality	  recommended	  an	  average	  bond	  of	  $455	  for	  an	  alleged	  prostitute,	  whereas	  judges	  who	  were	  not	  exposed	  to	  MS	  recommended	  an	  average	  bond	  of	  $50	  (Greenberg,	  Pyszczynski,	  and	  Solomon	  7).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  MS	  does	  not	  straightforwardly	  lead	  to	  the	  punishing	  of	  transgressors.	  Rather,	  TMT	  suggests	  that	  a	  person	  confronted	  with	  their	  mortality	  wants	  to	  protect	  their	  self-­‐esteem	  and	  worldview,	  and	  will	  do	  so	  by	  bolstering	  whoever	  is	  in	  their	  in-­‐group	  and	  opposing	  whoever	  is	  in	  their	  out-­‐group.	  Therefore,	  if	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  crime	  represented	  a	  threat	  to	  a	  judge’s	  worldview	  placing	  them	  in	  the	  out-­‐group,	  then	  the	  judge	  would	  be	  harsher	  on	  the	  victim	  by	  being	  more	  lenient	  on	  the	  perpetrator	  who	  would	  be	  considered	  within	  the	  in-­‐group	  despite	  their	  behavior	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Arndt	  129).	  In	  another	  experiment,	  Christian	  participants	  who	  were	  reminded	  of	  their	  death	  exhibited	  liking	  for	  a	  Christian	  student	  and	  disliking	  for	  Jewish	  student,	  but	  those	  who	  were	  not	  reminded	  of	  their	  mortality	  did	  not	  display	  any	  preference	  (Greenberg,	  Pyszczynski,	  and	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Solomon	  8).	  In	  general,	  MS	  has	  consistently	  increased	  preference	  for	  one’s	  in-­‐group	  and	  hostility	  to	  one’s	  out-­‐group,	  showing	  support	  for	  Becker’s	  theory.	  	   In	  some	  TMT	  experiments,	  the	  opposition	  towards	  the	  out-­‐group	  has	  manifested	  in	  more	  severe	  intentions	  of	  aggression.	  For	  example,	  American	  participants	  confronted	  with	  MS	  had	  an	  increased	  acceptance	  of	  extreme	  military	  force,	  including	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  and	  chemical	  weapons,	  in	  order	  to	  fight	  terrorism.	  Similarly,	  Iranian	  participants	  exposed	  to	  MS	  had	  an	  increased	  approval	  of	  suicide	  attacks	  against	  the	  US,	  whereas	  participants	  in	  the	  control	  condition	  disapproved	  of	  suicide	  attacks	  (Jonas	  and	  Fritsche	  546).	  This	  experiment	  exposes	  the	  frightening	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy	  that	  occurs	  with	  MS.	  A	  country	  at	  war	  is	  bombarded	  with	  everyday	  reminders	  of	  death,	  such	  as	  constant	  news	  reports	  of	  fatalities	  and	  the	  prevalence	  of	  destroyed	  buildings.	  This	  increase	  in	  MS	  will	  likely	  increase	  the	  dislike	  for	  the	  out-­‐group	  ‘enemy’	  and	  the	  belief	  they	  should	  be	  harshly	  fought	  against.	  Then,	  this	  expanding	  negative	  perspective	  can	  lead	  to	  more	  attacks	  against	  the	  ‘enemy’	  other,	  which	  in	  turn	  creates	  more	  reminders	  of	  death.	  The	  increase	  in	  MS	  for	  this	  ‘enemy’	  other	  heightens	  the	  probability	  that	  they	  too	  will	  attack	  in	  retaliation.	  In	  this	  way,	  mortality	  salience	  can	  quickly	  escalate	  into	  and	  perpetuate	  war.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  TMT	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  defensive	  and	  detrimental	  consequences	  of	  MS.	  Thoughts	  of	  death	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  lead	  to	  prejudice,	  stereotyping,	  aggression,	  and	  racism,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  violent	  intergroup	  conflict,	  and	  then	  can	  spiral	  into	  war.	  This	  concentration	  on	  the	  negative	  aftermath	  of	  death	  awareness	  is	  not	  surprising	  considering	  that	  Becker,	  the	  theoretical	  source	  of	  TMT,	  focused	  a	  great	  deal	  on	  the	  harmful	  aspects	  of	  our	  denial	  of	  death.	  Furthermore,	  the	  general	  trend	  of	  social	  psychology	  research	  at	  the	  time	  TMT	  was	  first	  emerging	  was	  the	  examination	  of	  malevolent	  behavior	  (Vail	  et	  al.	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305).	  Because	  of	  this	  overwhelming	  concentration	  on	  the	  harmful	  consequences	  of	  MS,	  some	  TMT	  researchers	  are	  now	  trying	  to	  investigate	  more	  beneficial	  effects	  of	  death	  awareness	  (Vail	  et	  al.	  305).	  While	  it	  is	  incredibly	  challenging	  to	  even	  define	  what	  is	  negative	  and	  detrimental	  and	  what	  is	  positive	  and	  beneficial,	  Vail	  et	  al.	  have	  proposed	  “positive”	  outcomes	  as	  those	  that	  “minimize	  harm	  to	  oneself	  and	  others,	  and	  promote	  well-­‐being	  in	  physical,	  social,	  and	  psychological	  domains”	  (305).	  In	  short,	  at	  least	  a	  handful	  of	  TMT	  researchers	  are	  now	  turning	  towards	  uncovering	  ways	  that	  mortality	  salience	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  of	  harm	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  “well-­‐being.”	  	  
V.	  Potentially	  Beneficial	  Consequences	  of	  MS	  	  A	  specific	  line	  of	  experiments	  conduced	  by	  Vail	  et	  al.	  has	  examined	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  consciously	  thinking	  about	  death	  (308).	  In	  particular,	  this	  research	  exposes	  that	  people	  who	  tend	  to	  think	  about	  mortality	  more	  than	  others	  oftentimes	  place	  greater	  importance	  on	  pursing	  intrinsic	  goals.	  Vail	  et	  al.	  defines	  intrinsic	  goals	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  personal	  meaningful	  goals,	  in	  contrast	  to	  extrinsic	  goals	  that	  they	  explain	  as	  the	  automatic	  adoption	  of	  culturally	  prescribed	  goals.	  Interestingly,	  this	  same	  result	  occurs	  in	  experiments	  that	  stimulate	  MS	  but	  do	  not	  use	  a	  delay.	  That	  is,	  people	  who	  are	  reminded	  of	  their	  death,	  and	  are	  asked	  about	  their	  goals	  while	  death	  is	  still	  consciously	  on	  their	  minds,	  place	  greater	  importance	  on	  pursuing	  intrinsic	  versus	  extrinsic	  goals.	  Vail	  et	  al.	  argue	  that	  intrinsic	  goals	  are	  beneficial	  in	  that	  they	  assist	  in	  making	  life	  more	  meaningful,	  enhance	  psychological	  well-­‐being,	  and	  potentially	  can	  result	  in	  greater	  social	  cohesion	  (308).	  While	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  conscious	  awareness	  of	  death	  relates	  to	  a	  valuation	  of	  intrinsic	  goals	  and	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it	  is	  debatable	  if	  intrinsic	  goals	  are	  actually	  beneficial,	  these	  experiments	  still	  begin	  to	  reveal	  that	  thinking	  about	  death	  does	  not	  solely	  have	  detrimental	  effects.	  Furthermore,	  if	  a	  person	  is	  reminded	  of	  positive	  values,	  thinking	  about	  death	  encourages	  behavior	  that	  aligns	  with	  these	  beliefs.	  Many	  experiments	  have	  shown	  that	  when	  MS	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  delay,	  a	  person	  will	  more	  vigorously	  adopt	  primed	  values.	  While	  the	  salient	  values	  are	  typically	  those	  of	  a	  person’s	  culture	  and	  in-­‐group,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  alter	  the	  response	  following	  MS	  by	  priming	  other	  values	  instead.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  person	  is	  primed	  with	  peace,	  acceptance,	  and	  openness,	  after	  being	  reminded	  of	  their	  death,	  they	  will	  likely	  respond	  in	  ways	  that	  conform	  to	  these	  values.	  In	  one	  experiment,	  participants	  who	  completed	  a	  word	  search	  task	  with	  terms	  about	  pacifism	  increased	  their	  support	  for	  peaceful	  strategies	  after	  MS	  (Jonas	  and	  Fritsche	  551).	  Another	  especially	  interesting	  experiment	  began	  when	  a	  confederate,	  an	  accomplice	  to	  the	  experiment,	  talked	  loudly	  on	  a	  cell	  phone	  around	  people	  who	  subsequently	  became	  naïve	  participants	  (see	  Gailliot	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  Study	  3	  discussed	  in	  Vail	  et	  al.	  311).	  The	  phone	  conversation	  the	  participants	  overheard	  was	  either	  about	  helping	  others	  or	  about	  a	  control	  topic.	  As	  the	  participants	  continued	  walking	  down	  the	  sidewalk,	  they	  encountered	  a	  second	  confederate	  who	  dropped	  a	  notebook	  and	  struggled	  with	  their	  backpack.	  Of	  the	  participants	  who	  were	  primed	  with	  helping,	  those	  who	  encountered	  the	  second	  confederate	  in	  front	  of	  a	  cemetery	  helped	  them	  40%	  more	  of	  the	  time	  than	  those	  who	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  same	  experiment	  a	  block	  away	  from	  the	  cemetery.	  While	  the	  definitions	  of	  peaceful,	  helpful,	  accepting,	  and	  open	  are	  not	  straightforward	  and	  could	  potentially	  become	  problematic	  if	  left	  unquestioned,	  these	  experiments	  nevertheless	  demonstrate	  that	  MS	  does	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  harming	  others	  and	  can	  instead	  result	  in	  empathetic	  responses.	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   In	  addition,	  other	  research	  has	  shown	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  detrimental	  effects	  of	  MS	  when	  a	  person’s	  conception	  of	  their	  in-­‐group	  is	  expanded.	  MS	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  one’s	  in-­‐group,	  so	  if	  people	  broaden	  who	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  in	  their	  in-­‐group,	  they	  come	  to	  have	  concern	  for	  a	  larger	  group	  of	  people.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  person	  comes	  to	  think	  of	  themselves	  as	  a	  European	  instead	  of	  a	  German,	  after	  being	  reminded	  of	  their	  death,	  they	  will	  likely	  come	  to	  see	  a	  French	  person	  in	  a	  more	  positive	  way	  than	  if	  they	  think	  of	  themselves	  more	  narrowly	  as	  a	  German	  (Jonas	  and	  Fritsche	  551).	  Another	  way	  to	  expand	  one’s	  in-­‐group	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  similarities	  underlying	  humanity	  across	  the	  globe.	  One	  experiment	  primed	  American	  participants	  with	  either	  the	  universal	  threat	  of	  climate	  change	  or	  a	  local	  natural	  catastrophe.	  Participants	  who	  were	  primed	  with	  the	  global	  problem	  had	  an	  increased	  support	  for	  international	  peacemaking	  efforts	  and	  supported	  less	  militarism	  against	  Iran	  (Vail	  et	  al.	  314).	  Other	  experiments	  have	  similar	  results	  that	  primed	  a	  broader	  sense	  of	  humanity	  simply	  by	  having	  participants	  read	  essays	  about	  favorite	  childhood	  experiences	  from	  around	  the	  world	  and	  then	  contemplating	  their	  own	  memories	  (Vail	  et	  al.	  314).	  Again,	  these	  psychology	  studies	  demonstrate	  that	  thinking	  about	  mortality	  does	  not	  straightforwardly	  and	  absolutely	  lead	  to	  the	  harming	  of	  others,	  and	  by	  altering	  the	  content	  surrounding	  MS,	  death	  awareness	  can	  actually	  lead	  to	  compassionate	  behavior.	  	   Reminding	  people	  of	  their	  mortality	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  potential	  benefits.	  Experiments	  have	  demonstrated	  thinking	  about	  death	  can	  encourage	  greater	  fitness	  and	  exercise	  intentions,	  reduce	  smoking	  intensity	  among	  smokers,	  and	  increase	  intentions	  to	  use	  sunscreen	  (Vail	  et	  al.	  308).	  Other	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  elderly	  people	  who	  sense	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  time	  remaining	  before	  they	  die	  tend	  to	  maximize	  the	  positive	  aspects	  of	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their	  life	  and	  minimize	  the	  negative	  (Vail	  et	  al.	  317).	  An	  additional	  line	  of	  experiments	  examines	  the	  potential	  positive	  impact	  of	  MS	  on	  depression.	  For	  example,	  depressed	  participants	  who	  are	  reminded	  of	  their	  death	  and	  then	  are	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  defend	  their	  worldview	  actually	  begin	  to	  see	  life	  as	  more	  meaningful	  (Greenberg,	  Pyszczynski,	  and	  Solomon	  13).	  In	  another	  experiment,	  after	  MS	  and	  a	  creative	  writing	  exercise	  that	  focused	  on	  social	  connectedness,	  participants	  had	  increased	  positive	  mood,	  creative	  problem	  solving,	  and	  vitality,	  or	  what	  researchers	  call	  “positive	  psychological	  well	  being”	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Arndt	  126).	  In	  total,	  TMT	  research	  has	  been	  able	  to	  go	  farther	  than	  Becker’s	  theory	  in	  recent	  years,	  showing	  ways	  in	  which	  our	  awareness	  of	  mortality	  can	  be	  beneficial	  to	  life	  instead	  of	  automatically	  resulting	  in	  the	  escalation	  of	  stereotyping,	  prejudice,	  violence,	  and	  war.	  	  
VI.	  Dispositional	  Differences	  in	  Response	  to	  MS	  In	  addition	  to	  TMT	  experiments	  that	  display	  the	  potentially	  beneficial	  consequences	  of	  thinking	  about	  death,	  other	  TMT	  research	  is	  beginning	  to	  explain	  the	  role	  of	  dispositional	  and	  personal	  factors	  in	  how	  people	  are	  affected	  by	  MS.	  One	  particular	  line	  of	  experiments	  establishes	  that	  hardiness	  can	  decrease	  the	  effects	  of	  MS.	  According	  to	  the	  experimenters	  Florian,	  Mikulincer,	  and	  Hirschberger,	  hardiness	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  commitment	  to	  what	  one	  is	  doing	  in	  their	  lives,	  a	  belief	  that	  they	  have	  some	  control	  over	  results	  in	  life,	  and	  a	  perspective	  that	  challenge	  can	  lead	  to	  growth	  and	  is	  not	  just	  a	  threat	  (439).	  Their	  experiment	  revealed	  that,	  compared	  to	  Israeli	  students	  who	  were	  not	  exposed	  to	  MS,	  those	  who	  were	  confronted	  with	  their	  mortality	  gave	  harsher	  punishments	  for	  social	  transgressions.	  However,	  of	  the	  participants	  who	  were	  exposed	  to	  MS,	  those	  who	  also	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scored	  low	  on	  hardiness	  gave	  the	  most	  severe	  punishments.	  In	  other	  words,	  students	  who	  were	  hardy	  did	  not	  have	  as	  intense	  of	  a	  defense	  against	  others	  when	  confronted	  with	  reminders	  of	  death.	  	  Furthermore,	  Florian,	  Mikulincer,	  and	  Hirschberger	  maintain	  that	  people	  who	  rank	  high	  in	  hardiness	  tend	  to	  rely	  on	  active,	  transformational	  coping	  and	  are	  more	  flexible	  with	  decisions,	  and	  people	  who	  rank	  low	  in	  hardiness	  tend	  to	  prefer	  distancing	  coping	  strategies,	  such	  as	  repression	  or	  withdrawal	  behaviors	  (Florian,	  Mikulincer,	  and	  Hirschberger	  441).	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  propose	  people	  who	  rank	  high	  in	  hardiness	  rely	  more	  on	  inner	  strength	  rather	  than	  on	  cultural	  worldviews,	  so	  they	  react	  to	  death	  in	  an	  active,	  transformational	  way,	  and	  thus	  do	  nothave	  as	  much	  of	  a	  need	  to	  bolster	  established	  cultural	  positions	  (Florian,	  Mikulincer,	  and	  Hirschberger	  448).	  An	  alternative	  explanation	  the	  experimenters	  provide	  is	  that	  people	  who	  rank	  high	  in	  hardiness	  might	  not	  be	  as	  impacted	  by	  MS	  perhaps	  because	  they	  also	  have	  high	  self-­‐esteem,	  and	  thus	  do	  not	  need	  to	  compensate	  as	  much	  for	  the	  decreased	  self-­‐esteem	  that	  occurs	  from	  exposure	  to	  MS	  (Florian,	  Mikulincer,	  and	  Hirschberger	  450).	  While	  the	  experimenters’	  concept	  of	  hardiness	  is	  not	  completely	  clear	  and	  indisputable,	  this	  experiment	  reveals	  how	  individuals	  respond	  differently	  when	  confronted	  with	  thoughts	  of	  death,	  showing	  that	  MS	  does	  not	  have	  a	  universal	  response	  amongst	  all	  people.	  In	  this	  way,	  TMT	  has	  been	  able	  to	  build	  on	  top	  of	  Becker’s	  theory	  in	  that	  it	  is	  beginning	  to	  unpack	  the	  nuances	  involved	  in	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  deal	  with	  our	  denial	  of	  death.	  Other	  experiments	  examine	  how	  some	  people	  respond	  to	  MS	  with	  less	  defense	  against	  their	  out-­‐group.	  For	  example,	  MS	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  less	  of	  an	  impact	  on	  people	  who	  believe	  they	  have	  control	  over	  events	  that	  affect	  them,	  what	  psychologists	  call	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having	  a	  “high	  internal	  locus	  of	  control”	  (Jonas	  and	  Fritsche	  548).	  In	  addition,	  MS	  leads	  to	  less	  pronounced	  responses	  from	  people	  who	  feel	  they	  are	  well	  ingrained	  within	  an	  in-­‐group.	  Similarly,	  people	  who	  are	  reminded	  of	  having	  a	  secure	  relationship,	  such	  as	  a	  romantic	  partnership	  or	  offspring,	  respond	  with	  less	  opposition	  against	  others	  when	  reminded	  of	  death	  (Jonas	  and	  Fritsche	  553).	  Also,	  people	  who	  are	  intrinsically	  religious	  and	  are	  able	  to	  reaffirm	  their	  beliefs	  prior	  to	  MS	  display	  decreased	  oppositional	  effects	  (Jonas	  and	  Fritsche	  548).	  MS	  can	  sometimes	  even	  lead	  to	  self	  and	  social	  exploration	  among	  cognitively	  flexible,	  open-­‐minded,	  or	  creative	  individuals	  (Vail	  et	  al.	  316).	  Moreover,	  demographics	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  how	  people	  respond	  to	  MS.	  In	  particular,	  Burke’s	  meta-­‐analysis	  uncovered	  MS	  manipulations	  affected	  Americans	  significantly	  more	  than	  Europeans	  and	  Israelis,	  and	  also	  affected	  students	  in	  college	  more	  than	  those	  not	  in	  college.	  All	  of	  these	  results	  further	  show	  that	  MS	  does	  not	  straightforwardly	  lead	  to	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  aftereffect.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  wide	  variety	  of	  TMT	  research	  exposes	  that	  awareness	  of	  our	  mortality	  greatly	  affects	  us,	  but	  it	  does	  so	  differently	  depending	  on	  the	  person	  and	  the	  context.	  	  	  
VII.	  Future	  Directions	  of	  TMT	  While	  these	  experiments	  begin	  to	  reveal	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  universal	  response	  to	  MS,	  more	  research	  needs	  to	  explore	  how	  the	  particular,	  nuanced	  differences	  between	  people	  relate	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  MS.	  In	  particular,	  future	  experiments	  should	  clarify	  the	  details	  of	  individual	  dispositions	  in	  response	  to	  MS.	  Other	  research	  should	  investigate	  if	  there	  is	  a	  relation	  between	  the	  various	  types	  of	  immortality	  striving	  within	  a	  particular	  culture	  and	  the	  consequences	  following	  MS	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Pyszczynski	  123).	  Further	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experiments	  should	  examine	  the	  distinct	  responses	  to	  MS	  across	  more	  diverse	  cultures	  throughout	  the	  globe	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Pyszczynski	  124).	  Also,	  research	  should	  look	  into	  whether	  a	  person’s	  response	  to	  MS	  changes	  across	  their	  lifespan	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Pyszczynski	  125).	  By	  better	  understanding	  the	  specific	  dispositional	  and	  situational	  responses	  to	  MS,	  the	  beneficial	  consequences	  of	  thinking	  about	  one’s	  death	  might	  become	  clearer.	  	  Beyond	  the	  call	  for	  more	  detailed	  research,	  some	  TMT	  psychologists	  argue	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  an	  amendment	  to	  Terror	  Management	  Theory	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  particular,	  a	  handful	  of	  TMT	  researchers	  are	  looking	  at	  the	  work	  of	  Becker’s	  predecessor	  and	  main	  influence,	  Otto	  Rank,	  who	  proposed	  two	  motivational	  systems.	  One	  motivation	  Rank	  describes	  is	  reducing	  anxiety	  caused	  by	  fear	  of	  life	  and	  death,	  which	  is	  what	  TMT	  has	  focused	  on	  thus	  far.	  The	  second	  motivation	  Rank	  proposes	  is	  creative	  will,	  a	  simultaneous	  striving	  to	  grow	  and	  expand.	  Given	  Rank’s	  expanded	  focus,	  some	  TMT	  researchers	  postulate	  an	  individual	  is	  partially	  striving	  to	  reduce	  the	  terror	  of	  our	  death	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  also	  trying	  to	  open	  possibilities	  in	  life.	  As	  a	  result,	  these	  TMT	  psychologists	  are	  encouraging	  future	  research	  to	  investigate	  growth-­‐expansion	  side	  by	  side	  with	  the	  terror-­‐reduction	  already	  being	  investigated	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Pyszczynski	  130).	  	  
VIII.	  Validation	  for	  TMT	  	   In	  total,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  psychological	  experimentation,	  TMT	  offers	  a	  coherent	  illustration	  of	  how	  death	  frequently	  affects	  us	  without	  our	  conscious	  realization,	  providing	  experimental	  support	  for	  some	  of	  Becker’s	  theories.	  TMT	  experiments	  demonstrate	  that	  following	  reminders	  of	  death,	  people	  react	  in	  a	  way	  to	  increase	  their	  self-­‐esteem	  and	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worldview	  defense.	  This	  bolstering	  of	  one’s	  identity	  that	  occurs	  following	  MS	  usually	  involves	  “intensified	  positive	  reactions	  to	  those	  who	  validate	  one’s	  cherished	  beliefs	  and	  intensified	  negative	  reactions	  to	  those	  who	  threaten	  such	  beliefs”	  (Greenberg,	  Pyszczynski,	  and	  Solomon	  9).	  Most	  of	  the	  research	  conducted	  to	  date	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  reminders	  of	  death,	  but	  other	  areas	  of	  TMT	  are	  starting	  to	  highlight	  the	  positive	  impacts	  of	  MS.	  In	  this	  way,	  TMT	  is	  moving	  beyond	  Becker’s	  concentration	  on	  the	  harmful	  consequences	  of	  our	  mortality	  awareness	  to	  expose	  possible	  advantages.	  Yet	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  further	  testing	  of	  potential	  benefits	  that	  occur	  when	  thinking	  about	  death,	  detailed	  research	  into	  the	  different	  responses	  to	  MS,	  and	  an	  investigation	  into	  a	  parallel	  growth-­‐expansion	  motivation.	  Through	  understanding	  that	  we	  have	  the	  tendency	  to	  be	  detrimentally	  affected	  by	  confrontations	  with	  mortality,	  and	  elucidating	  possible	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  actually	  benefit	  from	  recognition	  of	  our	  finitude,	  TMT	  begins	  to	  give	  us	  the	  opportunity	  to	  use	  our	  death	  as	  a	  way	  to	  enhance	  and	  better	  life.	  TMT	  does	  not	  oppose	  other	  psychological	  theories,	  but	  rather	  aims	  to	  explain	  the	  underlying	  ‘why’	  behind	  the	  basic	  psychological	  entities	  these	  other	  theories	  describe	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Pyszczynski	  127).	  Despite	  the	  fact	  TMT	  ideas	  are	  not	  incongruent	  with	  contemporary	  psychology,	  they	  were	  initially	  completely	  rejected	  by	  the	  field	  of	  psychology	  (Greenberg,	  Pyszczynski,	  and	  Solomon	  5).	  Given	  that	  dozens	  of	  researchers	  have	  conducted	  hundreds	  of	  TMT	  studies	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Arndt	  117),	  the	  field	  of	  psychology	  is	  beginning	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  their	  experiments.	  However,	  there	  is	  still	  not	  wholehearted	  respect	  for	  TMT.	  There	  is	  hesitation	  from	  other	  scientists	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  that	  gathered	  data	  from	  almost	  300	  TMT	  experiments	  confirms	  “The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effect	  was	  r=.35,	  which	  attained	  the	  top	  quartile	  of	  effects	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for	  psychology	  in	  general	  and	  the	  80th	  percentile	  for	  theories	  in	  personality	  and	  social	  psychology”	  (Burke,	  Martens,	  and	  Faucher	  185).	  As	  a	  result,	  “the	  MS	  hypothesis	  of	  TMT—that	  death	  affects	  us	  without	  our	  conscious	  realization—is	  robust	  and	  produces	  moderate	  to	  large	  effects	  across	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  MS	  manipulations	  as	  well	  as	  attitudinal,	  behavioral,	  and	  cognitive	  DVs”	  (Burke,	  Martens,	  and	  Faucher	  187).	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  highly	  statistically	  valid	  to	  say	  that	  MS	  affects	  our	  thoughts,	  beliefs,	  and	  behaviors.	  The	  founders	  of	  TMT	  also	  assert	  “the	  empirical	  support	  for	  this	  picture	  is	  now	  sufficiently	  strong	  that	  the	  role	  of	  terror	  management	  concerns	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  any	  comprehensive	  treatments	  of	  topics	  within	  the	  conceptual	  domain	  of	  the	  theory”	  (Greenberg,	  Solomon,	  and	  Pyszczynski	  123).	  While	  TMT	  researchers	  do	  not	  want	  to	  claim	  TMT	  as	  the	  sole	  motivation	  behind	  human	  life,	  they	  believe	  the	  social	  sciences	  need	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  impact	  of	  our	  denial	  of	  death	  in	  everyday	  existence,	  especially	  because	  it	  has	  been	  experimentally	  demonstrated.	  	  	  
IX.	  Looking	  Beyond	  the	  Social	  Science	  of	  Death	  in	  Life	  Becker	  and	  TMT	  should	  be	  applauded	  for	  pushing	  the	  boundaries	  of	  psychology,	  and	  for	  trying	  to	  approach	  existential	  topics	  through	  science.	  They	  help	  to	  uncover	  how	  pervasively	  and	  profoundly	  death	  affects	  our	  lives,	  especially	  clarifying	  the	  detrimental	  and	  unhealthy	  consequences	  of	  many	  of	  the	  ways	  we	  usually	  cope	  with	  death.	  However,	  Becker	  and	  TMT	  make	  few	  successful	  strides	  toward	  explaining	  what	  this	  means	  about	  who	  we	  are,	  and	  what,	  if	  anything,	  we	  can	  do	  about	  it.	  While	  Becker	  promotes	  religion	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  deny	  death,	  his	  inadequate	  description	  of	  what	  he	  means	  by	  religion	  leaves	  his	  readers	  confused.	  Becker	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  way	  to	  approach	  the	  existential	  problems	  he	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begins	  to	  unfold.	  The	  experimental	  psychology	  of	  TMT	  supports	  and	  enhance	  many	  of	  Becker’s	  theoretical	  postulations,	  and	  goes	  beyond	  Becker	  in	  beginning	  to	  expose	  possible	  ways	  in	  which	  death	  awareness	  can	  lead	  to	  beneficial	  consequences.	  However,	  TMT	  researchers	  also	  do	  not	  directly	  show	  us	  different	  ways	  to	  confront	  our	  mortality	  nor	  do	  they	  question	  the	  healthiness	  of	  our	  responses.	  While	  Becker	  and	  TMT	  succeed	  in	  their	  critique	  of	  our	  rejection	  of	  death,	  their	  positive	  response	  proves	  less	  than	  satisfying.	  The	  psychological	  approach	  begins	  to	  skim	  the	  ontic	  surface	  of	  our	  relation	  to	  death,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  penetrate	  into	  how	  death	  is	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  who	  we	  are.	  	  	   Considering	  that	  he	  is	  a	  historian,	  Ariès	  too	  offers	  little	  illumination	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  making	  sense	  of	  how	  fundamental	  death	  is	  to	  our	  existence.	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  a	  continental	  philosopher,	  despite	  having	  respect	  for	  Ariès	  work,	  points	  out	  this	  issue	  and	  says,	  “The	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  death	  and	  of	  the	  word	  ‘death,’	  the	  question	  ‘What	  is	  death	  in	  general?	  or	  ‘What	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  death?’	  and	  the	  question	  of	  knowing	  if	  death	  ‘is’-­‐	  and	  what	  death	  ‘is’-­‐	  all	  remain	  radically	  absent	  as	  questions”	  (25).	  According	  to	  Derrida,	  Ariès	  assumes	  that	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  death	  is	  self-­‐explanatory.	  Indeed,	  at	  this	  point	  Derrida	  turns	  to	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  as	  we	  will	  do	  in	  the	  coming	  chapter,	  for	  Derrida	  sees	  Heidegger’s	  rigorous	  ontological	  study	  of	  human	  life	  as	  taking	  precisely	  those	  precautions	  Ariès	  does	  not.	  Heidegger	  attempts	  to	  uproot	  widespread	  presuppositions	  about	  what	  death	  is.	  Derrida	  has	  his	  own	  philosophical	  agenda	  in	  referencing	  Ariès	  and	  Heidegger	  here,	  but	  for	  our	  purposes	  what	  is	  most	  important	  is	  his	  elucidation	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  social	  science	  investigations	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  examining	  our	  mortality	  through	  the	  perspective	  of	  continental	  philosophy.	  By	  focusing	  more	  precisely	  on	  the	  possibilities	  of	  responding	  to	  death,	  continental	  philosophy	  can	  supplement	  the	  work	  of	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  
	   64	  
TMT.	  Accordingly,	  Chapter	  Four	  of	  this	  thesis	  describes	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy	  and	  Chapter	  Five	  explains	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophical	  psychology	  in	  order	  to	  more	  comprehensively	  investigate	  the	  theme	  of	  death	  in	  life.	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Chapter	  Four:	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  Continental	  Philosopher:	  Ontology	  of	  Death	  
I.	  Introduction	  to	  Heidegger	  This	  thesis	  next	  turns	  towards	  Martin	  Heidegger	  (1889-­‐1976),	  a	  German	  philosopher	  well	  known	  for	  his	  work	  Being	  and	  Time	  published	  in	  1927.	  The	  project	  of	  the	  book	  is	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  Being	  of	  beings,	  an	  undertaking	  Heidegger	  claims	  no	  philosopher	  has	  ever	  truly	  attempted.	  In	  order	  to	  try	  to	  uncover	  what	  Being	  is,	  Heidegger	  constructs	  a	  new	  language.	  He	  oftentimes	  uses	  familiar	  words	  in	  novel	  ways	  to	  build	  a	  way	  in	  which	  to	  conceptualize	  Being.	  Furthermore,	  Heidegger	  employs	  a	  phenomenological	  method,	  approaching	  the	  question	  of	  Being	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  everyday	  phenomena.	  Specifically,	  Heidegger	  looks	  at	  our	  everyday	  existence	  in	  his	  examination	  of	  our	  being.	  He	  calls	  our	  being	  ‘Dasein,’	  which	  in	  German	  technically	  means	  something	  like	  “being	  there.”	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  define	  Dasein	  as	  human	  being	  because	  he	  wants	  to	  stay	  away	  from	  making	  any	  claims	  about	  universal,	  absolute	  human	  nature	  or	  reality.	  In	  addition,	  Dasein	  is	  not	  just	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  live	  nor	  does	  Dasein	  signify	  consciousness	  or	  ego.	  Rather,	  Heidegger	  is	  trying	  to	  investigate	  the	  beings	  that	  we	  are,	  that	  I	  am,	  which	  he	  illustrates	  as	  distinct	  from	  all	  other	  types	  of	  being.	  He	  describes	  Dasein	  as	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  is	  a	  being	  concerned	  about	  its	  Being.	  Said	  differently,	  we	  are	  a	  distinct	  kind	  of	  being	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  apprehend	  what	  Being	  is.	  Given	  Dasein’s	  exceptional	  character,	  the	  method	  of	  Heidegger’s	  project	  in	  Being	  and	  Time	  is	  elucidating	  our	  being,	  Dasein,	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  Being	  in	  general.	  	  	  
II.	  Being-­‐towards-­‐Death	  
A.	  We	  Are	  In	  Relation	  Towards	  Our	  Death	  
	   66	  
Throughout	  Being	  and	  Time	  Heidegger	  uncovers	  various	  intertwining	  aspects	  of	  the	  ontological	  constitution	  of	  Dasein.	  Heidegger	  describes	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  central	  aspects	  of	  who	  we	  are.	  Heidegger’s	  ideas	  are	  complexly	  connected,	  so	  they	  are	  less	  than	  ideal	  to	  separate	  from	  one	  another.	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  space	  and	  clarity,	  this	  chapter	  will	  concentrate	  on	  explicating	  the	  basics	  of	  Heidegger’s	  idea	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  chapter	  is	  focusing	  on	  one	  piece	  of	  Heidegger’s	  entire	  project,	  and	  thus	  is	  only	  beginning	  to	  scratch	  the	  surface	  of	  his	  concept	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  his	  explanation	  of	  Being	  in	  general.	  Heidegger	  philosophically	  investigates	  death	  on	  a	  different	  level	  than	  the	  social	  science	  of	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT.	  Heidegger	  is	  not	  just	  saying	  our	  thoughts,	  behaviors,	  and	  emotions	  are	  affected	  by	  our	  ultimate	  perishing.	  Rather,	  he	  defines	  our	  being	  as	  essentially	  toward	  death;	  we	  are	  constantly	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  death.	  Heidegger	  states,	  “Death	  is	  a	  way	  to	  be,	  which	  Dasein	  takes	  over	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  is.	  ‘As	  soon	  as	  man	  comes	  to	  life,	  he	  is	  at	  once	  old	  enough	  to	  die’”	  (BT	  [MR]	  289/SZ	  245).11	  With	  this	  quote	  Heidegger	  is	  saying	  much	  more	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  could	  die	  at	  any	  point,	  he	  is	  revealing	  that	  I,	  Dasein,	  am	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  	  
B.	  Not	  Experiencing	  Demise	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  believe	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  involves	  experiencing	  death.	  In	  particular,	  he	  claims	  that	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  does	  not	  involve	  one	  ‘dying’	  because	  Dasein	  cannot	  experience	  its	  own	  death.	  Heidegger	  states,	  in	  this	  “transition	  to	  no-­‐longer-­‐Dasein	  [Dasein]	  gets	  lifted	  right	  out	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  experiencing	  this	  transition	  and	  of	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understanding	  it	  as	  something	  experienced”	  (BT	  [MR]	  281/SZ	  237).	  When	  Dasein	  ‘dies,’	  it	  cannot	  experience	  its	  lack	  of	  existence	  because	  then	  it	  no	  longer	  exists	  and	  is	  thus	  unable	  to	  experience	  its	  not	  existing.	  As	  a	  result,	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  not	  about	  Dasein’s	  ‘dying’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  demise.	  	   Beyond	  an	  inability	  to	  experience	  one’s	  own	  death,	  Heidegger	  also	  asserts	  Dasein	  cannot	  experience	  the	  death,	  as	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  of	  another.	  Instead	  of	  having	  the	  unique	  type	  of	  being	  as	  a	  Dasein,	  the	  deceased	  ceases	  to	  be	  Dasein	  (BT	  [MR]	  282/SZ	  238).	  The	  deceased	  no	  longer	  maintains	  the	  unique	  being	  of	  Dasein,	  and	  comes	  to	  be	  more	  like	  that	  of	  a	  thing.	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  the	  dead	  body	  becomes	  “an	  object	  of	  ‘concern’”	  in	  the	  funeral	  rituals	  (BT	  [MR]	  282/SZ	  238).	  As	  soon	  as	  Dasein	  ‘dies,’	  no	  one	  can	  experience	  them	  as	  Dasein,	  as	  the	  unique	  being	  that	  is	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  Therefore,	  Dasein	  cannot	  experience	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  of	  another	  Dasein.	  We	  can	  witness	  the	  death	  of	  another,	  we	  can	  be	  alongside	  the	  dying,	  but	  we	  cannot	  experience	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  of	  anyone	  but	  ourselves.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  establishing	  that	  we	  cannot	  experience	  death,	  Heidegger	  points	  out	  that	  this	  underlying	  conception	  of	  death,	  as	  the	  last	  moment	  of	  one’s	  life,	  is	  not	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  his	  inquiry.	  Dastur	  clarifies	  Heidegger’s	  perspective	  and	  states,	  “For	  what	  essentially	  characterizes	  human	  being	  is	  the	  relation	  to	  its	  own	  death,	  which	  can	  never	  become	  an	  event	  in	  the	  world,	  since	  it	  constitutes	  the	  end	  of	  the	  world	  for	  the	  human	  being”	  (38).	  Heidegger	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  looking	  at	  death	  as	  the	  final	  event	  of	  transition	  from	  being-­‐there	  to	  no-­‐longer-­‐being-­‐there.	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  is	  not	  investigating	  what	  he	  calls	  “demise,”	  the	  moment	  when	  life	  becomes	  death,	  nor	  is	  he	  examining	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  ‘dying’	  that	  occurs	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  one’s	  life.	  As	  a	  result,	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  want	  to	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approach	  death	  from	  a	  biological	  or	  psychological	  perspective.	  Unlike	  the	  traditional	  perspective	  held	  in	  these	  disciplines,	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  consider	  our	  death	  as	  “a	  being-­‐at-­‐an-­‐end”	  but	  a	  “being	  towards	  the	  end”	  (BT	  [JS]	  236/SZ	  245).	  Death	  is	  not	  the	  end	  moment(s)	  in	  life,	  but	  is	  rather	  is	  a	  part	  of	  our	  entire	  existence,	  an	  essential	  constitution	  of	  our	  being.	  	  	  
C.	  Not	  a	  Religious	  or	  Metaphysical	  Claim	  	   Even	  though	  Heidegger	  distances	  himself	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  death	  as	  a	  physical	  end	  of	  life,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  he	  wants	  to	  look	  at	  death	  in	  a	  transcendental	  perspective.	  Specifically,	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  want	  to	  ask	  questions	  regarding	  the	  afterlife,	  such	  as	  whether	  it	  exists,	  is	  a	  higher	  or	  lower	  form	  of	  existence,	  or	  involves	  immortality	  (BT	  [MR]	  292/SZ	  248).	  Instead,	  Heidegger	  wants	  “our	  analysis	  of	  death	  [to	  remain]	  purely	  ‘this-­‐worldly’”	  (BT	  [MR]	  292/SZ	  248).	  Heidegger’s	  desire	  to	  stay	  clear	  of	  these	  religious	  questions	  does	  not	  mean	  he	  is	  claiming	  these	  questions	  cannot	  be	  asked.	  Heidegger,	  as	  a	  phenomenologist,	  believes	  we	  must	  start	  our	  investigation	  from	  our	  everyday	  experience,	  ‘this-­‐worldly,’	  and	  only	  once	  we	  have	  achieved	  this	  foundation	  can	  we	  move	  on	  to	  other	  questions.	  	   Heidegger	  also	  does	  not	  want	  to	  make	  any	  metaphysical	  claims	  about	  death.	  For	  example,	  he	  does	  not	  want	  to	  postulate	  how	  death	  came	  into	  the	  world,	  the	  ‘meaning’	  of	  death,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  negative	  and	  evil	  (King	  151).	  In	  a	  paper	  written	  shortly	  before	  Being	  and	  
Time	  Heidegger	  says,	  “‘Our	  aim	  here	  is	  not	  to	  offer	  a	  metaphysics	  of	  death	  but	  to	  understand	  the	  ontological	  structures	  of	  death	  within	  life’”	  (qtd.	  in	  Ireton	  252).	  Again,	  the	  metaphysical	  question,	  like	  the	  religious	  question,	  is	  inappropriate	  and	  only	  could,	  if	  ever,	  be	  asked	  after	  the	  primary	  question	  about	  the	  ontology	  of	  death.	  For	  Heidegger,	  the	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question	  of	  what	  death	  ‘is’	  and	  in	  what	  way	  it	  ‘is’	  has	  to	  be	  resolved	  before	  other	  questions	  of	  death	  can	  be	  investigated.	  Furthermore,	  Heidegger	  views	  all	  other	  disciplines	  that	  discuss	  death,	  such	  as	  biology	  and	  psychology,	  as	  also	  secondary	  to	  an	  existential	  analysis	  of	  death	  (BT	  [MR]	  292/SZ	  248).	  In	  this	  way,	  Heidegger	  is	  trying	  to	  uncover	  an	  understanding	  of	  our	  death	  that	  is	  fundamental	  and	  primary	  to	  what	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  presuppose	  that	  they	  are	  investigating.	  	  	  
D.	  Unlike	  ‘Death’	  of	  Other	  Beings	  Heidegger	  differentiates	  his	  idea	  of	  Dasein’s	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  from	  the	  ‘death’	  of	  other	  kinds	  of	  beings.	  In	  particular,	  Heidegger	  claims	  that	  Dasein’s	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  not	  like	  the	  “death”	  of	  an	  animal,	  or	  what	  he	  titles	  “perishing”	  (BT	  [MR]	  284/SZ	  240).	  Just	  as	  he	  believes	  Dasein	  cannot	  experience	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐life,	  of	  either	  itself	  or	  of	  another	  Dasein,	  Heidegger	  argues	  Dasein’s	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  of	  other	  types	  of	  living	  beings.	  	  	   In	  addition,	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  death	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘not	  yet’	  for	  Dasein,	  since	  insofar	  as	  Dasein	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  dead.	  However,	  Heidegger	  illustrates	  that	  Dasein’s	  not-­‐yet	  is	  distinct	  compared	  to	  other	  kinds	  of	  not-­‐yets.	  Specifically,	  he	  describes	  that	  the	  death	  of	  Dasein	  is	  not	  like	  an	  owed	  debt	  to	  be	  repaid	  in	  the	  future,	  a	  not-­‐yet	  completed	  repayment	  (BT	  [MR]	  287/SZ	  243).	  Dasein	  is	  not	  a	  sum	  of	  parts	  where	  death	  is	  the	  missing	  part	  that	  eventually	  adds	  up	  to	  make	  Dasein	  whole.	  Therefore,	  because	  Dasein	  is	  not	  like	  an	  object	  that	  eventually	  is	  completed,	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  not	  an	  outstanding	  aspect	  of	  Dasein.	  The	  death	  of	  Dasein	  is	  also	  unlike	  the	  dark	  side	  of	  the	  moon,	  a	  not-­‐yet	  perceived	  (BT	  [MR]	  287/SZ	  243).	  This	  not-­‐yet	  seen	  part	  of	  the	  moon	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  being	  of	  the	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moon,	  but	  only	  involves	  our	  perception	  of	  the	  moon	  from	  earth.	  Unlike	  the	  moon,	  our	  being	  is	  not	  entire	  from	  the	  start,	  and	  unlike	  the	  dark	  side	  of	  the	  moon,	  our	  death	  is	  not	  just	  hidden	  because	  of	  a	  limited	  perspective.	  Instead,	  Dasein	  must	  become	  its	  death.	  Furthermore,	  the	  death	  of	  Dasein	  is	  not	  like	  a	  fruit	  ripening	  (BT	  [MR]	  287/SZ	  243).	  Heidegger	  contends	  that	  a	  ripening	  fruit	  is	  more	  similar	  to	  Dasein’s	  death	  than	  the	  other	  two	  examples	  in	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  static	  existence.	  Heidegger	  explains,	  “The	  ‘not-­‐yet’	  has	  already	  been	  included	  in	  the	  very	  Being	  of	  the	  fruit,	  not	  as	  some	  random	  characteristic,	  but	  as	  something	  constitutive.	  Correspondingly,	  as	  long	  as	  any	  Dasein	  is,	  it	  too	  is	  already	  its	  
‘not-­‐yet’”(BT	  [MR]	  288/SZ	  244).	  Like	  a	  fruit	  ripening,	  death	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  being	  of	  Dasein.	  However,	  Heidegger	  argues	  that	  the	  example	  of	  ripening	  still	  does	  not	  fully	  represent	  Dasein’s	  death.	  A	  fruit	  constantly	  moves	  closer	  to	  ripeness	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  manifests	  into	  existence.	  When	  a	  fruit	  ripens,	  it	  becomes	  complete	  in	  a	  sense	  of	  fulfilling	  itself.	  However,	  when	  Dasein	  dies,	  it	  usually	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Dasein	  has	  fulfilled	  its	  specific	  possibilities	  (BT	  [MR]	  288/SZ	  244).	  Most	  of	  the	  time	  Dasein	  dies	  unfulfilled	  or	  else	  has	  “disintegrated	  and	  been	  used	  up”	  (BT	  [MR]	  288/SZ	  244).	  Regardless	  of	  what	  example	  is	  used,	  Heidegger	  elucidates	  the	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  of	  Dasein	  as	  distinct	  and	  unique	  compared	  to	  the	  ‘death’	  of	  all	  other	  beings,	  whether	  animate	  or	  inanimate.	  	  
E.	  Ontological	  Constitution	  An	  essential	  aspect	  of	  Heidegger’s	  understanding	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  opposite	  of	  life.	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  see	  a	  clear	  opposition	  between	  life	  and	  death.	  He	  says,	  “Death,	  in	  the	  widest	  sense,	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  life”(BT	  [MR]	  290/SZ	  246).	  As	  a	  phenomenologist,	  Heidegger	  is	  interested	  in	  how	  phenomena	  appear	  to	  us	  in	  our	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experience.	  Therefore,	  he	  is	  interested	  in	  looking	  at	  how	  death	  manifests	  within	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  Heidegger’s	  investigation	  examines	  how	  we	  are	  always	  relating	  to	  death,	  as	  continuously	  being	  towards	  death	  every	  moment	  of	  our	  lives.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  view	  our	  relation	  to	  death	  as	  only	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  our	  lives	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  eventual	  event	  of	  our	  demise.	  Instead,	  Heidegger	  views	  our	  death	  as	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  our	  being.	  Magda	  King,	  a	  researcher	  working	  on	  Heidegger,	  explains	  it	  well,	  “In	  the	  existential	  sense,	  death	  is	  not	  a	  ‘fact,’	  an	  occurrence	  within	  the	  world;	  there	  is	  death	  only	  in	  the	  being	  of	  a	  Dasein	  to	  his	  end,	  which	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  is	  constantly	  disclosed	  to	  him”	  (157).	  Being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  an	  ontological	  constitution	  of	  Dasein.	  	  
F.	  Ownmost,	  Nonrelational,	  Certain,	  Indefinite,	  and	  Insuperable	  Possibility	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  positively	  describing	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  an	  ontological	  constitution	  of	  Dasein,	  Heidegger	  provides	  a	  more	  specific	  definition	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  In	  particular,	  Heidegger	  defines	  death	  as	  the	  “ownmost,	  nonrelational,	  certain	  and,	  as	  such,	  indefinite	  and	  insuperable	  possibility	  of	  Dasein”	  (BT	  [JS]	  248/SZ	  259).	  Heidegger	  explains	  these	  terms	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  them	  difficult	  to	  parse	  out	  into	  separate	  descriptions.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  section	  will	  aim	  to	  more	  generally	  explain	  what	  these	  terms	  imply	  together.	  	  To	  begin,	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  because	  death	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  impossibility	  of	  our	  existence,	  death	  is	  our	  most	  extreme	  possibility.	  Said	  differently,	  death	  is	  a	  peculiar	  possibility	  because	  it	  is	  what	  halts	  all	  other	  possibilities.	  Heidegger	  asserts	  that	  out	  of	  all	  of	  our	  possibilities,	  death	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  is	  most	  one’s	  own.12	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Heidegger	  states,	  “No	  one	  can	  take	  the	  Other’s	  dying	  away	  from	  him”	  (BT	  [MR]	  284/SZ	  240).	  My	  death	  cannot	  be	  undergone	  by	  anyone	  else;	  no	  one	  else	  can	  die	  my	  death.	  While	  Dasein	  can	  die	  for	  another	  by	  sacrificing	  itself,	  the	  Dasein	  who	  was	  initially	  spared	  from	  dying	  will	  eventually	  have	  to	  die.	  In	  addition,	  Dasein	  cannot	  face	  its	  death	  with	  others;	  it	  must	  experience	  its	  death	  on	  it	  own.	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  death	  “individualizes	  Dasein	  down	  to	  itself”	  (BT	  [MR]	  308/SZ	  263).	  Because	  only	  I	  can	  die	  my	  death,	  my	  death	  creates	  a	  separate	  ‘me.’	  Death	  is	  thus	  paradoxical	  in	  that	  it	  is	  mine,	  and	  it	  makes	  a	  ‘me’	  and	  ‘mine,’	  but	  does	  so	  because	  it	  is	  also	  not-­‐yet	  mine.	  Heidegger	  additionally	  points	  out	  that	  death	  is	  certain	  in	  that	  it	  will	  come	  for	  every	  Dasein,	  and	  death	  is	  insuperable	  in	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  overcome.	  However,	  even	  though	  death	  is	  sure	  to	  come,	  it	  is	  indefinite	  in	  that	  Dasein	  does	  not	  know	  when	  and	  how	  death	  will	  occur.	  	  
III.	  Possibilities	  of	  Inauthenticity	  and	  Authenticity	  
A.	  How	  We	  Can	  Relate	  to	  Our	  Being-­‐towards-­‐Death	  While	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  explain	  how	  life	  is	  greatly	  affected	  by	  death,	  Heidegger	  goes	  beyond	  these	  social	  scientists	  in	  describing	  death	  as	  a	  part	  of	  our	  being.	  Over	  and	  above	  explaining	  who	  we	  are	  as	  fundamentally	  tied	  to	  our	  mortality,	  Heidegger	  also	  exceeds	  these	  social	  scientists	  in	  his	  exposing	  possible	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  reconcile	  this	  part	  of	  who	  we	  are.	  Heidegger	  lays	  forth	  multiple	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  relate	  to	  our	  death.	  That	  is,	  Heidegger	  describes	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  our	  death	  either	  inauthentically	  or	  authentically.	  	  
	  
B.	  Inauthentic	  Being-­‐towards-­‐Death	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1.	  Fundamental	  Tendency	  Heidegger	  describes	  how	  Dasein	  has	  a	  fundamental	  tendency	  for	  an	  inauthentic	  understanding	  of	  its	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  He	  asserts,	  “proximally	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  Dasein	  covers	  up	  its	  ownmost	  Being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  fleeing	  in	  the	  face	  of	  it”	  (BT	  [MR]	  295/SZ	  251).	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  tend	  to	  reject	  death	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  is;	  we	  typically	  relate	  to	  our	  death	  with	  denial.	  	  Heidegger	  further	  explains	  that	  our	  rejection	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  exposes	  that,	  on	  some	  level,	  we	  already	  ‘know’	  about	  our	  death.	  For	  example,	  Heidegger	  describes	  that	  everyday	  “Dasein	  is	  acquainted	  with	  death’s	  certainty,	  and	  yet	  evades	  Being-­‐certain”	  (BT	  [MR]	  302/SZ	  258).	  As	  previously	  described,	  certainty	  is	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  death.	  Therefore,	  when	  Dasein	  “evades	  Being-­‐certain,”	  Dasein	  is	  rejecting	  death	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  is.	  Heidegger	  argues	  that	  Dasein	  can	  only	  reject	  the	  certainty	  of	  death	  because	  it	  already	  ‘knows’	  that	  death	  is	  certain.	  	  Put	  simply,	  in	  order	  to	  run	  from	  something,	  one	  must	  recognize	  there	  is	  something	  to	  run	  away	  from.	  Therefore,	  Dasein	  typically	  denies	  its	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	  death	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  is.	  Said	  differently,	  Dasein	  tends	  to	  inauthentically	  disown	  its	  awareness	  that	  it	  is	  a	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  	  
2.	  Everyday	  Preoccupations	  with	  Things	  One	  way	  that	  Dasein	  inauthentically	  undermines	  death	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  is,	  is	  through	  distracting	  itself	  with	  its	  everyday	  dealings	  with	  things.	  Heidegger	  says,	  “Everyday	  taking	  care	  of	  things	  makes	  definite	  for	  itself	  the	  indefiniteness	  of	  certain	  death	  by	  interposing	  before	  it	  those	  manageable	  urgencies	  and	  possibilities	  of	  the	  everyday	  matters	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nearest	  to	  us”	  (BT	  [JS]	  248/SZ	  258).	  Dasein	  rejects	  the	  uncertainity	  of	  death	  by	  getting	  wrapped	  up	  in	  its	  daily	  interactions	  with	  things.	  In	  our	  everyday	  lives,	  we	  are	  constantly	  dealing	  with	  things,	  such	  as	  using	  cellphones,	  paying	  bills,	  driving	  cars,	  feeding	  the	  pet,	  fixing	  up	  the	  house,	  or	  working	  through	  a	  complicated	  thought.	  By	  preoccupying	  itself	  in	  dealing	  with	  things,	  Dasein	  forgets	  the	  uncontrollability	  of	  death	  in	  its	  controlling	  things.	  Said	  differently,	  in	  our	  interactions	  with	  things,	  we	  become	  distracted	  and	  forget	  that	  we	  are	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  	   On	  a	  more	  ontological	  level,	  in	  its	  preoccupations	  with	  things,	  Dasein	  also	  disowns	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  death	  through	  conceptualizing	  its	  being	  as	  like	  that	  of	  a	  thing.	  One	  of	  Heidegger’s	  most	  basic	  ideas	  is	  that	  Dasein	  is	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  We,	  ourselves,	  are	  in	  the	  world.	  While	  people	  typically	  reflect	  on	  themselves	  as	  an	  “I”	  who	  exist	  separately	  from	  their	  interactions	  in	  the	  world,	  Heidegger	  asserts	  that	  Dasein	  actually	  exists	  in	  its	  encounters	  with	  other	  beings	  in	  the	  world.	  Heidegger	  explains,	  “Dasein	  has	  always	  already	  stepped	  out	  beyond	  itself…it	  is	  in	  a	  world.	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  never	  anything	  like	  a	  subjective	  inner	  sphere”	  (BPP	  170).	  Dasein	  is	  its	  interactions.	  	  	   Because	  Dasein	  is	  its	  dealings	  with	  other	  beings,	  Dasein	  cannot	  step	  back	  and	  look	  at	  itself	  as	  a	  separate	  entity.	  The	  only	  way	  to	  see	  itself	  is	  indirectly	  through	  a	  reflection	  in	  the	  beings	  it	  encounters,	  much	  like	  looking	  at	  a	  mirror.	  Heidegger	  explains,	  Dasein	  “never	  finds	  itself	  otherwise	  than	  in	  things…that	  daily	  surround	  it.	  It	  finds	  itself	  primarily	  and	  constantly	  
in	  things	  because,	  tending	  them,	  [assailed]	  by	  them,	  it	  always	  in	  some	  way	  or	  other	  rests	  in	  things”	  (BPP	  159).	  Dasein	  can	  only	  see	  itself	  in	  the	  things	  with	  which	  it	  interacts.	  Said	  simply,	  in	  its	  interacting	  with	  things,	  Dasein	  comes	  to	  understand	  itself	  through	  things.	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As	  a	  consequence	  of	  Dasein	  understanding	  itself	  through	  its	  reflection	  in	  the	  beings	  it	  encounters,	  Dasein	  comes	  to	  understand	  its	  being	  to	  be	  like	  that	  of	  these	  entities.	  Heidegger	  says	  Dasein	  understands	  itself	  “proximally	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  […]	  in	  terms	  of	  that	  with	  which	  it	  is	  customarily	  concerned”	  (BT	  [MR]	  283/SZ	  239).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  understanding	  itself	  through	  things,	  it	  becomes	  easy	  for	  Dasein	  to	  think	  of	  itself	  as	  a	  thing.	  Because	  Dasein	  is	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  it	  is	  its	  everyday	  interactions,	  and	  thus	  tends	  to	  see	  itself	  as	  what	  it	  interacts	  with.	  Thus,	  Dasein	  comes	  to	  view	  itself	  as	  a	  thing	  instead	  of	  as	  Dasein,	  a	  unique	  kind	  of	  being.	  	  In	  viewing	  itself	  as	  a	  thing,	  Dasein	  inauthentically	  conceives	  of	  its	  death	  as	  ‘perishing’	  or	  ‘demising.’	  That	  is,	  Dasein	  tends	  to	  forget	  that	  it	  is	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  a	  way	  of	  being	  that	  is	  a	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  When	  Dasein	  understands	  itself	  as	  a	  thing,	  a	  “being-­‐produced,”	  Dasein	  perceives	  itself	  as	  created	  by	  someone	  else,	  determined	  for	  a	  specific	  purpose	  (BPP	  154).	  As	  a	  result,	  Dasein	  oftentimes	  does	  not	  perceive	  its	  potentiality.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  Dasein	  inauthentically	  understands	  itself	  as	  a	  thing	  instead	  of	  authentically	  grasping	  its	  possibilities,	  especially	  its	  most	  extreme	  possibility	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  	  
3.	  Falling	  Prey	  in	  Idle	  Talk	  of	  The	  They	  
a.	  The	  They	  Another	  way	  Dasein’s	  tendency	  for	  an	  inauthentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  manifests	  is	  through	  the	  idle	  talk	  of	  The	  They.	  Heidegger	  uses	  the	  term	  Das	  Man	  or	  “The	  They”	  in	  order	  to	  signify	  the	  impersonal	  anonymous	  public	  rule.	  Technically,	  Das	  Man	  means	  something	  like	  “One”	  in	  English,	  as	  compared	  to	  “I”	  or	  “you”	  or	  “she.”	  In	  this	  way,	  The	  They	  refers	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  entity	  itself.	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Heidegger	  explains	  that	  The	  They	  is	  not	  something	  separate	  from	  me.	  He	  states,	  “For	  the	  most	  part	  I	  myself	  am	  not	  the	  ‘who’	  of	  Dasein;	  the	  they-­‐self	  is	  its	  ‘who’	  (BT	  [MR]	  312/SZ	  267).	  Heidegger	  understands	  Dasein	  to	  not	  typically	  embrace	  its	  being	  as	  Dasein;	  Dasein	  tends	  not	  to	  own	  its	  being	  as	  the	  being	  it	  is.	  Instead,	  Dasein	  usually	  is	  a	  part	  of	  The	  They,	  a	  they-­‐self	  doing	  what	  “One”	  should	  do	  instead	  of	  what	  Dasein	  itself	  determines.	  Heidegger	  illustrates,	  We	  enjoy	  ourselves	  and	  have	  fun	  the	  way	  they	  enjoy	  themselves.	  We	  read,	  see,	  and	  judge	  literature	  and	  art	  the	  way	  they	  see	  and	  judge	  it.	  But	  we	  also	  withdraw	  from	  the	  ‘great	  mass’	  the	  way	  they	  withdraw,	  we	  find	  ‘shocking’	  what	  they	  find	  shocking.	  The	  they,	  which	  is	  nothing	  definite	  and	  which	  all	  are,	  though	  not	  as	  a	  sum,	  prescribes	  the	  kind	  of	  being	  of	  everydayness.	  (BT	  [JS]	  123/SZ	  127)	  	  In	  being	  a	  part	  of	  The	  They,	  an	  amorphous	  indeterminate	  public	  authority,	  Dasein	  is	  disburdened	  from	  the	  responsibility	  of	  making	  its	  own	  judgments	  and	  decisions	  (BT	  [JS]	  124/SZ	  127).	  Therefore,	  when	  Dasein	  embraces	  its	  they-­‐self,	  it	  is	  able	  to	  unthinkingly	  follow	  the	  prescriptions	  provided	  by	  The	  They.	  	  
b.	  Idle	  Talk	  	   The	  way	  in	  which	  The	  They	  communicates	  is	  through	  “idle	  talk.”	  Idle	  talk	  refers	  to	  the	  everyday	  habitual	  discourse	  of	  society.	  Heidegger	  asserts	  that	  through	  idle	  talk	  we	  typically	  inauthentically	  undermine	  death	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  is.	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  while	  it	  is	  infrequent	  that	  a	  person	  talks	  about	  death,	  if	  a	  person	  does,	  it	  is	  an	  assertion	  that	  “one	  dies”	  (BT	  [JS]	  243/ST	  253).	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “one,”	  death	  is	  “leveled	  down,”	  the	  threat	  of	  death	  becomes	  distributed	  across	  the	  public.	  In	  this	  way,	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Dasein	  “can	  convince	  him/herself	  that	  in	  no	  case	  it	  is	  I	  myself	  [who	  dies],	  for	  this	  one	  is	  no	  
one”	  (BT	  [JS]	  243/ST	  253).	  Within	  idle	  talk,	  the	  term	  “one”	  makes	  it	  seem	  as	  if	  an	  anonymous	  other	  dies,	  and	  I	  do	  not.	  	  In	  addition,	  idle	  talk	  reduces	  the	  indefinite	  quality	  of	  death,	  hiding	  the	  fact	  it	  could	  come	  now	  or	  at	  any	  moment.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  tense	  used	  in	  the	  phrase	  “one	  dies”	  pushes	  death	  to	  an	  undetermined	  future	  date,	  covering	  over	  that	  it	  is	  a	  current	  threat.	  Similarly,	  The	  They	  uses	  other	  idle	  talk	  such	  as	  “‘Death	  certainly	  comes,	  but	  not	  right	  away’”	  (BT	  [MR]	  302/SZ	  258).	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  through	  this	  phrase,	  The	  They	  “implant[s]	  in	  Dasein	  the	  illusion	  that	  it	  is	  itself	  certain	  of	  its	  death”	  (BT	  [MR]	  301/SZ	  257).	  In	  this	  idle	  talk,	  The	  They	  convinces	  itself	  that	  it	  accepts	  death	  as	  inevitable	  and	  thus	  thinks	  it	  is	  not	  denying	  death,	  yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  is	  able	  to	  also	  still	  deny	  death’s	  indeterminacy.	  	  Furthermore,	  Heidegger	  illustrates	  that	  in	  idle	  talk,	  “Death	  gets	  passed	  off	  as	  something	  ‘actual’;	  its	  character	  as	  a	  possibility	  gets	  concealed”	  (BT	  [MR]	  297/SZ	  253).	  When	  we	  say	  “one	  dies,”	  we	  understand	  death	  as	  a	  physical	  occurrence,	  a	  thing	  that	  happens	  to	  us.	  That	  is,	  through	  idle	  talk,	  we	  conceptualize	  death	  as	  an	  actual	  event,	  and	  do	  not	  realize	  that	  we	  are	  constantly	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  death	  in	  that	  we	  are	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  Through	  talking	  about	  death,	  we	  come	  to	  forget	  that	  death	  is	  my	  existential	  possibility.	  	  In	  total,	  through	  idle	  talk	  we	  proudly	  convince	  ourselves	  that	  we	  acknowledge	  death	  as	  a	  fact.	  However,	  in	  doing	  so,	  we	  hold	  our	  own	  death	  far	  enough	  away	  so	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  authentically	  grasp	  it	  as	  the	  extreme	  possibility	  that	  it	  is.	  As	  a	  result,	  through	  idle	  talk,	  Dasein	  is	  able	  to	  deny	  that	  it	  denies	  it	  death.	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c.	  Falling	  Prey	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  through	  idle	  talk	  Dasein	  “falls	  prey”	  to	  The	  They.	  In	  idle	  talk,	  The	  They	  eclipses	  Dasein’s	  mode	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  and	  coerces	  Dasein	  into	  inauthenticity.	  Said	  differently,	  society’s	  denial	  of	  death	  pressures	  us	  to	  forget	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  our	  own	  death.	  Heidegger	  says,	  “The	  ‘they’	  gives	  its	  approval,	  and	  aggravates	  the	  temptation	  to	  cover	  up	  from	  oneself	  one’s	  ownmost	  Being-­‐towards-­‐death”	  (BT	  [MR]	  297/SZ	  253).	  The	  They	  are	  so	  insistent	  on	  covering	  over	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  that	  The	  They	  evens	  tries	  to	  convince	  a	  dying	  person	  that	  he	  or	  she	  will	  “soon	  return	  to	  the	  tranquillized	  everydayness	  of	  the	  world	  of	  [his	  or	  her]	  concern”	  (BT	  [MR]	  297/SZ	  253).	  That	  is,	  The	  They	  tells	  the	  dying	  that	  they	  actually	  are	  not	  dying	  and	  will	  soon	  be	  able	  to	  return	  to	  their	  lives.	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  The	  They	  imposes	  this	  tranquilization	  not	  so	  much	  to	  console	  the	  person	  dying,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  public	  covering	  over	  of	  death	  (BT	  [MR]	  297/SZ	  253).	  	  In	  addition,	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  when	  someone	  dies,	  it	  is	  percieved	  as	  a	  “social	  inconvenience,	  if	  not	  even	  a	  downright	  tactlessness,	  against	  which	  the	  public	  is	  to	  be	  guarded”	  (BT	  [MR]	  298/SZ	  254).	  Society	  views	  death	  as	  an	  annoying	  problem	  rather	  than	  as	  each	  of	  our	  most	  extreme	  possibilities.	  Furthermore,	  society	  also	  understands	  contemplating	  death	  as	  a	  weakness.	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  The	  They	  have	  deemed	  “‘thinking	  about	  death’	  [a]	  cowardly	  fear,	  a	  sign	  of	  insecurity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Dasein,	  and	  a	  somber	  way	  of	  fleeing	  from	  the	  world”	  (BT	  [MR]	  298/SZ	  254).	  Heidegger	  even	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  assert,	  “The	  they	  does	  not	  permit	  the	  courage”	  to	  authentically	  be-­‐toward-­‐death	  (BT	  [JS]	  244/ST	  254).	  Through	  idle	  talk,	  Dasein	  falls	  prey	  to	  the	  demands	  from	  The	  They	  to	  not	  be	  worried	  when	  dying	  is	  immanent,	  to	  be	  irritated	  when	  everyday	  life	  is	  interrupted	  by	  a	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death,	  and	  to	  consider	  it	  detrimental	  to	  think	  about	  death.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  idle	  talk	  of	  The	  They	  makes	  it	  incredibly	  challenging	  for	  Dasein	  to	  resist	  an	  inauthentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Dasein’s	  falling	  prey	  to	  The	  They	  occurs	  because	  of	  the	  being	  Dasein	  is.	  Remember	  Dasein	  is	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  and	  comes	  to	  understand	  itself	  in	  its	  interactions	  with	  other	  beings.	  As	  previously	  explained,	  one	  type	  of	  these	  other	  beings	  are	  things.	  Therefore,	  Dasein	  tends	  to	  understand	  itself	  as	  a	  thing,	  a	  being-­‐produced	  with	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  purpose.	  However,	  as	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  Dasein	  also	  interacts	  with	  other	  Daseins,	  which	  make	  up	  The	  They.	  Correspondingly,	  in	  its	  daily	  interactions	  with	  other	  Daseins,	  Dasein	  also	  tends	  to	  inauthentically	  understand	  itself	  as	  a	  they-­‐self	  pre-­‐determined	  by	  The	  They.	  Therefore,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  Dasein	  comes	  to	  inauthentically	  understand	  itself,	  pre-­‐determined	  both	  as	  a	  being-­‐produced	  thing	  and	  as	  a	  they-­‐self.	  	  
4.	  Tendency	  as	  Ontological	  Constitution	  of	  Dasein	  In	  sum,	  because	  of	  the	  being	  Dasein	  is,	  Dasein	  in	  its	  everyday	  interactions	  becomes	  preoccupied	  with	  things	  and	  falls	  prey	  in	  the	  idle	  talk	  of	  The	  They.	  As	  a	  result,	  Dasein	  typically	  forgets	  that	  it	  is	  a	  unique	  being.	  Dasein	  instead	  comes	  to	  view	  itself	  as	  pre-­‐determined	  like	  a	  thing	  and	  by	  The	  They,	  and	  thus	  Dasein	  has	  a	  fundamental	  tendency	  to	  cover	  over	  its	  ownmost	  potentiality	  of	  being.	  Dasein	  forgets	  that	  is	  a	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  so	  Dasein	  also	  proximally	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  is	  inauthentically	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  disowning	  death	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  is.	  This	  misunderstanding	  of	  its	  being	  is	  not	  illusory,	  un-­‐genuine,	  or	  immoral,	  but	  is	  simply	  a	  part	  of	  Dasein’s	  being	  as	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐
	   80	  
world	  (BPP	  160).	  Heidegger	  states,	  the	  “inauthenticity	  of	  Dasein	  does	  not	  signify	  a	  ‘lesser’	  being	  or	  a	  ‘lower’	  degree	  of	  being”	  (BT	  [JS]	  42/SZ	  43).	  Rather,	  “inauthenticity	  belongs	  to	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	  factical	  Dasein”	  (BPP	  171).	  The	  tendency	  for	  inauthentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  a	  part	  of	  Dasein’s	  ontological	  constitution.	  	  	  
C.	  Authentic	  Being-­‐towards-­‐Death	  
1.	  Possibility	  for	  Authentic	  Being-­‐towards-­‐Death	  Heidegger	  argues	  that	  authenticity	  is	  another	  way	  in	  which	  we	  can	  relate	  to	  our	  death.	  Even	  though	  Dasein	  has	  a	  tendency	  for	  inauthenticity,	  Dasein	  has	  the	  possibility	  for	  authenticity.	  Heidegger	  explains,	  “Dasein	  does	  not	  necessarily	  and	  constantly	  have	  to	  divert	  itself	  into	  [the]	  kind	  of	  Being	  [of	  inauthenticity]”	  (BT	  [MR]	  303/SZ	  259).	  As	  previously	  explained,	  Dasein	  is	  able	  to	  flee	  from	  its	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  only	  because	  it	  has	  an	  underlying	  awareness	  of	  its	  death.	  This	  same	  pre-­‐ontological	  ‘knowledge’	  about	  death	  provides	  Dasein	  with	  the	  potentiality	  to	  re-­‐gain	  the	  awareness	  of	  its	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  and	  thus	  become	  authentic.	  Also	  as	  described	  above,	  one	  consequence	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  is	  Dasein’s	  tendency	  to	  misunderstand	  and	  reject	  its	  unique	  being.	  However,	  another	  result	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  is	  that	  it	  is	  what	  makes	  Dasein	  fundamentally	  unique	  and	  able	  to	  belong	  to	  itself.	  Heidegger	  explains,	  “because	  Dasein	  is	  always	  essentially	  its	  possibility,	  it	  can	  ‘choose’	  itself	  in	  its	  being	  [or]	  it	  can	  lose	  itself”	  (BT	  [JS]	  42/ST	  43).	  That	  is,	  because	  of	  the	  being	  Dasein	  is,	  Dasein	  has	  a	  tendency	  to	  fall	  into	  inauthenticity	  and	  forget	  itself	  and	  Dasein	  has	  the	  possibility	  to	  authentically	  understand	  itself	  and	  exist	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  Therefore,	  inauthenticity	  is	  only	  a	  tendency,	  not	  a	  permanent	  determination.	  Because	  the	  being	  of	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Dasein	  is	  not	  actually	  pre-­‐determined	  by	  The	  They	  or	  a	  being-­‐produced	  like	  that	  of	  a	  thing,	  Dasein	  can	  determine	  itself.	  Dasein	  has	  the	  possibility	  to	  understand	  itself	  otherwise,	  and	  do	  so	  freely,	  without	  having	  its	  self-­‐understanding	  imposed	  by	  others.	  Dasein	  can	  authentically	  apprehend	  its	  death.	  	  
2.	  Embracing	  Death	  as	  Possibility	  While	  inauthenticity	  is	  a	  disownment	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  one’s	  death,	  authenticity	  is	  taking	  hold	  of	  and	  owning	  one’s	  death	  as	  possibility.	  Authenticity	  is	  understanding	  death	  as	  possibility	  and	  sustaining	  it	  as	  possibility.	  Heidegger	  explains,	  “this	  possibility	  must	  not	  be	  weakened:	  it	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  possibility,	  it	  must	  be	  cultivated	  as	  a	  possibility,	  and	  we	  must	  [sustain]	  it	  as	  a	  possibility,	  in	  the	  way	  we	  comport	  ourselves	  towards	  it”	  (BT	  [MR]	  306/H	  261).	  Authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  a	  particular	  relation	  to	  one’s	  death,	  one	  that	  endures	  death	  as	  one’s	  most	  extreme	  possibility	  that	  is	  ownmost,	  non-­‐relational,	  indefinite,	  insuperable,	  and	  certain.	  	  
3.	  Not	  an	  Actualization	  of	  Death	  Embracing	  death	  as	  possibility	  does	  not	  involve	  experiencing	  death.	  As	  previously	  explained,	  Dasein	  cannot	  experience	  its	  own	  death,	  so	  authenticity	  does	  not	  involve	  seeking	  out	  one’s	  own	  ‘death,’	  as	  in	  killing	  oneself	  or	  putting	  oneself	  in	  situations	  with	  a	  high	  probability	  of	  demise.	  If	  Dasein	  died,	  death	  would	  cease	  to	  be	  a	  possibility.	  Similarly,	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  does	  not	  involve	  being	  in	  the	  proximity	  of	  the	  demise	  of	  others,	  such	  as	  by	  fighting	  in	  a	  war	  or	  working	  in	  a	  hospital	  or	  mortuary.	  Again,	  these	  situations	  are	  that	  of	  demise	  and	  not	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  Moreover,	  within	  these	  social	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circumstances,	  Dasein	  is	  not	  embracing	  death	  as	  its	  own	  possibility.	  In	  addition	  to	  not	  involving	  the	  act	  of	  ‘death’	  or	  demise,	  authenticity	  also	  does	  not	  entail	  thinking	  about	  and	  dwelling	  on	  death.	  Heidegger	  asserts	  that	  brooding	  over	  death	  weakens	  its	  character	  of	  possibility	  (BT	  [JS]	  250/ST	  261).	  That	  is,	  ruminating	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  make	  death	  into	  something,	  a	  calculated	  idea,	  instead	  of	  approaching	  death	  authentically	  as	  an	  indefinite	  and	  insuperable	  possibility.	  Therefore,	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  actualization	  of	  one’s	  own	  death,	  another’s	  death,	  or	  the	  thought	  of	  death.	  	  	  
4.	  Not	  Separating	  Oneself	  from	  the	  World	  	   Even	  though	  death	  is	  Dasein’s	  ownmost	  possibility	  and	  individuates	  Dasein,	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  does	  not	  involve	  embracing	  oneself	  as	  separate	  from	  the	  world.	  Remember	  that	  Dasein	  is	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  so	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  must	  involve	  accepting	  oneself	  as	  such,	  as	  a	  being	  connected	  to	  its	  interactions	  with	  things	  and	  other	  Daseins.	  Therefore,	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  does	  not	  involve	  a	  removal	  of	  oneself	  from	  the	  world	  where	  one	  encounters	  others	  and	  things	  everyday.	  Heidegger	  asserts	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  does	  not	  “signify	  a	  kind	  of	  seclusion	  in	  which	  one	  flees	  the	  world”	  (BT	  [MR]	  358/SZ	  310).	  In	  this	  way,	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  does	  not	  require	  a	  life	  like	  an	  isolating	  religious	  hermitage.	  In	  authenticity,	  Dasein	  must	  own	  itself	  as	  what	  it	  is,	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  who	  is	  a	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  	  	  
D.	  The	  Process	  of	  Authenticity	  
1.	  Anxiety	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If	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  does	  not	  involve	  experiencing	  death	  nor	  does	  it	  entail	  removing	  oneself	  from	  the	  everyday	  world,	  then	  how	  can	  Dasein	  embrace	  death	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  is?	  Heidegger	  describes	  anxiety	  as	  a	  key	  component	  of	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  In	  particular,	  he	  says,	  “anxiety	  is	  not	  an	  accidental	  or	  random	  mood	  of	  ‘weakness’	  in	  some	  individual;	  but,	  as	  a	  basic	  state-­‐of-­‐mind	  of	  Dasein,	  it	  amounts	  to	  the	  disclosedness	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Dasein	  exists	  as	  thrown	  Being	  towards	  its	  end”	  (BT	  [MR]	  295/SZ	  251).	  In	  other	  words,	  anxiety	  is	  what	  reveals	  to	  us	  our	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  As	  a	  result,	  to	  even	  begin	  to	  be	  authentic,	  Dasein	  requires	  the	  disclosedness	  of	  its	  death,	  which	  manifests	  as	  anxiety	  in	  order	  to	  apprehend	  its	  being	  as	  constantly	  in	  relation	  with	  its	  death.	  	  More	  specifically,	  anxiety	  opens	  up	  death	  as	  possibility.	  Dastur	  explains,	  “anxiety	  […reveals]	  the	  most	  extreme	  possibility,	  the	  collapse	  of	  all	  possibilities	  that	  is	  death”	  (18).	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  even	  though	  anxiety	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  death,	  it	  does	  not	  determine	  the	  mode	  in	  which	  Dasein	  understands	  the	  possibility	  of	  death.	  That	  is,	  anxiety	  does	  not	  automatically	  determine	  that	  Dasein	  will	  authentically	  be-­‐towards-­‐death;	  anxiety	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  an	  inauthentic	  relation	  towards	  death.	  	  In	  particular,	  Dasein	  can	  authentically	  embrace	  the	  openness	  of	  its	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  revealed	  in	  anxiety.	  Or	  Dasein	  can	  inauthentically	  reject	  the	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  that	  anxiety	  revealed	  and	  instead	  try	  to	  transform	  the	  anxiety	  into	  fear.	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  through	  the	  idle	  talk	  of	  The	  They,	  anxiety	  of	  death	  is	  transformed	  into	  fear	  of	  demise	  (BT	  [MR]	  298/SZ	  254).	  However,	  Heidegger	  asserts,	  “Anxiety	  in	  the	  face	  of	  death	  must	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  fear	  in	  the	  face	  of	  one’s	  demise”	  (BT	  [MR]	  295/SZ	  251).	  A	  person	  who	  is	  anxious	  experiences	  a	  generalized	  feeling	  of	  uneasiness	  and	  cannot	  take	  any	  concrete	  steps	  to	  relieve	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  ambiguous	  and	  open	  threat.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  person	  who	  has	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fear	  is	  scared	  of	  a	  specific	  object	  that	  they	  can	  make	  preparations	  to	  try	  to	  conquer.	  Therefore,	  anxiety	  of	  death	  keeps	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  death,	  but	  fear	  of	  death	  strips	  the	  character	  of	  possibility	  from	  death.	  In	  total,	  Dasein	  inauthentically	  falls	  prey	  to	  The	  They,	  which	  involves	  becoming	  afraid	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  ‘death,’	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  relieve	  the	  fundamental	  anxiety	  of	  its	  constant	  relation	  to	  death.	  Nevertheless,	  Dasein	  can	  instead	  authentically	  determine	  itself	  and	  embrace	  its	  fundamental	  anxiety	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  death.	   Dastur	  describes	  that	  the	  authentic	  embracing	  of	  anxiety	  does	  not	  entail	  an	  overcoming	  of	  an	  anxious	  state	  of	  mind,	  but	  is	  a	  remaining	  within	  anxiety	  (42).	  She	  explains,	  we	  must	  “stop	  opposing	  anxiety	  with	  vain	  resistances	  and	  let	  ourselves	  be	  borne	  by	  it	  in	  order	  thus	  to	  achieve	  that	  moment	  when	  it	  changes	  into	  joy”	  (42).	  Heidegger	  too	  mentions	  this	  joy	  when	  he	  says,	  “Along	  with	  the	  sober	  anxiety	  which	  brings	  us	  face	  to	  face	  with	  our	  individualized	  potentiality-­‐for-­‐Being,	  there	  goes	  an	  unshakable	  joy	  in	  this	  possibility”	  (BT	  [MR]	  358/SZ	  310).	  In	  pointing	  out	  the	  joy	  of	  anxiety,	  Heidegger	  and	  Dastur	  challenge	  the,	  at	  least	  current,	  notion	  that	  anxiety	  of	  death	  is	  problematic	  and	  proposing	  it	  as	  actually	  transformative	  and	  beneficial.	  In	  this	  way,	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  echoing	  the	  beliefs	  of	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT.	  The	  incredibly	  challenging	  task	  of	  maintaining	  one’s	  anxiety	  of	  their	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  necessary	  to	  begin	  to	  authentically	  be-­‐towards-­‐death.	  	  
2.	  Vorlaufen:	  Anticipation	  and	  Running	  Ahead	  	  Heidegger	  describes	  Vorlaufen	  as	  another	  key	  component	  of	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  which	  is	  translated	  from	  German	  into	  English	  as	  either	  anticipation	  or,	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more	  literally,	  as	  running	  ahead.	  Heidegger	  seems	  to	  explain	  anxiety	  as	  revealing	  the	  possibility	  of	  death,	  and	  running	  ahead	  as	  the	  authentic	  engagement	  of	  that	  possibility	  of	  death.	  Said	  differently,	  running	  ahead	  is	  the	  authentic	  relating	  to	  our	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  that	  anxiety	  reveals.	  	  One	  reason	  why	  anticipation	  is	  chosen	  to	  translate	  Vorlaufen	  is	  because	  Heidegger	  contrasts	  Vorlaufen	  with	  expectation.	  Heidegger	  defines	  expectation	  as	  a	  “waiting	  for	  [an]	  
actualization”	  (BT	  [MR]	  306/SZ	  262).	  One	  always	  expects	  something.	  In	  other	  words,	  an	  expectation	  is	  a	  desire	  to	  complete	  or	  actualize	  a	  potentiality.	  Therefore,	  expecting	  death	  involves	  removing	  the	  character	  of	  possibility	  from	  death,	  making	  expectation	  inauthentic.	  In	  opposition,	  anticipation	  is	  indefinite	  and	  does	  not	  involve	  accomplishing	  what	  one	  anticipates.	  Therefore,	  Heidegger	  sees	  anticipation	  of	  death	  as	  authentically	  holding	  open	  and	  sustaining	  the	  possibility	  of	  death.	  	  
Vorlaufen	  is	  also	  translated	  as	  running	  ahead	  because	  it	  signifies	  a	  jolting	  forth,	  a	  breaking	  away,	  an	  intense	  bolting	  forward.	  Running	  ahead	  is	  not	  just	  a	  peaceful	  walk	  in	  the	  park,	  but	  is	  an	  intense	  movement	  of	  impact	  and	  shattering.	  In	  this	  way,	  running	  ahead	  abruptly	  awakens	  Dasein,	  destroying	  the	  tranquility	  of	  the	  habitual	  they-­‐self.	  Through	  this	  abrupt	  motion	  of	  running	  ahead,	  Dasein	  is	  “wrenched	  away	  from	  [The	  They]”	  (BT	  [MR]	  307/SZ	  263).	  Heidegger	  states,	  “When,	  by	  [running	  ahead],	  one	  becomes	  free	  for	  one’s	  own	  death,	  one	  is	  liberated	  from	  one’s	  lostness	  in	  those	  possibilities	  which	  may	  accidentally	  thrust	  themselves	  upon	  one”	  (BT	  [MR]	  308/SZ	  264).	  In	  running	  ahead,	  Dasein	  is	  jerked	  free	  from	  going	  with	  the	  flow	  of	  what	  is	  instructed	  and	  prescribed	  by	  society.	  	   Because	  running	  ahead	  frees	  Dasein	  from	  The	  They,	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  
Vorlaufen	  brings	  Dasein	  back	  to	  itself.	  That	  is,	  running	  ahead	  does	  not	  entail	  running	  away,	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nor	  is	  running	  ahead	  like	  the	  physical	  fleeing	  movement	  from	  one	  place	  to	  another.	  Running	  ahead	  is	  not	  a	  linear	  going	  forward.	  Instead,	  Heidegger	  asserts	  that	  running	  ahead	  is	  a	  cycling	  back	  to	  oneself13	  in	  a	  full	  embracing	  of	  one’s	  being.	  In	  running	  ahead	  into	  death,	  Dasein	  is	  individualized	  down	  to	  itself,	  is	  able	  to	  take	  hold	  of	  its	  own	  life,	  and	  can	  exist	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  Heidegger	  states,	  in	  running	  ahead	  “one	  is	  liberated	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  for	  the	  first	  time	  one	  can	  authentically	  understand	  and	  choose	  among	  the	  factical	  possibilities	  [that	  are	  subordinate	  to]	  that	  possibility	  which	  is	  not	  to	  be	  outstripped”	  (BT	  [MR]	  308/SZ	  264).	  While	  Dasein	  cannot	  overcome	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  death,	  running	  ahead	  into	  death	  opens	  up	  and	  enables	  Dasein	  to	  take	  hold	  of	  the	  possibilities	  of	  its	  life.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  Heidegger	  asserts	  that	  we	  are	  essentially	  open,	  futural,	  and	  life	  is	  possible	  because	  we	  are	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  Thus,	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  the	  understanding	  and	  utilization	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  because	  we	  are	  finite	  beings	  that	  we	  are	  also	  beings	  of	  possibility.	  King	  clarifies,	  “It	  is	  only	  by	  running	  forward	  to	  the	  certain	  possibility	  of	  not-­‐being-­‐able-­‐to-­‐be-­‐here-­‐anymore	  that	  the	  ‘I-­‐am-­‐able-­‐to-­‐be-­‐here’	  itself	  is	  eminently	  revealed”	  (204).	  Similarly	  Dastur	  adds,	  “the	  essential	  transitoriness	  and	  precariousness	  of	  [Dasein’s]	  being	  is	  also	  what	  allows	  it	  to	  be	  open	  to	  itself,	  to	  others,	  and	  to	  the	  world.	  Death	  would	  then	  no	  longer	  appear	  as	  a	  scandal,	  but	  rather	  as	  the	  very	  foundation	  of	  our	  existence”	  (44).	  Death	  illuminates	  the	  possibilities	  of	  life.	  It	  is	  through	  an	  authentic	  embracing	  of	  our	  most	  extreme	  possibility	  of	  death	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  take	  hold	  of	  our	  life	  in	  all	  its	  possibilities.	  	  
	  
3.	  Resoluteness	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   An	  additional	  central	  aspect	  of	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  Entschlossenheit, usually	  translated	  from	  German	  into	  English	  as	  resoluteness,	  but	  could	  be	  better	  understood	  as	  resolute-­‐openness.	  Resolute-­‐openness	  is	  a	  process	  of	  authentically	  understanding	  and	  apprehending	  our	  being	  as	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  Heidegger	  understands	  that	  in	  authentically	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  running	  ahead	  is	  on	  the	  ontological	  level	  and	  resolute-­‐openness	  is	  on	  the	  ontic	  level.	  Heidegger	  explains	  the	  ontological	  as	  a	  more	  fundamental	  level	  of	  Being	  in	  general,	  which	  requires	  an	  “existential”	  and	  more	  theoretical	  understanding.	  The	  ontic,	  he	  describes,	  involves	  the	  experiential,	  everyday	  interactions	  with	  other	  beings	  in	  the	  world	  and	  an	  “existentiell”	  understanding	  (BT	  [JS]	  12/SZ	  13).	  Heidegger	  states,	  “authentic	  Being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  [Vorlaufen].	  Dasein’s	  authentic	  potentiality-­‐for-­‐Being,	  in	  its	  existentiell	  attestation	  [is]	  resoluteness”	  (BT	  [MR]	  349/SZ	  302).	  In	  this	  way,	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  to	  experientially	  authentically	  be-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  through	  resolute-­‐openness.	  	  	   Heidegger	  illustrates	  that	  resolute-­‐openness	  occurs	  through	  making	  oneself	  ready	  for	  the	  call	  of	  conscience.14	  Conscience,	  for	  Heidegger,	  is	  not	  an	  internal	  subjectivity,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  an	  individual’s	  moral	  voice	  inside	  of	  their	  minds.	  In	  addition,	  Heidegger	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  origins	  of	  conscience,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  religion,	  nor	  does	  he	  want	  to	  consider	  why	  we	  might	  have	  conscience,	  such	  as	  through	  the	  study	  of	  evolutionary	  science.	  Furthermore,	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  want	  to	  examine	  conscience	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  philosophical	  ethics	  or	  metaphysics.	  Instead,	  Heidegger	  understands	  conscience	  as	  an	  appeal	  to	  “Dasein	  by	  calling	  it	  to	  its	  ownmost	  potentiality-­‐for-­‐Being-­‐its-­‐Self”	  (BT	  [MR]	  314/SZ	  269).	  In	  other	  words,	  conscience	  is	  a	  type	  of	  disclosure	  of	  Dasein	  to	  itself.	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The	  way	  in	  which	  conscience	  reveals	  to	  Dasein	  its	  ownmost	  being	  is	  through	  a	  call.	  The	  call	  of	  conscience	  interrupts	  the	  idle	  talk	  of	  The	  They.	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  in	  the	  idle	  talk	  of	  The	  They,	  Dasein	  	  “fails	  to	  hear	  [überhört]	  its	  own	  Self	  in	  listening	  to	  the	  they-­‐self”	  (BT	  [MR]	  315/SZ	  271).	  The	  call	  does	  not	  cut	  off	  the	  idle	  talk	  of	  The	  They	  by	  becoming	  louder	  or	  by	  speaking	  more	  words.	  Instead,	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  is	  able	  to	  break	  apart	  Dasein’s	  entanglement	  with	  The	  They	  through	  silence.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  call	  is	  silent,	  Dasein	  can	  only	  understand	  the	  call	  in	  itself.	  The	  ‘voice’	  of	  the	  call	  is	  not	  an	  utterance,	  but	  a	  personal	  understanding.	  The	  call	  is	  understood	  only	  by	  the	  individual.	  As	  a	  result,	  Dasein	  cannot	  communicate	  its	  conscience	  to	  another	  Dasein.	  Beyond	  being	  silent	  and	  completely	  personal,	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  says	  nothing.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  provides	  no	  content,	  guidance,	  or	  suggestions.	  Conscience	  does	  not	  inform	  Dasein	  to	  make	  the	  right	  decisions.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  not	  as	  if	  Dasein	  only	  listens	  once	  to	  the	  silent	  call	  of	  conscience	  in	  order	  to	  be	  freed	  permanently	  from	  The	  They.	  The	  call	  of	  conscience	  must	  be	  listened	  to	  and	  retrieved	  ever	  anew.	  Because	  the	  call	  is	  silent,	  individual,	  without	  explicit	  content,	  and	  not	  absolute,	  the	  call	  leads	  Dasein	  to	  its	  particular	  manifestation	  of	  authenticity	  distinct	  from	  that	  of	  other	  Daseins.	  	  	  However,	  even	  though	  conscience	  is	  obscure,	  specific	  to	  each	  individual,	  and	  “seemingly	  indefinite,	  the	  direction	  it	  takes	  is	  a	  sure	  one	  and	  is	  not	  to	  be	  overlooked”	  (BT	  [MR]	  318/SZ	  274).	  Like	  Vorlaufen,	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  involves	  a	  forward	  movement	  into	  Dasein’s	  possibilities.	  Heidegger	  states,	  conscience	  “calls	  Dasein	  forth	  (and	  ‘forward’)	  into	  its	  ownmost	  possibilities”	  (BT	  [MR]	  318/SZ	  273).	  Ireton	  clarifies	  that	  the	  silent	  call	  of	  conscience	  “summons	  Dasein	  from	  its	  inauthentic	  entanglement	  in	  the	  they	  and	  forward	  
into	  an	  authentic	  understanding	  of	  its	  possibilities”	  (272).	  Therefore,	  instead	  of	  a	  clear	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verbal	  moralizing,	  Heidegger	  understands	  conscience	  as	  calling	  an	  opening-­‐forward	  of	  Dasein	  into	  its	  possibilities.	  	  	  In	  opening	  up	  Dasein	  to	  its	  possibilities,	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  provides	  Dasein	  with	  an	  authentic	  self-­‐understanding.	  The	  call	  of	  conscience	  is	  not	  a	  critical	  and	  negative	  message,	  nor	  does	  the	  call	  provide	  a	  set	  path	  of	  action.	  Instead	  of	  telling	  Dasein	  what	  to	  do,	  the	  silent	  call	  of	  conscience	  reveals	  to	  Dasein	  who	  it	  is.	  Heidegger	  states,	  “The	  call	  of	  conscience	  fails	  to	  give	  any	  such	  ‘practical’	  injunctions,	  solely	  because	  it	  summons	  Dasein	  to	  existence,	  to	  its	  ownmost	  potentiality-­‐for-­‐Being-­‐its-­‐Self”	  (BT	  [MR]	  340/SZ	  294).	  That	  is,	  similar	  to	  Vorlaufen,	  conscience	  calls	  Dasein	  forward	  which	  is	  a	  bringing	  Dasein	  back	  to	  itself	  (BT	  [MR]	  317/SZ	  273).	  Furthermore,	  the	  being	  that	  Dasein	  gets	  brought	  back	  to	  is	  not	  like	  an	  inner	  subjective	  sphere,	  as	  in	  a	  separated	  “I”	  from	  the	  world.	  Instead,	  the	  call	  reveals	  to	  and	  brings	  Dasein	  back	  to	  itself	  as	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  that	  is	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  (BT	  [MR]	  344/SZ	  298).	  Because	  it	  is	  not	  a	  prescription	  but	  the	  bringing	  us	  back	  to	  ourselves,	  King	  explains	  that	  the	  silent	  call	  of	  conscience	  does	  not	  necessarily	  change	  our	  behaviors,	  but,	  rather,	  transforms	  our	  being	  (164).	  	  Furthermore,	  this	  resoluteness	  of	  coming	  back	  to	  oneself	  is	  contrasted	  with	  an	  irresolute	  inauthentic	  succumbing	  to	  the	  pre-­‐determination	  of	  The	  They.	  Heidegger	  illustrates	  an	  irresolute	  Dasein	  is	  entangled	  in	  the	  “common	  sense	  ambiguity	  of	  that	  publicness	  in	  which	  nobody	  resolves	  upon	  anything	  but	  which	  has	  always	  made	  its	  decision”	  (BT	  [MR]	  345/SZ	  298).	  Therefore,	  resoluteness,	  like	  running	  ahead,	  breaks	  Dasein	  away	  from	  its	  tendency	  for	  inauthentic	  irresolute	  falling	  into	  The	  They	  and	  brings	  Dasein	  to	  itself	  to	  determine	  its	  own	  being.	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   Nevertheless,	  Dasein	  cannot	  force	  this	  coming	  back	  to	  itself.	  Heidegger	  maintains	  that	  all	  Dasein	  can	  do	  is	  become	  free	  for	  the	  call	  of	  conscience.	  Heidegger	  says,	  “Understanding	  the	  call	  is	  choosing;	  but	  it	  is	  not	  a	  choosing	  of	  conscience,	  which	  as	  such	  cannot	  be	  chosen.	  What	  is	  chosen	  is	  […]	  ‘wanting	  to	  have	  a	  conscience’”	  (BT	  [MR]	  334/SZ	  288).	  Dasein	  cannot	  straightforwardly	  compel	  conscience	  to	  call,	  and	  is	  only	  able	  to	  make	  itself	  ready	  for	  the	  call.	  King	  clarifies	  that	  making	  oneself	  ready	  for	  the	  call	  is	  “steadfastly	  willing	  to	  be	  called	  forward	  to	  the	  owning	  which	  lies	  in	  [one’s]	  own	  existence”	  (195).	  Given	  that	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  is	  silent	  and	  says	  nothing,	  it	  necessitates	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  hearing,	  a	  particular	  orientation	  from	  us	  to	  receive	  it,	  one	  that	  is	  open,	  willing,	  and	  wanting	  to	  be	  brought	  back	  to	  our	  being	  (BT	  [MR]	  316/SZ	  271).	  	   Considering	  that	  conscience	  has	  thus	  far	  been	  described	  as	  not	  originating	  from	  a	  pure	  internal	  subject,	  it	  might	  seem	  that	  Heidegger	  views	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  as	  coming	  from	  an	  outside	  source.	  However,	  Heidegger	  explains	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  comes	  both	  from	  Dasein	  and	  over	  and	  above	  Dasein	  (BT	  [MR]	  320/ST	  275).	  The	  call	  of	  conscience	  is	  neither	  internally	  subjective	  nor	  is	  it	  external.	  Heidegger	  clarifies,	  “the	  call	  is	  precisely	  something	  which	  we	  ourselves	  have	  neither	  planned	  nor	  […]	  voluntarily	  performed	  […]	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  call	  undoubtedly	  does	  not	  come	  from	  someone	  else	  who	  is	  with	  me	  in	  the	  world”	  (BT	  [MR]	  320/	  SZ	  275).	  Said	  differently,	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  does	  not	  come	  solely	  from	  within	  Dasein,	  nor	  does	  it	  come	  from	  a	  source	  entirely	  separate	  from	  Dasein.	  Dasein	  is	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  and	  is	  not	  an	  inner	  subjective	  “I”	  that	  acts	  out	  onto	  an	  external	  world.	  As	  a	  result,	  Dasein	  cannot	  command	  conscience	  to	  call,	  and	  Dasein	  instead	  can	  only	  make	  itself	  ready	  for	  the	  call.	  The	  call	  requires	  both	  Dasein	  and	  more	  than	  Dasein.	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   Although	  Heidegger’s	  formulation	  of	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  may	  seem	  obscure	  and	  removed	  from	  everyday	  life,	  Heidegger	  is	  adamant	  that	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  is	  only	  actualized	  through	  experiences.	  In	  particular,	  he	  explains	  the	  call	  of	  conscience	  exists	  only	  as	  resolute	  choice.	  Heidegger	  asserts,	  “[r]esoluteness	  ‘exists’	  only	  as	  a	  resolution”	  (BT	  [MR]	  345/SZ	  298).	  Dasein	  must	  enact	  resoluteness	  in	  actual	  decisions	  in	  specific	  contexts.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  resolute	  choice	  involves	  taking	  action	  or	  behaving	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  Yet	  resolute	  choice	  is	  also	  not	  a	  theoretical	  conception	  or	  the	  thinking	  of	  some	  idea.	  In	  addition,	  resolute	  choice	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  heroic,	  stoic	  hardening	  oneself	  against	  death	  (Dastur	  42).	  Furthermore,	  resolute	  choice	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  individual	  Dasein	  and	  not	  universal.	  	  
4.	  Anticipatory	  Resoluteness	  Opens	  Possibilities	  of	  Life	  Instead,	  resolute	  choice	  is	  Dasein’s	  demonstrated	  potentiality	  of	  being.	  In	  order	  to	  elucidate	  what	  this	  means,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  note	  that	  Heidegger	  sees	  resoluteness	  and	  running	  ahead/anticipation	  as	  fundamentally	  connected.	  Indeed,	  Heidegger	  oftentimes	  refers	  to	  the	  two	  together	  as	  “anticipatory	  resoluteness.”	  In	  placing	  them	  together,	  one	  can	  understand	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  involving	  an	  embracing	  of	  oneself	  as	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  that	  is	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  And	  it	  is	  through	  this	  apprehending	  oneself	  as	  this	  unique,	  mortal	  Dasein	  that	  an	  individual	  is	  able	  to	  determine	  him	  or	  herself	  and	  make	  a	  resolute	  choice.	  Heidegger	  states,	  “The	  more	  authentically	  Dasein	  resolves-­‐	  and	  this	  means	  that	  in	  anticipating	  death	  it	  understands	  itself	  unambiguously	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  ownmost	  distinctive	  possibility-­‐	  the	  more	  unequivocally	  does	  it	  choose	  and	  find	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  existence”	  (BT	  [MR]	  435/SZ	  384).	  Anticipatory	  resoluteness	  involves	  apprehending	  oneself	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as	  a	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  and	  making	  choices	  from	  out	  of	  this	  authentic	  self-­‐understanding.	  Said	  differently,	  resolute	  choice	  is	  the	  taking	  up	  of	  one’s	  being	  as	  a	  unique	  Dasein	  who	  is	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  and	  concretely	  ‘acting’	  from	  out	  of	  this	  most	  extreme	  possibility	  of	  death.	  Heidegger	  illustrates	  anticipatory	  resoluteness	  “makes	  it	  possible	  for	  Dasein	  to	  be	  able	  to	  take	  over	  resolutely	  that	  entity	  which	  it	  already	  is”	  (BT	  [MR]	  388/SZ	  339).	  Ireton	  clarifies	  that	  anticipatory	  resoluteness	  is	  Dasein’s	  “unlocking	  of	  itself	  […]	  into	  an	  act	  of	  self-­‐disclosure	  that	  allows	  for	  a	  firm	  seizure	  of	  existence”	  (275).	  Anticipatory	  resoluteness	  is	  a	  grasping	  of	  one’s	  finitude	  in	  order	  to	  take	  hold	  of	  one’s	  life.	  As	  such,	  resolute	  choice	  is	  a	  demonstrated	  potentiality	  of	  being	  in	  that	  it	  is	  the	  attestation	  of	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  embracing	  the	  possibility	  of	  death	  in	  that	  it	  is	  opens	  up	  the	  possibilities	  of	  life.	  Therefore,	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  does	  not	  just	  maintain	  death	  as	  a	  possibility,	  but	  opens	  up	  and	  maintains	  all	  possibilities	  of	  Dasein.	  In	  this	  way,	  Heidegger	  understands	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  the	  medium	  to	  authentic	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  in	  general.	  In	  total,	  making	  oneself	  ready	  for	  the	  silent	  call	  of	  conscience	  frees	  Dasein	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  anxiously	  resolutely	  running	  ahead	  authentically	  into	  one’s	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  which	  opens	  Dasein	  forward	  into	  its	  possibilities	  in	  life.	  	  Moreover,	  when	  Dasein	  is	  authentic,	  it	  encourages	  other	  Daseins	  to	  free	  themselves	  from	  The	  They	  and	  embrace	  their	  own	  possibilities	  as	  well.	  Heidegger	  asserts,	  “Dasein’s	  resoluteness	  towards	  itself	  is	  what	  first	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  let	  the	  Others	  who	  are	  with	  it	  ‘be’	  in	  their	  ownmost	  potentiality-­‐for-­‐Being,	  and	  to	  co-­‐disclose	  this	  potentiality	  in	  the	  solicitude	  which	  leaps	  forth	  and	  liberates”	  (BT	  [MR]	  344/SZ	  298).	  That	  is,	  Heidegger	  believes	  that	  an	  authentic	  Dasein	  will	  incite	  others	  to	  also	  authentically	  be.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember,	  however,	  that	  Heidegger	  is	  not	  directly	  prescribing	  authenticity,	  but	  is	  rather	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exposing	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  understanding	  ourselves	  and	  relating	  to	  our	  death.	  Although	  it	  is	  sounds	  like	  Heidegger	  is	  suggesting	  authenticity	  as	  beneficial	  in	  that	  it	  encourages	  others	  to	  also	  be	  authentic,	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  want	  to	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  authenticity	  is	  any	  better	  than	  inauthenticity.	  	  
6.	  Possibility	  of	  Authenticity	  through	  Anxious	  Anticipatory	  Resoluteness	  To	  summarize,	  because	  of	  the	  unique	  being	  that	  we	  are,	  we	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  have	  an	  inauthentic	  self-­‐understanding	  in	  our	  everyday	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  However,	  also	  because	  of	  the	  being	  that	  we	  are,	  we	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  authentically	  understand	  ourselves	  as	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  Inauthentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  fleeing	  death	  as	  the	  most	  extreme	  possibility	  that	  it	  is.	  Authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  embracing	  anxiety	  and	  resolutely	  running	  forward	  into	  the	  possibility	  of	  death.	  This	  authentic	  relation	  to	  our	  finitude	  is	  the	  portal	  to	  authentic	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  in	  general.	  Authentically	  being-­‐towards	  our	  death,	  through	  anxious	  anticipatory	  resoluteness,	  has	  an	  affect	  on	  both	  our	  life	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  others	  around	  us.	  	  Through	  his	  description	  of	  anxious	  anticipatory	  resoluteness,	  Heidegger	  goes	  beyond	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  in	  proposing	  a	  way	  in	  which	  we	  can	  authentically	  relate	  to	  our	  death.	  However,	  Heidegger’s	  terminology	  seems	  to	  obscure	  the	  meaning	  of	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  a	  reader	  can	  describe	  what	  “anxiety,”	  “anticipation,”	  and	  “resoluteness”	  mean	  to	  Heidegger,	  it	  is	  incredibly	  challenging	  to	  grasp	  how	  they	  manifest	  within	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  What	  does	  anticipation	  and	  running	  ahead	  into	  death	  actually	  look	  like?	  How	  would	  a	  person	  know	  if	  they	  are	  making	  resolute	  choices?	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  explain	  in	  concrete	  experiential	  terms	  how	  to	  authentically	  be-­‐
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towards-­‐death.	  Therefore,	  even	  though	  Heidegger	  pushes	  the	  conversation	  of	  death	  in	  life	  to	  more	  fundamental	  and	  deeper	  levels	  than	  the	  previously	  discussed	  social	  scientists,	  Heidegger’s	  philosophizing	  still	  does	  not	  clarify	  how	  death	  can	  be	  approached,	  related	  to,	  and	  understood	  in	  our	  everyday	  lives.15	  	  	  
IV.	  Potential	  Reasons	  for	  Lack	  of	  Concrete	  Explanation	  of	  Authentic	  Being-­‐towards-­‐Death	  
A.	  Not	  a	  Straightforward	  Choice	  	   However,	  because	  Heidegger	  is	  so	  rigorous	  with	  his	  philosophizing,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  possible	  reasons	  why	  Heidegger	  did	  not	  experientially	  illustrate	  how	  Dasein	  can	  authentically	  be-­‐towards-­‐death.	  In	  other	  words,	  because	  Heidegger	  carefully	  analyzed	  the	  different	  relations	  we	  can	  take	  toward	  death,	  it	  is	  possible	  Heidegger	  has	  valid	  and	  purposeful	  reasons	  for	  not	  fully	  revealing	  the	  way	  in	  which	  to	  authentically	  apprehend	  death	  in	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  Perhaps	  through	  considering	  potential	  reasons	  for	  Heidegger’s	  lack	  of	  clarity,	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  can	  be	  further	  elucidated.	  One	  reason	  why	  Heidegger	  may	  not	  describe	  how	  to	  experientially	  accomplish	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  because	  he	  does	  not	  conceive	  of	  the	  modes	  of	  self-­‐understanding	  and	  relating	  to	  our	  death	  as	  a	  straightforward	  choice.	  Because	  Dasein	  as	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  is	  its	  relations	  with	  other	  Daseins,	  things,	  and	  the	  world,	  Dasein	  does	  not	  straightforwardly	  have	  fate	  or	  free	  will.	  Indeed,	  Heidegger	  sometimes	  uses	  scare	  quotes	  around	  the	  word	  choice,	  which	  makes	  it	  seem	  that	  one	  cannot	  choose	  to	  be	  authentic	  in	  the	  full	  sense	  of	  the	  term.	  In	  addition,	  as	  previously	  explained,	  the	  call	  of	  conscience,	  which	  is	  necessary	  to	  authentically	  be-­‐towards-­‐death,	  comes	  from	  both	  Dasein	  itself	  and	  over	  and	  above	  Dasein.	  As	  a	  result,	  Dasein	  cannot	  command	  the	  call	  to	  come,	  and	  can	  only	  make	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itself	  ready	  for	  the	  call.	  Therefore,	  because	  Dasein	  cannot	  straightforwardly	  choose	  authenticity,	  it	  would	  be	  incongruous	  for	  Heidegger	  to	  fully	  define	  the	  ways	  Dasein	  can	  choose	  to	  be	  authentic.	  	  
	  
B.	  Transforms	  and	  Changes	  Another	  possible	  reason	  why	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  concretely	  describe	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  because	  authenticity	  must	  be	  regained	  ever	  anew.	  When	  Dasein	  is	  authentically	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Dasein	  has	  reached	  a	  type	  of	  permanent	  enlightenment.	  Instead,	  Heidegger	  describes	  there	  is	  a	  continuous	  oscillation	  between	  inauthenticity	  and	  authenticity.	  Because	  inauthenticity	  is	  an	  ontological	  constitution	  of	  Dasein,	  Dasein	  is	  always	  at	  risk	  of	  becoming	  inauthentic.	  That	  is,	  Dasein	  cannot	  forevermore	  sustain	  a	  continuous	  marathon	  of	  authentic	  resolutely	  running	  forward	  and	  inevitably	  falls	  back	  into	  The	  They	  and	  inauthenticity.	  As	  a	  result,	  when	  Dasein	  embraces	  an	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  it	  is	  always	  a	  re-­‐emerging	  into	  authenticity.	  Considering	  that	  authenticity	  must	  be	  gained	  again	  and	  again,	  it	  is	  likely	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  become	  authentic	  are	  constantly	  changing	  and	  transforming.	  Therefore,	  authenticity	  is	  not	  a	  set	  path	  that	  Heidegger	  would	  ever	  be	  able	  to	  describe.	  	  
C.	  Complexly	  Intertwined	  with	  Inauthenticity	  To	  further	  complicate	  matters,	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  authenticity	  is	  not	  wholly	  separated	  from	  inauthenticity.	  Heidegger	  states,	  “In	  anticipatory	  resoluteness,	  Dasein	  holds	  itself	  open	  for	  its	  constant	  lostness	  in	  the	  irresoluteness	  of	  the	  ‘they’-­‐	  a	  lostness	  which	  is	  possible	  from	  the	  very	  basis	  of	  its	  own	  Being”	  (BT	  [MR]	  356/SZ	  308).	  Because	  authenticity	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involves	  embracing	  the	  being	  that	  one	  is,	  and	  because	  inauthenticity	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  being	  one	  is,	  then	  authenticity	  is	  not	  completely	  void	  of	  inauthenticity.	  Because	  authenticity	  is	  not	  transcendent	  beyond	  one’s	  everyday	  existence,	  and	  seems	  to	  be	  fundamentally	  intertwined	  with	  inauthenticity,	  it	  becomes	  incredibly	  challenge	  to	  grasp,	  let	  alone	  communicate,	  what	  authenticity	  concretely	  entails.	  
	  
D.	  Not	  Superior	  to	  Inauthentic	  Being-­‐towards-­‐Death	  Another	  explanation	  for	  why	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  fully	  illustrate	  how	  one	  reaches	  authenticity	  is	  because	  he	  does	  not	  want	  to	  prioritize	  authenticity	  over	  inauthenticity.	  	  Heidegger	  is	  adamant	  that	  inauthenticity	  is	  not	  bad	  and	  problematic	  and	  authenticity	  is	  not	  good	  and	  a	  solution,	  although	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  avoid	  this	  impression.	  Inauthenticity	  and	  authenticity	  are	  just	  types	  of	  relations	  to	  our	  death,	  different	  ways	  of	  self-­‐understanding	  we	  experience.	  Heidegger	  is	  not	  dictating	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  life,	  but	  pointing	  out	  Dasein’s	  possible	  modes	  of	  being.	  Therefore,	  perhaps	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  describe	  concrete	  ways	  to	  anxiously	  anticipate	  one’s	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  reader	  from	  thinking	  he	  is	  prescribing	  authenticity.	  	  
E.	  Must	  Be	  Enacted	  By	  Oneself	  An	  additional	  plausible	  reason	  why	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  explain	  how	  to	  anxiously	  anticipate	  one’s	  death	  is	  because	  any	  instruction	  for	  how	  to	  reach	  authenticity	  would	  go	  against	  its	  very	  definition.	  Because	  authenticity	  fundamentally	  involves	  owning	  oneself,	  determining	  oneself	  in	  contrast	  to	  falling	  prey	  to	  The	  They,	  then	  Dasein	  must	  embrace	  its	  being	  on	  its	  own.	  If	  Heidegger	  were	  to	  clearly	  and	  explicitly	  describe	  the	  steps	  in	  which	  to	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anxiously	  anticipate	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  and	  the	  reader	  were	  to	  follow	  these	  words,	  the	  reader	  would	  be	  losing	  himself	  or	  herself	  to	  the	  preconceived	  ways	  The	  They	  decides.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  Heidegger	  tells	  Dasein	  how	  to	  be	  authentic,	  then	  he	  disables	  Dasein	  from	  authentically	  owning	  and	  determining	  itself.	  	  	  
VI.	  Heidegger’s	  Relation	  to	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  
A.	  Similarities	  to	  the	  Social	  Scientists	  Now	  that	  a	  basic	  explanation	  of	  Heidegger’s	  conception	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  has	  been	  described,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  examine	  how	  Heidegger’s	  formulation	  of	  our	  mortality	  relates	  to	  those	  of	  the	  previously	  discussed	  social	  scientists.	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  TMT,	  and	  Heidegger	  agree	  that	  people,	  at	  least	  in	  contemporary	  times,	  typically	  deny	  death.	  Heidegger	  elucidates	  this	  concept	  with	  his	  explanation	  of	  our	  tendency	  of	  an	  inauthentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  	  Furthermore,	  all	  of	  the	  thinkers	  thus	  far	  discussed	  argue	  that,	  more	  than	  any	  other	  aspect	  of	  our	  lives,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  relate	  to	  our	  death	  has	  a	  central	  influence	  on	  us.	  In	  particular,	  Heidegger	  understands	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  the	  portal	  to	  authenticity	  in	  general.	  While	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  prescribe	  authenticity,	  he	  does	  believe	  that	  authenticity	  impacts	  our	  lives.	  Therefore,	  much	  like	  how	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  argue	  death	  greatly	  influences	  our	  everyday	  experiences,	  Heidegger	  asserts	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  understand	  ourselves	  as	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  affects	  our	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  existence.	  	  A	  more	  specific	  similarity	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  Becker	  is	  their	  understanding	  that	  our	  denial	  of	  death	  manifests	  through	  our	  interactions.	  Becker	  explains	  that	  through	  our	  societal	  interactions	  we	  come	  to	  deny	  our	  death	  in	  an	  adoption	  of	  a	  cultural	  heroic	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system.	  Comparatively,	  Heidegger	  describes	  that	  a	  denial	  of	  death	  occurs	  in	  our	  interactions	  with	  other	  beings,	  such	  as	  when	  we	  fall	  prey	  in	  the	  idle	  talk	  of	  The	  They	  and	  when	  we	  preoccupy	  ourselves	  with	  things	  that	  surround	  us.	  Moreover,	  Becker	  and	  Heidegger	  both	  view	  this	  denial	  of	  death	  as	  a	  paradoxical	  attempt	  to	  gain	  freedom	  from	  the	  anxiety	  of	  our	  death	  by	  imprisoning	  ourselves	  in	  the	  pre-­‐made	  decisions	  of	  the	  public.	  An	  additional	  similarity	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  Becker	  is	  in	  how	  they	  propose	  the	  appealing	  way16	  in	  which	  to	  relate	  to	  our	  death.	  Becker	  promotes	  the	  religious	  solution	  and	  Heidegger	  describes	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  While	  fundamentally	  quite	  different,	  Becker	  and	  Heidegger	  use	  similar	  language	  to	  describe	  the	  mechanism	  to	  reach	  this	  appealing	  approach	  to	  death.	  In	  particular,	  Becker	  uses	  the	  phrase	  “leap	  of	  faith”	  and	  Heidegger	  uses	  “forward	  running	  resoluteness.”	  In	  this	  way,	  both	  thinkers	  illustrate	  the	  appealing	  way	  to	  confront	  mortality	  through	  a	  bodily	  metaphor	  that	  implies	  a	  harsh,	  urgent	  movement	  in	  a	  forward	  direction.	  In	  addition,	  both	  Becker	  and	  Heidegger	  do	  not	  fully	  and	  concretely	  describe	  what	  the	  appealing	  relation	  to	  our	  death	  looks	  like	  in	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  While	  Becker’s	  definition	  of	  the	  religious	  solution	  is	  highly	  contradictory	  and	  confusing,	  Heidegger’s	  description	  of	  anxious	  resolute	  running	  ahead	  is	  incredibly	  challenging	  to	  grasp	  in	  an	  experiential	  way.	  Therefore,	  both	  Becker	  and	  Heidegger	  are	  similar	  in	  that	  they	  remain	  obscure	  in	  their	  explanation	  of	  the	  appealing	  way	  to	  approach	  our	  mortality.	  
	  
B.	  Differences	  with	  the	  Social	  Scientists	  A	  major	  difference	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  Becker	  is	  how	  they	  formulate	  the	  appealing	  way	  to	  relate	  to	  our	  death.	  In	  particular,	  Becker	  thinks	  the	  appealing	  way	  to	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approach	  death	  still	  involves	  a	  denial	  in	  that	  he	  views	  the	  religious	  solution	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  deny	  our	  mortality.	  In	  contrast,	  Heidegger	  describes	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  a	  grasping	  and	  maintaining	  death	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  is.	  In	  this	  way,	  Heidegger	  believes	  that	  we	  are	  indeed	  capable	  of	  not	  denying	  our	  death.	  Nevertheless,	  Heidegger	  makes	  clear	  that	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  state	  of	  enlightenment,	  and	  Dasein	  will	  always	  inevitably	  fall	  back	  into	  inauthenticity.	  As	  a	  result,	  Heidegger	  does	  seem	  to	  agree	  with	  Becker	  that	  a	  denial	  of	  death	  is	  impossible	  to	  completely	  eradicate.	  Still,	  Heidegger	  seems	  more	  hopeful	  than	  Becker	  in	  his	  belief	  that	  we	  can	  actually	  confront	  and	  apprehend	  our	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  	   Another	  crucial	  difference	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  Becker	  is	  that	  Heidegger	  is	  adamant	  that	  the	  appealing	  way	  to	  approach	  death	  is	  not	  transcendent	  beyond	  this	  world.	  Heidegger	  understands	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  apprehending	  the	  being	  one	  is,	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  fundamentally	  connected	  to	  this	  world	  and	  other	  beings.	  Therefore,	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  does	  not	  involve	  removing	  oneself	  from	  its	  interactions	  with	  things	  and	  others.	  In	  contrast,	  Becker’s	  promotion	  of	  the	  religious	  solution	  involves	  a	  transcendent	  leap	  of	  faith.	  While	  Becker	  is	  unclear	  what	  he	  means	  by	  leap	  of	  faith,	  it	  seems	  Becker	  suggests	  the	  appealing	  way	  to	  approach	  our	  death	  is	  by	  moving	  beyond	  this	  realm	  and	  connecting	  with	  God.	  As	  a	  result,	  Becker	  understands	  the	  appealing	  way	  to	  relate	  to	  our	  death	  is	  through	  transcending	  whereas	  Heidegger	  understands	  it	  as	  necessarily	  connected	  to	  our	  everyday	  lives	  in	  this	  world.	  	   An	  additional	  difference	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  Becker	  is	  how	  they	  view	  their	  subject	  of	  investigation.	  Heidegger,	  like	  Becker,	  sees	  our	  tendency	  to	  deny	  our	  death	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  who	  we	  are.	  However,	  Heidegger	  is	  speaking	  only	  about	  Dasein,	  our	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐
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world,	  and	  does	  not	  want	  to	  make	  claims	  about	  a	  universal	  human	  nature	  as	  Becker	  seems	  to	  do.	  That	  is,	  even	  though	  Heidegger	  believes	  our	  tendency	  to	  inauthentically	  relate	  to	  our	  death	  is	  a	  part	  of	  our	  ontological	  constitution,	  Heidegger,	  unlike	  Becker,	  does	  not	  propose	  that	  this	  is	  a	  permanent	  characteristic	  of	  human	  beings.	  	  	  Still	  another	  discrepancy	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  the	  social	  scientists	  is	  that	  they	  seem	  to	  have	  different	  meanings	  for	  the	  term	  death.	  Heidegger	  tries	  to	  clearly	  define	  what	  he	  signifies	  by	  death,	  a	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  distinct	  from	  demise,	  perishing,	  and	  dying.	  However,	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  do	  not	  directly	  explain	  what	  they	  mean	  by	  death,	  and	  presuppose	  their	  readers	  understand	  what	  they	  are	  referencing.	  For	  example,	  TMT	  rests	  their	  entire	  experimental	  framework	  on	  Mortality	  Salience,	  or	  priming	  someone	  with	  awareness	  of	  their	  death.	  However,	  Heidegger’s	  careful	  definitions	  expose	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  what	  exactly	  TMT	  experiments	  are	  priming.	  It	  seems	  likely	  TMT	  researchers	  are	  investigating	  both	  demise	  and	  dying,	  and	  are	  thus	  not	  examining	  how	  people	  confront	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  appears	  that	  Heidegger	  and	  TMT	  are	  investigating	  different	  phenomenon.	  As	  previously	  alluded	  to	  in	  Derrida’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  social	  scientific	  view	  of	  death,	  Heidegger’s	  work	  underlines	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  social	  sciences	  to	  reconsider	  what	  exactly	  they	  are	  studying.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  of	  significance	  that	  despite	  this	  major	  incongruence	  in	  what	  they	  mean	  by	  death,	  both	  Heidegger	  and	  the	  social	  sciences	  seem	  to	  uncover	  the	  pervasive	  impact	  of	  ‘death’	  in	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  
	  
C.	  Contributions	  and	  Limitations	  In	  sum,	  Heidegger	  uses	  rigorous	  ontological	  phenomenology	  in	  order	  to	  reaffirm	  what	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  generally	  think	  about	  our	  mortality.	  Heidegger	  is	  also	  able	  to	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go	  beyond	  these	  thinkers	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  elucidate	  possible	  ways	  to	  confront	  our	  death.	  While	  Becker	  confusingly	  tries	  to	  explain	  different	  relations	  to	  our	  death,	  Heidegger	  does	  so	  with	  careful	  precision.	  Additionally,	  Heidegger	  goes	  farther	  than	  Becker	  and	  TMT	  in	  his	  proposition	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  not	  always	  deny	  our	  death.	  Heidegger	  describes	  an	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  involves	  confronting	  and	  facing	  death	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  is.	  Heidegger	  contributes	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  the	  conversation	  about	  death	  in	  life,	  both	  in	  pushing	  the	  meticulousness	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  death	  and	  in	  advancing	  descriptions	  of	  possible	  ways	  to	  approach	  death.	  	  However,	  despite,	  or	  precisely	  because	  of,	  the	  carefulness	  of	  his	  philosophizing,	  Heidegger	  is	  limited	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  tangibly	  explain	  what	  death	  means	  to	  my	  everyday	  life.	  As	  previously	  explained,	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  remain	  bound	  within	  their	  disciplines	  and	  are	  unable	  to	  describe	  potential	  ways	  to	  approach	  our	  death.	  Heidegger	  similarly	  is	  confined	  by	  his	  ultraprecise	  system	  and	  his	  quasi-­‐scientific	  terminology,	  which	  are	  incredibly	  difficult	  for	  readers	  to	  comprehend.	  While	  he	  unfolds	  the	  intricacies	  of	  an	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  involving	  anxiously	  resolutely	  running	  forward,	  the	  reader	  is	  left	  not	  knowing	  how	  this	  relation	  to	  death	  can	  concretely	  manifest	  within	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  existence.	  Heidegger’s	  philosophizing	  on	  death	  provides	  clarity,	  but	  because	  of	  its	  explicitly	  ontological	  approach,	  it	  remains	  within	  a	  realm	  of	  abstract	  cognition	  instead	  of	  illuminating	  lived	  experience.	  No	  thinker	  thus	  far	  discussed	  has	  been	  able	  to	  explain	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  approach	  our	  death	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  can	  be	  embodied	  and	  truly	  apprehended.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  next	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis	  examines	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche’s	  more	  personal	  methodology	  in	  the	  quest	  to	  unfold	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  I	  can	  comprehend	  and	  integrate	  my	  death	  in	  life.	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Chapter	  Five:	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  Philosophical	  Therapist:	  Embodiment	  of	  Death	  
I.	  Introduction	  to	  Nietzsche	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  (1844-­‐1900)	  is	  traditionally	  considered	  a	  philosopher,	  but	  his	  project	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  different	  light,	  as	  that	  of	  a	  “cultural	  physician.”17	  Nietzsche’s	  major	  aim	  was	  to	  doctor	  the	  sickness	  of	  modern	  society,	  and	  in	  this	  way	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  macro-­‐psychotherapist.	  In	  Ecce	  Homo	  he	  asserts,	  “The	  fact	  that	  a	  psychologist	  without	  equal	  is	  speaking	  in	  my	  works,	  this	  is	  perhaps	  the	  first	  thing	  a	  good	  reader	  will	  realize”	  (EH,	  “Books”	  105	  §5).	  Instead	  of	  elucidating	  specific	  philosophical	  content,	  Nietzsche	  provided	  a	  form	  of	  therapy,	  a	  methodology	  in	  order	  to	  have	  his	  readers	  embody	  a	  process	  to	  grow	  into	  a	  stronger	  way	  of	  living.	  Nietzsche’s	  central	  philosophical	  task	  was	  assisting	  you	  to	  become	  healthier.	  	  Fundamental	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  project	  was	  the	  attempt	  to	  get	  you,	  as	  an	  individual	  reader,	  to	  realize	  that	  your	  beliefs	  were	  not	  set	  in	  stone.	  His	  philosophy	  was	  one	  of	  provocation,	  and	  he	  often	  wrote	  in	  ways	  that	  opposed	  the	  prevailing	  tradition.	  Nietzsche	  purposefully	  tried	  to	  chide	  his	  readers	  in	  order	  to	  ruffle	  their	  conventional	  ways	  and	  uproot	  them	  from	  their	  habitual	  tranquility.	  In	  addition,	  he	  wrote	  to	  be	  confusing	  and	  contradictory,	  often	  employing	  poetic	  techniques	  such	  as	  metaphors,	  imagery,	  and	  symbolism.	  Nietzsche	  did	  not	  want	  to	  present	  straightforward	  ideas.	  Similarly,	  instead	  of	  wrapping	  up	  his	  writings	  with	  tidy	  conclusions,	  Nietzsche	  tried	  to	  open	  up	  the	  content	  even	  more.	  For	  example,	  Nietzsche	  oftentimes	  finished	  his	  aphorisms	  with	  a	  question	  mark	  or	  dash	  instead	  of	  a	  period.	  Through	  both	  what	  he	  said	  and	  how	  he	  said	  it,	  Nietzsche	  jostled	  his	  readers’	  ideas	  to	  awaken	  them	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  conceptions	  are	  not	  absolute,	  and	  that	  they	  have	  the	  agency	  to	  create	  different	  formulations.	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Through	  undermining	  the	  foundational	  beliefs	  of	  his	  readers,	  Nietzsche	  was	  trying	  to	  get	  them	  to	  question	  whether	  their	  current	  understandings	  were	  detrimental	  or	  beneficial	  to	  their	  life.	  Indeed,	  this	  could	  be	  described	  as	  Nietzsche’s	  task—the	  investigation	  into	  what	  is	  in	  the	  service	  of	  life.	  If,	  after	  questioning,	  the	  reader’s	  conceptions	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  detrimental	  to	  their	  life,	  Nietzsche	  encouraged	  the	  reader	  to	  create	  other,	  stronger	  conceptions.	  His	  open-­‐ended,	  poetic	  methodology	  was	  meant	  to	  get	  his	  readers	  to	  re-­‐imbue	  their	  own	  meaning	  regarding	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  For	  example,	  David	  Allison,	  a	  scholar	  who	  works	  on	  Nietzsche	  and	  psychoanalysis,	  explains	  that	  Nietzsche	  often	  used	  an	  aphoristic	  approach	  because	  through	  this	  process	  the	  readers	  “have	  to	  actively	  and	  seriously	  engage	  themselves	  –	  by	  personally	  interpreting	  the	  aphorism”	  (xi).	  In	  contrast	  to	  declaring	  a	  philosophical	  postulation	  to	  no	  one	  in	  particular,	  Allison	  describes	  that	  Nietzsche	  intimately	  talks	  to	  his	  readers	  as	  if	  they	  are	  his	  friends,	  speaking	  specifically	  to	  you	  as	  you	  process	  his	  works	  (xii).	  Much	  like	  conversation	  with	  a	  friend,	  Nietzsche	  offers	  disjointed,	  open-­‐ended	  insights,	  so	  his	  readers	  must	  come	  to	  their	  own	  conclusions	  as	  to	  the	  importance	  and	  significance	  of	  the	  concept	  raised.	  In	  this	  way,	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophy	  is	  a	  form	  of	  therapy,	  one	  that	  aims	  to	  get	  the	  reader	  to	  realize	  the	  sickness	  in	  wholeheartedly,	  absolutely	  believing	  their	  cultural	  system,	  and	  an	  encouragement	  and	  helpful	  therapeutic	  hand	  to	  push	  the	  reader	  towards	  constructing	  a	  new,	  ever	  healthier	  system	  for	  themself.	  	  Because	  Nietzsche	  is	  a	  therapist	  of	  culture,	  he	  was	  not	  necessarily	  aiming	  to	  get	  his	  readers	  to	  rationally,	  cognitively	  think	  certain	  things.	  Rather,	  Nietzsche	  cares	  about	  how	  his	  readers	  feel,	  how	  they	  exist	  and	  experience	  their	  world.	  Heidegger	  too	  wanted	  to	  expose	  his	  readers	  to	  other	  potential	  ways	  to	  be.	  However,	  Heidegger,	  unlike	  Nietzsche,	  used	  a	  rigorous,	  logical	  approach	  to	  accomplish	  this	  task.	  Heidegger	  unfolded	  an	  intricate	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philosophical	  system	  that	  one	  has	  to	  spend	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  effort	  trying	  to	  unpack	  and	  rationally	  clarify.	  In	  contrast,	  Nietzsche	  used	  contradictory,	  paradoxical	  content	  in	  order	  to	  have	  his	  readers	  undergo	  an	  emotional,	  creative	  process	  as	  they	  read	  his	  works.	  Nietzsche	  never	  writes	  straightforwardly,	  so	  his	  readers	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  fully	  grasp	  exactly	  and	  in	  detail	  what	  Nietzsche	  means.	  Therefore,	  Nietzsche	  wants	  you	  to	  undergo	  an	  experimental,	  interpretative	  process	  in	  contrast	  to	  Heidegger	  who	  takes	  the	  reader	  on	  a	  path	  to	  understand	  a	  particular	  formulation.	  The	  different	  styles	  of	  Heidegger	  and	  Nietzsche	  become	  especially	  clear	  when	  examining	  how	  they	  approach	  the	  theme	  of	  death.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Heidegger	  carefully	  and	  rigorously	  elucidates	  a	  detailed	  definition	  of	  death	  and	  the	  modes	  in	  which	  we	  can	  relate	  to	  our	  mortality.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Heidegger	  remedies	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  the	  social	  sciences	  in	  their	  assumption	  that	  death	  means	  the	  end	  moment	  of	  one’s	  life,	  and	  he	  supplements	  the	  social	  sciences’	  lack	  of	  or	  unclear	  descriptions	  of	  potential	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  approach	  our	  finitude.	  However,	  this	  concentration	  on	  analyzing	  death	  restricts	  Heidegger.	  While	  his	  readers	  conceptually	  come	  to	  understand	  that	  they	  are	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  they	  are	  left	  not	  knowing	  what	  this	  means	  to	  their	  everyday	  existence.	  Even	  though	  Heidegger	  explains	  an	  authentic	  relation	  towards	  our	  death	  as	  involving	  an	  anxious	  running	  ahead	  resolute	  choice,	  his	  readers	  may	  have	  difficulty	  grasping	  how	  they	  can	  actualize	  this	  relation	  to	  their	  mortality	  within	  their	  own	  lives.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  Heidegger’s	  intense	  concentration	  on	  clarifying	  death,	  Nietzsche	  rarely	  directly	  spoke	  about	  death.	  When	  one	  considers	  his	  emphasis	  on	  embodiment,	  this	  silence	  does	  not	  seem	  unfitting.	  Nietzsche	  says,	  “Being	  –	  we	  have	  no	  idea	  of	  it	  apart	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘living.’	  –	  How	  can	  anything	  dead	  ‘be’?”	  (WP	  312	  §582).	  Through	  this	  quote,	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Nietzsche	  questions	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  wrap	  our	  minds	  around	  death.	  Considering	  that	  we	  are	  alive,	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  experientially	  know	  what	  death	  is.	  Because	  we	  cannot	  know	  what	  death	  is,	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  want	  to	  directly	  investigate	  death.	  Instead,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  confront	  our	  finitude	  through	  indirect	  avenues,	  ways	  in	  which	  mortality	  experientially	  shows	  itself	  within	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  	  This	  chapter	  looks	  at	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  Nietzsche	  indirectly	  examines	  the	  different	  modes	  in	  which	  we	  can	  approach	  our	  mortality.	  First,	  we	  will	  look	  at	  the	  various	  aphorisms	  where	  Nietzsche	  discusses	  his	  views	  on	  suicide.	  Then,	  we	  will	  describe	  Nietzsche’s	  formulation	  of	  sickness,	  as	  his	  take	  on	  how	  we	  confront	  our	  mortality	  through	  the	  fallibility	  of	  our	  bodies.	  	  	  
II.	  Suicide	  
A.	  Upturning	  Traditional	  Notions	  That	  Suicide	  Is	  Problematic	  Nietzsche’s	  most	  direct	  discussion	  of	  death	  involves	  the	  concept	  of	  suicide.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  Nietzsche	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  adamant	  proponent	  of	  killing	  oneself.	  For	  example,	  he	  states,	  “Out	  of	  love	  for	  life	  -­‐,	  you	  should	  want	  death	  to	  be	  different,	  free,	  conscious,	  without	  chance,	  without	  surprises	  […]	  When	  you	  do	  away	  with	  yourself	  you	  are	  doing	  the	  most	  admirable	  thing	  there	  is”	  (TI,	  “Untimely”	  210	  §36).	  In	  contemporary	  society,	  even	  the	  morality	  of	  suicide	  in	  the	  case	  of	  terminal	  illness	  is	  highly	  debated.	  Therefore,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  current	  mainstream	  values,	  Nietzsche’s	  general	  advocacy	  of	  suicide	  would	  likely	  seem	  radical	  and	  outrageous.	  However,	  perhaps	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  point.	  It	  is	  possible	  Nietzsche	  is	  promoting	  suicide	  in	  the	  same	  way	  he	  tries	  to	  constantly	  uproot	  all	  of	  modern	  society’s	  declaration	  of	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absolute	  values.	  Nietzsche	  oftentimes	  tries	  to	  expose	  that	  what	  we	  deem	  as	  fundamental,	  natural	  principles	  could	  actually	  be	  conceptualized	  otherwise.	  In	  this	  way,	  Nietzsche’s	  promotion	  of	  suicide	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  expose	  that	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  currently	  evaluate	  suicide	  is	  not	  immutable,	  and	  thus	  that	  suicide	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  horrible,	  evil	  phenomenon.	  	  One	  way	  in	  which	  Nietzsche	  shows	  our	  views	  could	  be	  otherwise	  is	  through	  his	  explanation	  that	  Christianity	  is	  what	  has	  deemed	  suicide	  in	  our	  contemporary	  times	  as	  absolutely	  negative.	  Nietzsche	  claims	  that	  Christianity	  has	  convinced	  society	  that	  all	  suicide	  or	  “unnatural	  death”	  is	  terrible	  and	  bad	  and	  all	  “natural	  death”	  or	  dying	  of	  old	  age	  and	  weakness	  is	  praiseworthy.	  However,	  Nietzsche	  asserts	  that	  outside	  of	  the	  religious	  mode,	  “natural	  death	  is	  worthy	  of	  no	  glorification”	  (HH,	  “Wanderer”	  355	  §185).	  Through	  pointing	  out	  that	  there	  is	  a	  history	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  suicide	  and	  suggesting	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  besides	  the	  Christian	  way	  in	  which	  to	  evaluate	  types	  of	  death,	  Nietzsche	  exposes	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  understand	  death	  differently	  than	  we	  do	  now.	  Another	  way	  in	  which	  Nietzsche	  reveals	  the	  changeability	  of	  our	  evaluation	  of	  suicide	  is	  through	  his	  explanation	  that	  the	  way	  we	  experience	  death	  psychologically	  is	  not	  always	  as	  it	  seems	  socially.	  Nietzsche	  states,	  “He	  who	  is	  honest	  usually	  feels	  when	  someone	  dies	  that	  he	  has	  really	  been	  deprived	  of	  very	  little	  and	  that	  the	  solemn	  funeral	  orator	  is	  a	  hypocrite”	  (HH,	  “Opinions”	  295	  §373).	  In	  other	  words,	  Nietzsche	  seems	  to	  be	  saying	  that	  even	  though	  we	  create	  a	  lot	  of	  fuss	  and	  drama	  when	  a	  person	  dies,	  we	  do	  not	  actually	  feel	  as	  affected	  as	  we	  may	  claim	  we	  are.	  In	  this	  way,	  Nietzsche	  suggests	  that	  death,	  including	  suicide,	  might	  not	  be	  as	  horrendous	  as	  we	  outwardly	  make	  it	  out	  to	  be.	  It	  is	  thus	  possible	  we	  could	  evaluate	  suicide	  positively,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  likely	  we	  already	  do.	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   Therefore,	  it	  seems	  that	  one	  reason	  why	  Nietzsche	  promotes,	  or	  at	  least	  does	  not	  proscribe,	  suicide	  is	  because	  he	  is	  trying	  to	  oppose	  the	  absolute	  notion	  that	  suicide	  is	  bad	  and	  horrific.	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  Nietzsche	  at	  the	  very	  least	  is	  trying	  to	  get	  us	  to	  question	  our	  traditional	  conception	  that	  dying	  at	  an	  old	  age	  of	  natural	  causes,	  such	  as	  weakness	  and	  degeneration,	  is	  glorious	  and	  killing	  ourselves	  in	  our	  prime	  is	  misguided	  and	  pathological.	  Corresponding	  to	  his	  philosophy	  at	  large,	  Nietzsche	  wants	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  impermanence	  of	  our	  conceptions,	  including	  how	  we	  perceive	  death,	  and	  to	  ask	  if	  other	  ways	  of	  conceptualizing	  and	  being	  may	  be	  healthier.	  	  	  
B.	  Potential	  Benefits	  of	  Suicide	  A	  different	  but	  not	  incongruous	  reason	  for	  why	  Nietzsche	  promotes	  suicide	  could	  be	  that	  he	  does	  in	  fact	  believe	  suicide	  is	  beneficial.	  Nietzsche	  discusses	  his	  opinions	  regarding	  suicide	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  confidence,	  which	  makes	  it	  seem	  as	  if	  he	  is	  not	  just	  promoting	  suicide	  to	  oppose	  traditional	  notions,	  but	  because	  he	  truly	  views	  it	  as	  praiseworthy	  and	  in	  the	  service	  of	  life.	  For	  example,	  he	  questions,	  “What	  is	  more	  rational,	  to	  stop	  the	  machine	  when	  the	  work	  one	  demands	  of	  it	  has	  been	  completed	  –	  or	  to	  let	  it	  run	  on	  until	  it	  stops	  of	  its	  own	  accord,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  until	  it	  is	  ruined?	  Is	  the	  latter	  not	  a	  squandering	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  maintenance,	  a	  misuse	  of	  the	  energy	  and	  attentiveness	  of	  those	  who	  service	  it?”	  (HH,	  “Wanderer”	  355	  §185).	  Here	  Nietzsche	  seems	  to	  be	  going	  beyond	  his	  method	  of	  passionate,	  antagonism	  of	  traditional	  notions	  to	  provide	  a	  rational	  argument	  why	  suicide	  is	  potentially	  commendable.	  Nietzsche	  is	  able	  to	  explain	  that	  much	  like	  machinery,	  it	  does	  not	  make	  logical	  sense	  to	  continue	  living	  when	  one	  is	  unable	  of	  functioning	  efficiently.	  Therefore,	  it	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seems	  that	  Nietzsche	  might	  not	  merely	  be	  trying	  to	  frustrate	  his	  readers’	  habitual	  conceptions,	  but	  that	  philosophically	  he	  understands	  suicide	  to	  be	  of	  benefit.	  	  Whether	  he	  is	  simply	  trying	  to	  overturn	  traditional	  notions	  or	  whether	  he	  is	  making	  a	  philosophical	  claim,	  with	  these	  aphorisms	  Nietzsche	  suggests	  that	  suicide	  might	  in	  fact	  be	  in	  the	  service	  of	  life.	  Therefore,	  it	  can	  be	  surmised	  that	  on	  a	  more	  general	  level	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  believe	  death	  straightforwardly	  opposes	  life,	  but	  that	  death	  could	  actually	  potentially	  enhance	  and	  affirm	  life.	  	  	  
C.	  Opposition	  to	  Degenerative	  Slow	  Suicide	  However,	  even	  though	  Nietzsche	  does	  indeed	  support	  suicide	  in	  many	  of	  his	  aphorisms,	  elsewhere	  he	  appears	  to	  fervently	  oppose	  it.	  That	  is,	  Nietzsche	  seems	  to	  be	  contradictorily	  both	  for	  and	  against	  the	  act	  of	  killing	  oneself.	  Yet,	  a	  careful	  examination	  of	  the	  aphorisms	  together	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  Nietzsche	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘suicide’	  in	  two	  ways,	  differentiated	  by	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  life.	  Specifically,	  Nietzsche	  promotes	  suicide	  when	  it	  affirms	  life,	  as	  in	  the	  examples	  above,	  and	  he	  opposes	  suicide	  when	  it	  is	  against	  life.	  Certain	  types	  of	  suicide	  involve	  a	  hatred	  or	  degeneration	  of	  life,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  type	  of	  killing	  oneself	  that	  Nietzsche	  condemns.	  Nietzsche	  calls	  this	  negative	  killing	  of	  oneself	  “slow	  suicide,”	  which	  involves	  the	  killing	  oneself	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  one’s	  life.	  Nietzsche	  understands	  Christianity	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  a	  slow	  suicide	  in	  that	  it	  denies	  this	  life	  in	  its	  desire	  not	  to	  live	  in	  this	  world.	  Christianity	  believes	  in	  a	  heaven	  realm,	  a	  beyond	  they	  view	  as	  the	  true,	  eternal	  existence.	  A	  person	  must	  die	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  this	  perfect	  realm,	  and	  thus,	  Nietzsche	  understands	  Christianity	  as	  preaching	  death	  (see	  Z,	  “Preachers”	  72).	  
	   109	  
Another	  detrimental	  suicide	  Nietzsche	  condemns	  is	  that	  of	  Socrates	  (GS	  272	  §340).	  While	  Nietzsche	  respected	  Socrates,	  he	  was	  disappointed	  and	  deeply	  upset	  with	  the	  way	  Socrates	  approached	  his	  death.	  Nietzsche	  explains	  that	  Socrates’	  last	  words	  of	  “O	  Crito,	  I	  owe	  Asclepius	  a	  rooster”	  actually	  mean,	  “O	  Crito,	  life	  is	  a	  disease.”	  Walter	  Kaufmann,	  an	  influential	  scholar	  of	  Nietzsche,	  points	  out	  that	  because	  Asclepius	  was	  the	  god	  of	  medicine,	  through	  this	  aphorism	  Nietzsche	  understands	  that	  Socrates’	  viewed	  his	  suicide	  as	  a	  cure	  of	  the	  disease	  of	  life	  (GS	  272	  Note	  70).	  In	  this	  way,	  “Socrates	  suffered	  life!,”	  and	  he	  rationalized	  his	  suicide	  by	  declaring	  a	  hatred	  of	  life.	  Nietzsche	  understands	  this	  final	  move	  by	  Socrates	  as	  undermining	  what	  Nietzsche	  initially	  believed	  to	  be	  an	  overarching	  cheerfulness	  in	  Socrates’	  work.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  reason	  Socrates	  gave	  for	  his	  suicide	  showed	  Nietzsche	  that	  Socrates’	  entire	  existence	  was	  a	  slow	  degeneration	  and	  opposition	  to	  life.	  The	  examples	  of	  Christianity	  and	  Socrates	  involve	  being	  so	  disgusted	  with	  life	  that	  they	  try	  to	  escape	  it	  by	  promoting	  death,	  a	  suicide	  Nietzsche	  opposes	  because	  it	  is	  life	  denying.	  	  	  
D.	  Promotion	  of	  Affirmative	  Suicide	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  slow	  suicide	  that	  involves	  a	  condemnation	  of	  life,	  the	  suicide	  Nietzsche	  promotes	  requires	  an	  affirmation	  of	  life.	  Nietzsche	  champions	  one	  who	  is,	  “Free	  for	  death	  and	  free	  in	  death,	  one	  who	  solemnly	  says	  No	  when	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  time	  for	  Yes:	  thus	  he	  understands	  life	  and	  death”	  (Z,	  “Voluntary”	  99).	  That	  is,	  Nietzsche	  promotes	  saying	  “No”	  or	  ending	  life	  when	  a	  person	  is	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  say	  “Yes”	  and	  affirm	  their	  life.	  Another	  way	  Nietzsche	  advocates	  suicide	  is	  through	  his	  encouragement	  of,	  “Dying	  proudly	  when	  it	  is	  not	  longer	  feasible	  to	  live	  proudly”	  (TI,	  “Untimely”	  210	  §36).	  Nietzsche	  recommends	  killing	  oneself	  when	  it	  becomes	  the	  final	  act	  of	  affirmation,	  even	  when	  this	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means	  killing	  oneself	  before	  one	  becomes	  old	  or	  falls	  ill.	  Ireton	  clarifies	  Nietzsche’s	  position	  when	  he	  says,	  “Eventually	  even	  self-­‐transcendence	  has	  its	  limits	  and	  it	  is	  then	  that	  death,	  paradoxically,	  becomes	  the	  only	  existential	  possibility	  for	  further	  growth”	  (162).	  When	  a	  person	  is	  unable	  to	  become	  more	  than	  what	  they	  are,	  cannot	  take	  hold	  of	  new	  possibilities,	  and	  thus	  cannot	  truly	  live,	  Nietzsche	  believes	  that	  at	  this	  point	  suicide	  is	  the	  most	  praiseworthy	  decision	  this	  individual	  can	  make.	  In	  this	  way,	  one	  honors	  life	  by	  stopping	  a	  life	  of	  non-­‐living.	  	  	   However,	  Nietzsche	  describes	  affirmative	  suicide	  as	  incredibly	  challenging.	  It	  is	  a	  major	  struggle	  to	  know	  when	  it	  is	  the	  “right	  time”	  to	  die	  	  (Z,	  “Voluntary”	  98).	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  pinpoint	  when	  it	  is	  that	  death	  affirms	  life	  and	  when	  it	  denies	  life.	  In	  addition,	  Nietzsche	  asserts	  suicide	  must	  be	  done	  as	  a	  rational,	  thoughtful	  decision,	  and	  not	  in	  the	  depths	  of	  brooding,	  passionate	  despair.	  Besides	  performing	  the	  act	  itself,	  and	  doing	  so	  at	  the	  right	  time,	  Nietzsche’s	  affirmative	  suicide	  must	  also	  be	  “carried	  out	  with	  lucidity	  and	  cheerfulness”	  (TI,	  “Untimely”	  210	  §36).	  	   	  Considering	  Nietzsche	  believes	  that	  one	  should	  kill	  themselves	  when	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  truly	  living,	  Nietzsche	  also	  argues	  that	  people	  who	  preach	  slow	  suicide,	  who	  kill	  themselves	  by	  denying	  their	  life,	  should	  commit	  suicide	  because	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  truly	  living.	  For	  example,	  he	  states,	  “Everywhere	  resound	  the	  voices	  of	  those	  who	  preach	  death	  […]	  Or	  ‘eternal	  life’:	  it	  is	  all	  the	  same	  to	  me –	  provided	  they	  pass	  away	  quickly!”	  (Z,	  “Preachers”	  73).	  Nietzsche	  understands	  those	  who	  “preach	  death”	  as	  people	  who	  hate	  life,	  exemplified	  by	  Christianity	  and	  Socrates.	  In	  this	  aphorism,	  Nietzsche	  seems	  to	  be	  saying	  that	  he	  wants	  these	  preachers	  of	  slow	  suicide	  to	  hurry	  up	  and	  kill	  themselves.	  In	  this	  way,	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we	  can	  see	  Nietzsche	  understands	  that	  a	  suicide	  committed	  rationally	  and	  affirmatively	  is	  superior	  to	  a	  ‘life’	  that	  is	  a	  dull,	  tranquilized,	  slow	  suicide.	  	  	   For	  Nietzsche,	  the	  opposition	  is	  not	  between	  death	  and	  life,	  but,	  rather,	  the	  opposition	  between	  affirming	  life	  and	  denying	  life	  (see	  EH,	  “Birth”	  109	  §2).	  Thus	  Nietzsche	  warns,	  “Let	  us	  beware	  of	  saying	  that	  death	  is	  opposed	  to	  life”	  (GS	  168	  §109).	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  have	  paradoxical	  opinions	  regarding	  suicide.	  Because	  Nietzsche	  views	  the	  opposition	  of	  life	  as	  the	  opposite	  to	  life,	  he	  champions	  suicide	  when	  it	  is	  a	  promotion	  of	  life	  and	  opposes	  suicide	  when	  it	  involves	  a	  fleeing	  from	  and	  degeneration	  of	  life.	  	  In	  line	  with	  these	  views	  he	  states,	  “It	  makes	  me	  happy	  that	  men	  do	  not	  want	  at	  all	  to	  think	  the	  thought	  of	  death!	  I	  should	  like	  very	  much	  to	  do	  something	  that	  would	  make	  the	  thought	  of	  life	  even	  a	  hundred	  times	  more	  appealing	  to	  them”	  (GS	  225	  §278).	  Here	  Nietzsche	  is	  encouraging	  that	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  in	  the	  service	  of	  life.	  In	  the	  right	  circumstances,	  death	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  affirmation	  of	  and	  not	  an	  opposition	  to	  life.	  Nietzsche,	  similar	  to	  Heidegger,	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  investigating	  how	  death	  is	  different	  than	  life,	  but	  about	  how	  we	  live	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  death.	  What	  matters	  for	  Nietzsche	  is	  that	  we	  learn	  the	  courage	  and	  cheerfulness	  to	  affirmatively	  embrace	  every	  moment	  of	  our	  lives,	  including	  an	  act	  of	  suicide	  when	  a	  person	  can	  no	  longer	  affirm	  their	  existence.	  	  
	  
E.	  Suicide	  as	  Both	  Physical	  and	  Metaphorical	  	  	   As	  has	  been	  alluded	  to	  thus	  far,	  Nietzsche’s	  formulation	  of	  suicide	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  physical	  killing	  oneself,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  viewed	  in	  a	  metaphorical	  way.	  People	  can	  kill	  themselves	  metaphorically	  by	  destroying	  their	  previous,	  set	  conceptions	  in	  order	  to	  learn	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new,	  more	  beneficial	  ways.	  Metaphorical	  suicide	  involves	  the	  overturning	  of	  one’s	  traditional	  notions,	  which	  as	  described	  above,	  is	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  provocative	  method	  Nietzsche	  often	  employs	  in	  his	  writings.	  This	  broader	  understanding	  of	  death	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  declaration,	  “I	  love	  him	  who	  wants	  to	  create	  beyond	  himself,	  and	  thus	  perishes”	  (Z,	  “Creator”	  91).	  Here	  Nietzsche	  is	  pointing	  out	  that	  every	  creation	  necessitates	  the	  killing	  of	  what	  formerly	  was,	  in	  order	  to	  build	  anew.	  Thus,	  creative	  endeavors	  involve	  a	  suicide	  of	  one’s	  previous	  way	  of	  being.	  Another	  example	  of	  this	  metaphorical	  understanding	  of	  death	  occurs	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  exclamation	  that:	  “[the	  living]	  sometimes	  appear	  to	  me	  as	  shades,	  so	  pale	  and	  ill-­‐humored,	  so	  restless	  and,	  alas!	  So	  lusting	  for	  life:	  whereas	  those	  others	  then	  seem	  to	  me	  so	  alive,	  as	  though	  now,	  after	  death,	  they	  could	  never	  again	  grow	  weary	  of	  life”	  (HH,	  “Opinions”	  299	  §408).	  In	  this	  aphorism,	  those	  who	  have	  “died”	  have	  not	  perished	  in	  the	  physical	  sense,	  but	  have	  undergone	  a	  metaphorical	  dying,	  an	  overturning	  of	  their	  previous	  ways.	  These	  “dead,”	  Nietzsche	  asserts,	  are	  more	  alive,	  more	  full	  of	  color,	  exuberance,	  and	  liveliness,	  than	  those	  who	  have	  lived	  their	  lives	  grumbling,	  feeble,	  and	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  engagement.	  Nietzsche	  understands	  a	  metaphorical	  dying	  as	  a	  way	  of	  being	  truly	  alive.	  	  Ireton	  finds	  Nietzsche’s	  more	  metaphorical	  understanding	  of	  death	  at	  work	  in	  Thus	  
Spoke	  Zarathustra.	  At	  one	  point,	  Zarathustra,	  the	  main	  character,	  promotes	  a	  free	  death	  (i.e.	  affirmative	  suicide),	  and	  Ireton	  claims	  that	  this	  promotion	  of	  free	  death	  should	  perhaps	  “be	  understood	  not	  as	  an	  actual	  and	  definitive	  killing	  of	  the	  self	  but	  as	  a	  projected	  end	  meant	  to	  further	  the	  freedom	  of	  existence	  and	  increase	  the	  potential	  of	  life.	  Free	  death	  results	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  one’s	  entire	  mode	  of	  existence	  and	  denotes	  more	  a	  life-­‐long	  attitude	  than	  a	  singular	  act	  of	  suicide”	  (172).	  Ireton	  believes	  that	  instead	  of	  just	  a	  promotion	  of	  physically	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killing	  oneself,	  Nietzsche,	  through	  his	  character	  of	  Zarathustra,	  encourages	  suicide	  as	  a	  destruction	  of	  one’s	  previous	  self	  throughout	  the	  entire	  course	  of	  one’s	  life.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  seems	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  affirmative	  suicide	  involves	  a	  continuous	  annihilation	  of	  detrimental	  ways	  of	  being,	  which	  enables	  a	  person	  to	  create	  and	  re-­‐create	  healthier,	  stronger	  forms	  of	  existence.	  Another	  way	  Nietzsche’s	  understanding	  of	  death	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  having	  both	  a	  physical	  and	  metaphorical	  meaning	  is	  in	  his	  claim	  that	  what	  matters	  is	  how	  a	  person	  views	  death	  when	  they	  are	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  their	  lives.	  Nietzsche	  states,	  “The	  whole	  way	  in	  which	  a	  person	  thinks	  of	  death	  during	  the	  high	  tide	  of	  his	  life	  and	  strength	  bears,	  to	  be	  sure,	  very	  eloquent	  witness	  as	  to	  that	  which	  is	  called	  his	  character;	  but	  the	  hour	  of	  death	  itself,	  his	  bearing	  on	  the	  deathbed,	  hardly	  does	  so	  at	  all”	  (HH,	  “Opinions”	  231	  §884).	  Within	  this	  aphorism,	  Nietzsche	  explains	  that	  contrary	  to	  popular	  belief	  the	  dying	  are	  not	  especially	  honest	  or	  strong.	  Nietzsche	  describes	  the	  altered	  states	  of	  physiology	  and	  pain	  involved	  in	  dying	  usually	  result	  in	  behavior	  distorted	  by	  fear	  and	  vanity.	  Through	  this	  explanation,	  Nietzsche	  exposes	  that	  the	  moment	  of	  demise	  is	  not	  a	  glorious,	  culminating	  point	  in	  an	  individual’s	  life,	  that	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  the	  way	  in	  which	  someone	  faces	  death	  on	  their	  deathbed.	  Rather,	  what	  is	  more	  telling	  about	  a	  person’s	  character	  is	  how	  one	  approaches	  death	  when	  they	  are	  at	  the	  highest,	  strongest	  point	  in	  their	  life.	  However,	  it	  is	  left	  open	  for	  interpretation	  whether	  Nietzsche	  means	  a	  physical,	  a	  metaphorical,	  or	  both	  a	  physical	  and	  metaphorical	  death	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  life.	  Regardless,	  here	  again	  Nietzsche	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  death	  is	  beyond	  just	  a	  physical	  phenomenon.	  	  
F.	  Multi-­‐Level	  Understandings	  of	  Suicide	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Because	  Nietzsche	  purposefully	  writes	  in	  a	  confusing	  and	  seemingly	  contradictory	  manner,	  it	  could	  appear	  upon	  first	  glance	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  interpretations	  of	  suicide	  are	  incongruous.	  However,	  through	  examining	  his	  aphorisms	  closely,	  Nietzsche	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  making	  specific	  claims	  about	  suicide,	  which	  help	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  how	  he	  views	  death	  more	  generally.	  In	  particular,	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  Nietzsche	  is	  both	  for	  and	  against	  suicide,	  depending	  on	  if	  suicide	  is	  in	  the	  service	  of	  life,	  and	  he	  refers	  to	  suicide	  both	  as	  a	  physical	  and	  metaphorical	  act.	  In	  this	  way,	  Nietzsche	  uses	  the	  term	  “suicide”	  to	  suggest	  multiple	  levels	  of	  meaning.	  Perhaps,	  as	  Allison	  describes,	  Nietzsche	  wrote	  with	  multi-­‐level	  meaning	  in	  order	  to	  cater	  the	  same	  words	  to	  different	  audiences	  (78).	  It	  also	  seems	  likely	  that	  Nietzsche	  wrote	  about	  suicide	  in	  multiple	  layers	  because	  he	  did	  not	  see	  a	  clear	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  physical	  and	  the	  metaphorical.	  Therefore,	  perhaps	  Nietzsche	  meant	  to	  champion	  affirmative	  physical	  and	  metaphorical	  suicide	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Even	  though	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  explicitly	  define	  his	  viewpoint	  on	  suicide,	  he	  does	  clearly	  encourage	  agency	  over	  one’s	  death,	  physically	  and	  metaphorically,	  in	  order	  to	  both	  overturn	  traditional	  notions	  and	  affirm	  life.	  Furthermore,	  in	  his	  aphorisms	  about	  suicide,	  it	  is	  also	  apparent	  that	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  view	  the	  opposite	  of	  life	  as	  death,	  but	  as	  not	  truly	  living,	  as	  tranquilizing	  and	  decaying	  life	  in	  a	  slow	  wasteful	  suicide.	  	  	  
III.	  Convalescing	  
A.	  Sickness	  as	  'Experiencing'	  Death	  within	  Life	  	   Another	  way	  in	  which	  Nietzsche’s	  understanding	  of	  death	  can	  be	  indirectly	  accessed	  is	  through	  his	  formulation	  of	  sickness.	  At	  some	  point	  in	  each	  of	  our	  lives,	  we	  will	  experience	  a	  physical	  ailment	  during	  which	  we	  will	  be	  forced	  into	  the	  awareness	  that	  we	  are	  restricted	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by	  our	  fallible,	  mortal	  bodies.	  In	  sickness,	  we	  encounter	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  total	  control	  over	  our	  temporary	  existence.	  Therefore,	  sickness	  is	  a	  way	  in	  which	  we	  experientially	  must	  confront	  our	  mortality	  within	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  	  Nietzsche	  was	  himself	  plagued	  with	  horrible	  periods	  of	  disabling	  illness	  throughout	  his	  life	  (Allison	  9).	  He	  had	  paralyzing	  migraines	  that	  lasted	  for	  days,	  ceaseless	  digestive	  issues,	  dizziness,	  vision	  problems,	  and	  was	  frequently	  unable	  to	  get	  out	  of	  bed.	  Although	  Nietzsche	  underwent	  so	  many	  bodily	  terrors,	  he	  wrote	  fifteen	  books	  in	  addition	  to	  other	  essays	  and	  unpublished	  works.	  Even	  more,	  he	  vigorously	  praised	  his	  sickness.	  Nietzsche	  proclaims,	  “I	  have	  never	  felt	  as	  happy	  with	  myself	  as	  I	  was	  in	  the	  sickest	  and	  most	  painful	  times	  of	  my	  life”	  (EH,	  “Human”	  119	  §4).	  Similarly	  he	  professes,	  “at	  the	  very	  bottom	  of	  my	  soul	  I	  feel	  grateful	  to	  all	  my	  misery	  and	  bouts	  of	  sickness	  and	  everything	  about	  me	  that	  is	  imperfect”	  (GS	  237	  §295).	  Nietzsche	  understood	  his	  personal	  sicknesses	  to	  be	  so	  crucial	  to	  his	  philosophy,	  that	  he	  recommends	  his	  readers	  “pay	  careful	  attention”	  to	  his	  lowest	  years	  (EH,	  “Wise”	  76	  §2).	  Considering	  the	  importance	  Nietzsche	  places	  on	  investigating	  only	  the	  aspects	  of	  our	  existence	  that	  we	  experience,	  and	  because	  sickness	  was	  personally	  something	  he	  experienced	  his	  entire	  life,	  Nietzsche	  understood	  sickness	  as	  a	  central	  topic	  in	  his	  philosophical	  project.	  Through	  unpacking	  his	  understanding	  of	  sickness,	  and	  subsequently	  his	  formulation	  of	  health,	  we	  can	  shed	  further	  light	  on	  how	  Nietzsche	  conceptualizes	  death	  in	  life.	  	  
B.	  Overturning	  Traditional	  Notion	  That	  Sickness	  Is	  Problematic	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Similar	  to	  his	  promotion	  of	  suicide,	  Nietzsche’s	  valorization	  of	  sickness	  opposes	  traditional	  notions.	  It	  seems	  commonsensical	  that	  we	  should	  avoid	  pain	  and	  strive	  for	  pleasure.	  It	  seems	  obvious	  that	  we	  should	  try	  to	  prevent,	  diminish,	  or	  fix	  anything	  harmful.	  The	  conventional	  idea	  that	  pain	  should	  be	  avoided	  manifests	  through	  the	  modern	  terms	  used	  to	  describe	  deviant	  perspectives.	  The	  word	  ‘masochist’	  describes	  someone	  who	  enjoys	  experiencing	  pain,	  and	  the	  adjective	  ‘depressed’	  signifies	  someone	  who	  overly	  ruminates	  on	  negative	  experiences.	  It	  is	  possible	  a	  contemporary	  Western	  person	  would,	  at	  least	  upon	  first	  glance,	  understand	  Nietzsche	  as	  having	  both	  of	  these	  abnormal	  viewpoints.	  In	  our	  current	  society,	  Nietzsche’s	  appreciation	  for	  and	  concentration	  on	  pain	  might	  even	  be	  considered	  psychologically	  unhealthy	  and	  warranting	  of	  intervening	  help.	  	  Yet	  Nietzsche	  asserts	  that	  our	  current	  negative	  evaluation	  of	  pain	  has	  not	  always	  been	  the	  way	  in	  which	  suffering	  has	  been	  conceptualized.	  Nietzsche	  describes	  that	  before	  the	  comforts	  of	  modernity,	  in	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  “age	  of	  fear,”	  it	  was	  beneficial	  for	  people	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  endure	  pain	  and	  suffering.	  He	  says,	  “In	  those	  days,	  one	  received	  ample	  training	  in	  bodily	  torments	  and	  deprivations	  and	  one	  understood	  even	  a	  certain	  cruelty	  against	  oneself	  and	  a	  voluntary	  habituation	  to	  pain	  as	  a	  necessary	  means	  of	  self-­‐preservation”	  (GS	  112	  §48).	  A	  person	  in	  the	  “age	  of	  fear”	  was	  directly	  educated	  on	  how	  to	  embrace	  and	  utilize	  their	  sufferings	  as	  a	  means	  of	  survival.	  However,	  Nietzsche	  claims	  that	  “pain	  is	  now	  hated	  much	  more	  than	  was	  the	  case	  formerly;	  one	  speaks	  much	  worse	  of	  it”	  (GS	  113	  §48).	  Nietzsche	  uses	  the	  word	  “now”	  in	  order	  to	  reference	  that	  contemporary	  society	  has	  a	  more	  contemptuous	  viewpoint	  on	  pain	  than	  in	  the	  “age	  of	  fear”	  of	  previous	  societies.	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In	  contemporary	  society	  the	  former	  acceptance	  of	  pain	  has	  somehow	  completely	  reversed,	  and	  “the	  mere	  thought	  of	  pain	  [is]	  scarcely	  endurable”	  (GS	  113	  §48).	  Instead	  of	  learning	  how	  to	  productively	  harness	  the	  advantages	  of	  suffering	  like	  previous	  societies,	  people	  nowadays	  reject	  and	  flee	  from	  all	  forms	  suffering.	  Modern	  society	  now	  becomes	  ‘sick’	  with	  any	  thought	  of	  sickness.	  Through	  his	  genealogical	  illustration	  that	  we	  have	  not	  always	  adamantly	  rejected	  all	  suffering	  as	  we	  do	  now,	  Nietzsche	  exposes	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to,	  and	  maybe	  should	  not,	  deny	  these	  painful	  parts	  of	  living.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  this	  is	  the	  same	  tactic	  Nietzsche	  used	  to	  explain	  that	  suicide	  has	  not	  always	  been	  thought	  of	  detrimentally.18	  	  Nietzsche	  oftentimes	  traces	  the	  history	  of	  a	  valuation	  in	  order	  to	  reveal	  that	  the	  value	  is	  not	  natural	  and	  absolute	  even	  though	  it	  seems	  to	  be,	  to	  question	  if	  our	  current	  perspective	  is	  advantageous,	  and	  to	  awaken	  us	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  can	  alter	  our	  conceptions.	  	  	  
C.	  Opposition	  to	  Negative	  Valuations	  of	  Sickness	  In	  fact,	  Nietzsche	  goes	  farther	  than	  just	  doubting	  and	  disagreeing	  with	  the	  present	  perspective	  of	  pain,	  he	  wholeheartedly	  asserts	  that	  this	  contemporary	  viewpoint	  is	  incredibly	  harmful.	  He	  states,	  “[T]he	  worst	  sickness	  of	  mankind	  originated	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  [combat]	  their	  sicknesses,	  and	  what	  seemed	  to	  cure	  has	  in	  the	  long	  run	  produced	  something	  worse	  than	  that	  which	  it	  was	  supposed	  to	  overcome”	  (D	  33	  §52).	  With	  this	  aphorism,	  Nietzsche	  claims	  that	  there	  are	  much	  more	  serious	  problems	  that	  erupt	  from	  our	  contempt	  and	  rejection	  of	  our	  suffering	  than	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  suffering	  itself.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  sickness	  that	  is	  against	  life,	  but,	  rather,	  our	  current	  negative	  valuation	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of	  sickness	  that	  is	  against	  life.	  Nietzsche	  views	  the	  ‘cures’	  invented	  in	  attempt	  to	  remove	  pain	  from	  our	  lives	  as	  dangerous	  diseases.	  	  Two	  of	  the	  ‘cures’	  of	  contemporary	  society	  that	  Nietzsche	  sees	  as	  the	  most	  life	  threatening	  are	  Christianity19	  and	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy.20	  In	  essence,	  Nietzsche	  illustrates	  that	  Christianity	  and	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  aim	  to	  ‘heal’	  by	  completely	  removing	  all	  sickness,	  pain,	  and	  suffering	  through	  promoting	  a	  hatred	  of	  and	  escape	  from	  pain	  that	  occurs	  in	  this	  body	  and	  world.	  In	  particular,	  Nietzsche	  was	  disgusted	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Christianity	  preaches	  the	  body	  as	  inherently	  sinful.	  He	  asserts	  that	  Christianity	  makes	  “necessary	  and	  regularly	  recurring	  sensations	  into	  a	  source	  of	  inner	  misery”	  (D	  45	  §76).	  By	  defining	  bodily	  expressions	  that	  are	  required	  for	  survival,	  such	  as	  sexuality,	  as	  wicked	  and	  evil,	  a	  person	  comes	  to	  feel	  guilt,	  shame,	  and	  self-­‐hatred	  for	  their	  natural	  human	  urges.	  As	  a	  result,	  Nietzsche	  argues	  Christianity	  encourages	  people	  to	  reduce,	  diminish,	  and	  decrease	  aspects	  of	  who	  they	  are,	  and	  in	  particular,	  the	  parts	  of	  them	  that	  affirm	  their	  life.	  	  Nietzsche	  also	  sees	  much	  of	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  as	  involving	  a	  contempt	  for	  the	  body,	  and	  is	  thus	  fundamentally	  “a	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  body”	  (GS,	  “Preface”	  35	  §2).	  Throughout	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  thinkers	  have	  understood	  bodily	  sensations	  and	  perceptions	  as	  erroneous.	  They	  claim	  that	  our	  bodies	  “‘[deceive]	  us	  about	  the	  true	  world’”	  and	  do	  not	  get	  us	  to	  what	  is	  really	  out	  there	  (TI,	  “Philosophy”	  167	  §1).	  Therefore,	  Nietzsche	  views	  philosophers	  as	  proposing	  to	  “‘above	  all,	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  body,	  this	  miserable	  idée	  fixe	  of	  the	  senses!	  full	  of	  all	  the	  errors	  of	  logic’”	  (TI,	  “Philosophy”	  167	  §1).	  In	  this	  way,	  Nietzsche	  accuses	  philosophers	  of	  promoting	  a	  hatred	  of	  the	  body	  because	  they	  believe	  it	  prevents	  us	  from	  reaching	  a	  more	  truthful	  existence.	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  animosity	  for	  the	  body,	  Nietzsche	  also	  understands	  Christianity	  and	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  as	  a	  demeaning	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  particular,	  he	  explains	  that	  Christianity	  posits	  a	  perfect	  heaven	  realm	  beyond	  this	  wretched	  earthly	  world.	  Christianity	  claims	  that	  the	  real	  life	  occurs	  when	  you	  are	  with	  God	  in	  heaven,	  so	  you	  should	  not	  overly	  concern	  yourself	  with	  the	  pains	  of	  temporary	  human	  existence.	  In	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  a	  rejection	  of	  our	  experiential	  existence	  is	  exemplified	  by	  Plato’s	  idealism	  or	  Kant’s	  idea	  of	  the	  noumenon,	  which	  postulate	  a	  realm	  beyond	  the	  one	  we	  naturally	  experience.	  Similar	  to	  Christianity,	  philosophers	  have	  claimed	  the	  world	  in	  which	  we	  actually	  live	  is	  not	  the	  True	  Reality.	  Nietzsche	  asserts,	  “the	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘beyond’,	  the	  ‘true	  world’,	  [was]	  invented	  to	  devalue	  the	  only	  world	  there	  is”	  (EH,	  “Destiny”	  150	  §8).	  Both	  Christianity	  and	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  involve	  contempt	  for	  this	  world	  in	  their	  advocacy	  to	  transcend	  what	  they	  view	  as	  an	  imperfect,	  untrue	  realm.	  	  Nietzsche	  understands	  Christianity	  and	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  as	  prime	  examples	  of	  what	  he	  titles	  “decadent	  morality.”	  One	  aspect	  of	  decadent	  morality	  is	  defined	  by	  Nietzsche	  as	  the	  depreciation	  and	  rejection	  of	  this	  imperfect,	  incorrect,	  or	  sinful	  realm	  of	  sensations	  and	  bodily	  perceptions.	  Another	  aspect	  of	  decadent	  morality	  is	  the	  preaching	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  higher,	  virtuous,	  painless	  form	  of	  existence	  in	  the	  perfect	  realm	  of	  God,	  universal	  ideals,	  or	  truth	  beyond.	  Decadent	  morality	  attempts	  to	  ‘cure’	  all	  sickness	  and	  pain	  through	  a	  postulation	  that	  the	  body	  and	  the	  world	  that	  involve	  pain	  are	  “bad.”	  Thus,	  individuals	  who	  ascribe	  to	  decadent	  morality	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  remove	  pain	  become	  morally	  obligated	  to	  reject	  their	  visceral	  bodies	  and	  their	  experiential	  world.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  rejection	  of	  our	  bodies	  and	  the	  world,	  Nietzsche	  argues	  that	  decadent	  morality	  is	  fundamentally	  against	  life.	  In	  particular,	  Nietzsche	  sees	  Christianity	  as	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“hostility	  to	  life,	  a	  furious,	  vengeful	  enmity	  towards	  life	  itself”	  (B,	  “Attempt”	  9	  §5).	  Similarly	  he	  asserts,	  “The	  concept	  ‘God’	  [was]	  invented	  as	  a	  counter	  concept	  to	  life”	  (EH,	  “Destiny”	  150	  §8).	  Nietzsche	  also	  claims	  “The	  history	  of	  philosophy	  is	  a	  secret	  raging	  against	  the	  preconditions	  of	  life”	  (WP	  253	  §461).	  Although	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  religious	  or	  philosophical	  beliefs	  are	  unreal,	  he	  is	  concerned	  with	  what	  this	  morality	  implies	  about	  the	  life	  we	  are	  actually	  living	  right	  now,	  within	  our	  bodies,	  within	  this	  world.	  Therefore,	  while	  decadent	  morality	  claims	  to	  be	  helping	  people	  to	  live	  better	  or	  truer	  lives,	  Nietzsche	  conceives	  that	  in	  its	  violent	  aggression	  towards	  this	  body	  and	  this	  world,	  and	  thus	  its	  attack	  on	  this	  life,	  decadent	  morality	  is	  a	  life-­‐threatening	  illness.	  In	  that	  it	  is	  an	  opposition	  to	  life,	  Nietzsche	  understands	  decadent	  morality	  as	  preaching	  what	  was	  previously	  explained	  as	  slow	  suicide.	  Because	  it	  promotes	  escaping	  from	  the	  body	  and	  the	  world,	  Nietzsche	  understands	  decadent	  morality	  as	  viewing	  death	  as	  a	  welcome	  experience.	  He	  states,	  “Hatred	  of	  ‘the	  world,’	  a	  curse	  on	  the	  passions,	  fear	  of	  beauty	  and	  sensuality,	  a	  Beyond,	  [was]	  invented	  in	  order	  better	  to	  defame	  the	  Here-­‐and-­‐Now,	  [and	  is]	  fundamentally	  a	  desire	  for	  nothingness,	  for	  the	  end”	  (B,	  “Attempt”	  9	  §5).	  Remember,	  as	  previously	  explained,	  the	  prime	  examples	  of	  slow	  suicide	  Nietzsche	  described	  were	  Christianity	  and	  Socrates,	  whom	  he	  saw	  as	  a	  key	  influence	  on	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  Nietzsche	  views	  Christianity	  as	  promoting	  death	  because	  it	  encourages	  one	  to	  transcend	  this	  sickly	  life	  to	  join	  in	  an	  absolute	  euphoric,	  blissful,	  ecstasy	  with	  God.	  The	  history	  of	  philosophy	  promotes	  death	  in	  its	  belief	  that	  if	  we	  could	  just	  remove	  or	  get	  rid	  of	  our	  ‘erroneous’	  body,	  then	  we	  could	  uncover	  truth.	  In	  attempt	  to	  escape	  the	  sickness	  and	  suffering	  inherent	  to	  existence,	  decadent	  morality	  leads	  people	  to	  hate	  what	  is	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  miserable	  world	  and	  an	  erroneous	  body.	  Therefore,	  decadent	  morality	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is	  an	  “instinct	  for	  annihilation”	  in	  that	  it	  promotes	  the	  slow	  killing	  of	  oneself	  through	  an	  aggressive	  assault	  on	  life	  (B,	  “Attempt”	  9	  §5).	  	   Nietzsche	  illustrates	  decadent	  morality’s	  assault	  on	  life	  and	  slow	  suicide	  as	  similar	  to	  an	  addiction.	  Nietzsche	  explains	  that	  Christianity	  tried	  to	  provide	  “a	  shorter	  way	  to	  perfection:	  just	  as	  some	  philosophers	  thought	  they	  could	  […provide]	  a	  ‘royal	  road	  to	  truth’”	  (D	  36	  §59).	  These	  ‘cures’	  posed	  themselves	  as	  quick	  fixes	  for	  dealing	  with	  suffering,	  but	  turned	  into	  a	  detrimental	  addiction	  that	  covers	  over	  the	  pain	  instead	  of	  proactively	  dealing	  with	  it.	  Nietzsche	  states,	  	  The	  means	  which	  worked	  immediately,	  anaesthetizing	  and	  intoxicating,	  the	  so-­‐called	  consolation,	  were	  ignorantly	  supposed	  to	  be	  actual	  cures;	  the	  fact	  was	  not	  even	  noticed,	  indeed,	  that	  these	  instantaneous	  alleviations	  often	  had	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  with	  a	  general	  profound	  worsening	  of	  the	  complaint,	  that	  the	  invalid	  had	  to	  suffer	  
from	  the	  after-­‐effect	  of	  intoxication.	  [italics	  added]	  (D	  33	  §52)	  	  Just	  as	  a	  drug	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  immediately	  relieve	  some	  sort	  of	  issue,	  so	  too	  do	  these	  ‘cures’	  seductively	  promise	  to	  provide	  a	  quick	  means	  of	  dealing	  with	  one’s	  sufferings.	  Both	  a	  drug	  and	  decadent	  morality	  attempt	  to	  ‘cure’	  by	  removing	  pain	  through	  ‘transcending’	  the	  everyday	  world	  of	  suffering	  to	  an	  “intoxicating”	  euphoric	  bliss.	  However,	  this	  ecstasy	  is	  just	  a	  temporary	  episode,	  and	  the	  superficial	  healing	  powers	  quickly	  wear	  off.	  With	  both	  a	  drug	  and	  decadent	  morality	  a	  person	  is	  eventually	  faced	  again	  with	  the	  actual	  suffering	  of	  life	  and	  not	  knowing	  how	  to	  actively	  deal	  with	  everyday	  pains.	  The	  person’s	  instincts	  become	  disoriented,	  and	  they	  begin	  to	  lose	  sense	  of	  what	  decisions	  are	  beneficial	  to	  their	  lives.	  This	  person	  may	  think	  they	  need	  another	  quick	  ‘fix’	  that	  makes	  them	  forget	  their	  bodies	  and	  their	  world,	  but	  in	  this	  forgetting	  they	  lose	  sight	  of	  how	  to	  engage	  in	  and	  control	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life	  at	  all.	  The	  addict	  spends	  their	  days	  obsessing	  about	  reducing	  and	  opposing	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  pains	  they	  feel,	  which	  means	  they	  stop	  any	  sort	  of	  active	  and	  affirmative	  living.	  These	  addicts	  devalue	  their	  bodies	  and	  their	  experiences	  in	  order	  to	  remove	  pain.	  The	  degradation	  of	  their	  bodies	  is	  apparent	  through	  their	  decaying	  physiology	  and	  psychology.	  The	  depreciation	  of	  their	  worlds	  manifests	  in	  the	  deterioration	  of	  their	  jobs,	  families,	  and	  homes.	  The	  ‘cure’	  of	  Christianity	  and	  philosophy,	  like	  a	  drug,	  are	  decadent	  in	  that	  they	  involve	  harm	  from	  an	  excess	  of	  pleasure	  and	  degeneration	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  pain.	  Just	  like	  a	  drug	  addiction,	  the	  temporary	  ‘cure’	  of	  decadent	  morality	  has	  become	  a	  life-­‐threatening	  disease.	  	  Another	  way	  that	  decadent	  morality	  is	  similar	  to	  an	  addiction	  is	  that	  the	  illness	  does	  not	  just	  affect	  the	  addict,	  but	  casts	  a	  shadow	  of	  suffering	  onto	  everyone	  around	  him	  or	  her.	  Nietzsche	  explains	  that	  because	  of	  decadent	  moralists,	  whom	  he	  calls	  “the	  drunkards	  […]	  the	  invalids	  […]	  the	  sickly	  and	  depressed,”	  “the	  whole	  air	  is	  continually	  whizzing	  with	  the	  arrow	  of	  their	  malice,	  so	  that	  the	  sun	  and	  the	  sky	  of	  life	  are	  darkened	  by	  them-­‐	  not	  only	  their	  sky	  but	  ours	  too”	  (D	  160	  §323).	  Here	  Nietzsche	  is	  explaining	  that	  even	  if	  a	  person	  does	  not	  partake	  in	  decadent	  morality,	  their	  life	  will	  still	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  sickness	  of	  modern	  society.	  Nietzsche	  views	  each	  of	  us	  as	  constantly	  affected	  by	  and	  in	  danger	  of	  falling	  ill	  to	  the	  disease	  of	  decadent	  morality.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  Nietzsche	  is	  not	  talking	  about	  a	  physical	  illness	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  flu	  or	  a	  cold,	  so	  much	  as	  he	  is	  describing	  a	  psychological,	  philosophical,	  and	  metaphorical	  sickness	  in	  which	  contemporary	  culture,	  and	  subsequently	  ourselves,	  are	  immersed.	  	  
D.	  Promotion	  of	  Sickness	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This	  life-­‐threatening	  decadent	  morality,	  in	  either	  the	  form	  of	  religion	  or	  philosophy,	  is	  “the	  only	  morality	  that	  has	  been	  taught	  so	  far”	  to	  modern	  society	  (EH,	  “Destiny”	  149	  §7).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  contemporary	  society	  currently	  approaches	  sickness,	  or	  dealing	  with	  our	  mortal	  fallibility,	  is	  through	  the	  decadent	  hatred	  of	  life,	  which	  Nietzsche	  has	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  detrimental	  illness	  itself.	  Nietzsche’s	  project	  is	  thus	  a	  positing	  of	  a	  new	  form	  of	  cure,	  a	  healthy	  alternative	  to	  decadent	  morality.	  Nietzsche	  claims	  that	  “if	  I	  became	  the	  master	  of	  anything”	  it	  was	  to	  “be	  able	  to	  look	  out	  from	  the	  optic	  of	  sickness	  towards	  healthier	  concepts	  and	  values”	  (EH,	  “Wise”	  76	  §1).	  Even	  though	  Nietzsche	  himself	  is	  immersed	  in	  the	  sickness	  of	  decadent	  morality,	  he	  understands	  his	  philosophical	  project	  as	  recognizing	  this	  sickness	  of	  our	  culture	  and	  attempting	  to	  emerge	  from	  out	  of	  it.	  In	  this	  way,	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophy	  is	  different	  than	  traditional	  philosophy,	  which	  tends	  to	  steer	  away	  from	  taking	  care	  of	  bodily	  and	  mental	  health,	  and	  typically	  does	  not	  use	  physician	  or	  psychological	  terms	  such	  as	  “health”	  and	  “sickness.”	  Thus	  it	  becomes	  clear	  why	  Nietzsche	  understands	  himself	  as	  a	  doctor	  or	  psychotherapist	  battling	  contemporary	  society’s	  disease	  of	  decadent	  morality	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Christianity	  and	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  Nietzsche’s	  medicine	  for	  the	  illness	  of	  decadent	  morality	  is	  an	  embracing	  of	  sickness	  and	  an	  affirmation	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  life.	  Nietzsche	  enthusiastically	  advocates	  an	  unconditional	  acceptance	  and	  celebration	  of	  all	  experiences.	  By	  embracing	  the	  negative	  aspects	  of	  life,	  Nietzsche	  is	  not	  just	  promoting	  an	  inversion	  of	  decadent	  morality.	  That	  is,	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  propose	  a	  supreme	  valuation	  of	  pain	  in	  his	  opposition	  to	  decadent	  morality’s	  promotion	  of	  absolute	  happiness.	  Rather,	  he	  asserts	  that	  “Nothing	  in	  existence	  should	  be	  excluded,	  nothing	  is	  dispensable”	  (EH,	  “Birth”	  109	  §2).	  Embracing	  the	  whole	  of	  life	  involves	  an	  acceptance	  of	  all	  types	  of	  experiences.	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Nietzsche	  understands	  that	  we	  must	  come	  to	  embrace	  both	  ‘positive’	  and	  ‘negative’	  aspects	  of	  existence	  because	  they	  are	  necessarily	  linked.	  Nietzsche	  argues	  that	  pleasures	  and	  pains	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  one	  another;	  positivity	  requires	  negativity	  to	  exist;	  there	  is	  no	  good	  without	  the	  bad;	  happiness	  is	  not	  completely	  separate	  from	  distress;	  and	  health	  cannot	  emerge	  without	  sickness.	  Embracing	  the	  whole	  of	  life	  involves	  accepting	  both	  of	  these	  ‘opposites.’	  Because	  they	  are	  connected,	  if	  a	  person	  tries	  to	  throw	  out	  their	  suffering,	  they	  also	  end	  up	  tossing	  out	  all	  the	  joys	  of	  life.	  Therefore,	  Nietzsche	  proposes	  an	  embracing	  of	  sickness,	  distress,	  and	  suffering,	  as	  necessary	  experiences	  in	  order	  to	  have	  health,	  happiness,	  and	  joy.	  Nietzsche	  contemplates,	  “what	  if	  pleasure	  and	  displeasure	  were	  so	  tied	  together	  that	  whoever	  wanted	  to	  have	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  of	  one	  must	  also	  have	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  of	  the	  other”	  (GS	  85	  §12).	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  fact	  they	  are	  not	  oppositional,	  these	  ‘opposites’	  actually	  need	  one	  another	  in	  order	  to	  manifest.	  Nietzsche	  describes	  that	  “profound	  joy	  [is]	  where	  the	  bleakest	  and	  most	  painful	  things	  do	  not	  have	  the	  character	  of	  opposites,	  but	  instead	  act	  as	  its	  conditions,	  as	  welcome	  components”	  (EH,	  “Zarathustra”	  127	  §3).	  It	  is	  only	  through	  negative	  experiences	  that	  one	  can	  reach	  a	  higher	  state	  of	  positivity.	  Nietzsche	  similarly	  describes	  that,	  “It	  is	  precisely	  at	  [an]	  injured	  and	  weakened	  spot	  that	  the	  whole	  body	  is	  as	  it	  were	  inoculated	  with	  something	  new;	  […]	  Every	  progress	  of	  the	  whole	  has	  to	  be	  preceded	  by	  a	  partial	  weakening”	  (HH,	  “Tokens”	  107	  §224).	  Here	  Nietzsche	  takes	  the	  platitude	  ‘what	  doesn’t	  kill	  you	  makes	  you	  stronger’	  and	  raises	  it	  up	  to	  a	  philosophically	  true	  statement.	  He	  asserts	  that	  we	  need	  the	  destabilizing,	  paralyzing	  effects	  of	  a	  sickness	  in	  order	  to	  emerge	  out	  of	  the	  sickness	  with	  a	  strengthened	  immune	  system	  and	  a	  refreshed	  perspective	  and	  excitement	  about	  living	  life.	  We	  become	  healthy	  not	  in	  spite	  of	  sickness,	  but	  precisely	  because	  of	  sickness.	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If	  sickness	  is	  rejected,	  just	  as	  in	  decadent	  morality,	  a	  person	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  evolve	  into	  a	  greater	  health.	  They	  will	  be	  stuck	  in	  a	  mediocre	  state	  of	  stagnation	  or	  what	  Nietzsche	  calls	  the	  “religion	  of	  comfortableness.”	  He	  says,	  “happiness	  and	  unhappiness	  are	  sisters	  and	  even	  twins	  that	  either	  grow	  up	  together	  or	  […]	  remain	  small	  together”	  (GS	  270	  §338).	  In	  this	  way,	  decadent	  morality	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  tranquilize	  life.	  Because	  decadent	  morality	  attempts	  to	  flee	  from	  pain,	  and	  pain	  is	  precisely	  what	  enables	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  healthy,	  strong,	  exuberant	  life,	  decadent	  morality	  immobilizes,	  paralyzes,	  and	  nullifies	  everyone	  that	  ascribes	  to	  a	  decadent	  moral	  system.	  Nietzsche	  ponders	  if	  we	  “require	  the	  sick	  soul	  as	  much	  as	  the	  healthy,	  and	  whether,	  in	  brief,	  the	  will	  to	  health	  alone,	  is	  not	  a	  prejudice,	  cowardice,	  and	  perhaps	  a	  bit	  of	  very	  subtle	  barbarism	  and	  backwardness”	  (GS	  177	  §120).	  Because	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  are	  essentially	  connected,	  decadent	  morality,	  in	  its	  rejection	  of	  sickness	  and	  pain,	  loses	  out	  on	  experiencing	  health	  and	  joy	  and	  aims	  for	  a	  sedated,	  weak,	  wasted	  existence.	  Nietzsche	  in	  his	  affirmation	  of	  all	  aspects	  of	  existence	  opposes	  decadent	  morality’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  ‘negative’	  aspects	  of	  existence.	  That	  is,	  Nietzsche	  promotes	  an	  embracing	  of	  the	  body	  and	  the	  world	  that	  sometimes	  involves	  pain,	  suffering,	  and	  sickness.	  He	  argues	  that	  these	  experiences	  need	  not	  be	  considered	  inadequacies	  of	  life,	  but	  as	  having	  the	  possibility	  to	  be	  fundamentally	  life	  nourishing.	  This	  support	  for	  the	  body	  and	  the	  world	  can	  be	  seen,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Nietzsche	  presents	  his	  argument.	  Nietzsche	  uses	  words	  such	  as	  ‘sickness,’	  ‘disease,’	  ‘cure,’	  ‘pleasure,’	  and	  ‘health,’	  which	  are	  all	  bodily	  terms.	  In	  addition,	  his	  illustrations	  oftentimes	  involve	  bodily	  or	  sensual	  metaphors,	  making	  valid	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  experience	  our	  body	  and	  our	  world.	  In	  total,	  Nietzsche	  advocates	  a	  gratitude	  for	  and	  affirmation	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  life,	  including	  the	  body	  and	  the	  world	  that	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provide	  us	  with	  the	  necessary	  sicknesses,	  pains,	  and	  sufferings	  to	  become	  stronger,	  healthier,	  fuller.21	  Armed	  with	  an	  understanding	  that	  Nietzsche	  advocates	  affirming	  the	  whole	  of	  life,	  we	  can	  now	  postulate	  that	  perhaps	  Nietzsche	  understands	  death	  as	  a	  necessary	  aspect	  of	  existence.	  Nietzsche	  highly	  values	  sickness	  and	  suffering,	  the	  greatest	  experiential	  examples	  of	  human	  fallibility,	  as	  the	  only	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  are	  able	  to	  emerge	  into	  an	  ever-­‐greater	  health.	  Therefore,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  Nietzsche	  also	  values	  mortality,	  the	  supreme	  example	  of	  human	  fallibility,	  as	  an	  enhancement	  of	  life.	  Dastur	  believes	  that	  Nietzsche,	  as	  well	  as	  Heidegger,	  did	  indeed	  ascribe	  to	  this	  perspective.	  In	  particular,	  Dastur	  explains	  that	  both	  Nietzsche	  and	  Heidegger	  promote	  becoming	  a	  mortal,	  which	  “would	  require	  that	  we	  stop	  giving	  in	  to	  the	  illusions	  of	  immortality	  and	  become	  capable	  of	  truly	  living	  on	  the	  earth	  and	  dwelling	  in	  a	  body”	  (47).	  In	  other	  words,	  instead	  of	  considering	  the	  impermanence	  of	  our	  body	  and	  our	  world	  as	  a	  problem	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  overcome,	  Nietzsche	  and	  Heidegger	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  to	  fully	  become	  the	  mortal,	  bodily	  creatures	  that	  we	  are	  within	  this	  transitory	  world.	  Our	  human	  impermanence	  creates	  strength,	  power,	  health,	  and	  life.	  Dastur	  herself	  similarly	  understands	  that	  accepting	  death	  consists	  of	  “seeing	  in	  death	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  life	  and	  in	  considering	  mortality	  less	  as	  a	  limit	  than	  as	  the	  secret	  resource	  nourishing	  existence”	  (3).	  As	  a	  result,	  even	  though	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  directly	  link	  sickness	  with	  death,	  through	  his	  elucidation	  of	  his	  central	  concept	  of	  sickness,	  we	  can	  indirectly	  see	  how	  he	  likely	  also	  views	  death	  as	  essential	  to	  truly	  living.	  	  	  
E.	  The	  Process	  of	  Convalescence	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In	  order	  to	  better	  unpack	  Nietzsche’s	  stance	  on	  death	  in	  life	  and	  death’s	  role	  as	  essential	  to	  truly	  living,	  let	  us	  continue	  to	  examine	  Nietzsche’s	  concept	  of	  sickness.	  Given	  that	  he	  views	  sickness	  as	  inexorably	  linked	  with	  health,	  Nietzsche’s	  concept	  of	  health	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  convalescence.	  For	  Nietzsche,	  an	  individual	  has	  the	  possibility	  to	  emerge	  out	  of	  sickness	  into	  health	  with	  a	  reinvigorated	  vitality	  and	  exuberance.	  When	  an	  individual	  experiences	  physical	  convalescence,	  they	  feel	  joyful,	  powerful,	  and	  renewed.	  To	  a	  convalescent,	  everyday	  life	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  beautiful	  and	  meaningful	  than	  they	  had	  previously	  realized.	  When	  they	  are	  finally	  able	  to	  emerge	  from	  their	  bed,	  the	  convalescent	  experiences	  thankfulness	  for	  even	  the	  ‘negative’	  aspects	  of	  their	  day.	  Being	  stuck	  in	  traffic	  or	  stubbing	  one’s	  toe	  do	  not	  seem	  like	  a	  problem,	  but	  incredible	  events.	  Nietzsche’s	  idea	  of	  health	  as	  convalescence	  involves	  this	  gratefulness	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  life,	  and	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  miraculous-­‐ness	  and	  wonderfulness	  of	  all	  the	  moments	  of	  living.	  In	  addition	  to	  understanding	  Nietzsche’s	  conception	  of	  convalescing	  through	  what	  he	  directly	  writes,	  Nietzsche’s	  readers	  are	  also	  exposed	  to	  his	  promotion	  of	  convalescence	  through	  many	  of	  his	  symbolic	  images.	  For	  example,	  within	  the	  preface	  of	  the	  Gay	  Science	  Nietzsche	  talks	  directly	  about	  his	  gratitude	  of	  convalescence	  as	  the	  attitude	  for	  the	  entire	  book	  (GS	  32).	  He	  describes	  convalescence	  as	  an	  emergence	  from	  out	  of	  the	  cold,	  paralyzing,	  painful	  winter	  into	  a	  warmed,	  light-­‐filled,	  renewed	  hope,	  and	  excitement	  about	  future	  adventures	  and	  goals.	  Daybreak,	  as	  the	  book	  title	  states,	  similarly	  alludes	  to	  this	  moment	  of	  emerging	  from	  out	  of	  cold,	  dark	  disorientation	  into	  powerful,	  excessive	  light,	  reawakened	  vigor	  for	  living,	  and	  embracing	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  day.	  As	  exemplified	  in	  the	  imagery	  from	  these	  book	  titles	  and	  prefaces,	  throughout	  his	  works,	  Nietzsche	  establishes	  an	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underlying	  flavor	  of	  convalescence	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  utilizing	  sickness	  to	  become	  even	  healthier.	  	  Nietzsche’s	  promotion	  of	  convalescence	  can	  also	  be	  experienced	  through	  his	  writing	  style.	  Allison	  describes	  that	  after	  one	  reads	  Nietzsche,	  a	  person	  feels	  as	  if	  they	  are	  convalescing	  in	  that	  “things	  take	  on	  a	  richer	  patina	  in	  turn,	  a	  sensuous	  immediacy,	  the	  way	  
one	  feels	  after	  a	  long	  illness	  [italics	  added]”	  (vii).	  Nietzsche	  writes	  in	  an	  empowering,	  invigorating,	  exciting	  way	  that	  leaves	  readers	  feeling	  electrified	  and	  ready	  to	  take	  on	  the	  world.	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  content	  of	  his	  text,	  his	  poetic	  imagery,	  and	  his	  stimulating	  writing	  style,	  central	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophical	  project	  is	  promoting	  sickness	  as	  a	  part	  of	  health	  in	  convalescence.	  	  Another	  aspect	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  understanding	  of	  convalescence	  is	  that	  this	  transitioning	  from	  sickness	  into	  health	  can	  never	  be	  completed.	  As	  such,	  health	  as	  convalescence	  is	  like	  a	  cyclical	  oscillation	  that	  never	  finishes.	  One	  “does	  not	  merely	  have	  [health]	  but	  also	  acquires	  [it]	  continually,	  and	  must	  acquire	  because	  one	  gives	  it	  up	  again	  and	  again,	  and	  must	  give	  it	  up”	  (GS	  346	  §382).	  A	  “great	  health”	  is	  a	  constant	  movement	  from	  sickness	  to	  healthier,	  and	  from	  sickness	  to	  healthier,	  ad	  infinitum.	  Health	  is	  a	  continuous	  dynamic	  re-­‐emergence	  into	  a	  strengthened,	  ever	  anew,	  greater	  health.	  Therefore,	  Nietzsche’s	  conception	  of	  health	  is	  a	  continuous	  convalescing.	  	  In	  addition,	  because	  convalescence	  is	  a	  continuous	  process,	  it	  is	  slow	  and	  ongoing.	  This	  patient	  growing	  into	  health	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  quick	  fix	  that	  decadent	  morality	  promotes.	  Convalescing	  is	  a	  dwelling	  in	  recuperation	  in	  order	  to	  deeply	  experience	  the	  transition	  into	  health,	  again	  and	  again.	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Furthermore,	  Nietzsche	  asserts	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  an	  absolute,	  universal,	  “normal”	  health.	  He	  explains,	  	  [There]	  is	  no	  health	  as	  such,	  and	  all	  attempts	  to	  define	  a	  thing	  that	  way	  have	  been	  wretched	  failures.	  Even	  the	  determination	  of	  what	  is	  healthy	  for	  your	  body	  depends	  on	  your	  goal,	  your	  horizon,	  your	  energies,	  your	  impulses,	  your	  errors,	  and	  above	  all	  the	  ideals	  and	  phantasms	  of	  your	  soul.	  Thus	  there	  are	  innumerable	  healths	  of	  the	  body	  […]	  In	  one	  person,	  of	  course,	  this	  health	  could	  look	  like	  its	  opposite	  in	  another	  person.	  (GS	  177	  §120)	  Not	  only	  does	  Nietzsche	  think	  that	  health	  is	  different	  between	  people,	  he	  also	  explains	  health	  transforms	  over	  time	  within	  each	  individual.	  Therefore,	  Nietzsche	  understands	  health	  to	  be	  completely	  fluid	  and	  dependent	  entirely	  on	  each	  specific	  person	  at	  that	  particular	  moment	  in	  their	  lives.	  Because	  health	  is	  specific	  to	  each	  individual,	  everyone	  who	  becomes	  healthy	  becomes	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  healthy.	  Moreover,	  Nietzsche	  seems	  to	  argue	  that	  not	  everyone	  can	  achieve	  health,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  continuously	  convalescing	  into	  affirmative	  living.	  Nietzsche	  suggests,	  “If	  possible	  live	  without	  a	  physician”	  and	  be	  your	  own	  doctor	  (D	  159	  §322).	  Because	  this	  phrase	  implies	  that	  some	  people	  are	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  be	  their	  own	  doctor,	  it	  seems	  that	  Nietzsche	  believes	  that	  some	  people	  cannot	  embrace	  their	  own	  unique	  version	  of	  health.	  As	  a	  result,	  Nietzsche	  seems	  to	  understand	  that	  some	  people	  may	  need	  to	  cling	  onto	  current	  moral	  systems,	  perhaps	  even	  onto	  decadent	  morality.	  Furthermore,	  Nietzsche	  explains	  that	  a	  person	  can	  be	  his	  or	  her	  own	  doctor	  only	  “as	  long	  as	  [they]	  are	  
basically	  healthy”	  (EH,	  “Wise”	  76	  §2).	  This	  idea	  of	  basic	  health	  might	  seem	  to	  conflict	  with	  Nietzsche’s	  previously	  explained	  assertion	  that	  there	  is	  no	  absolute	  health.	  However,	  while	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Nietzsche	  does	  not	  want	  to	  define	  the	  content	  of	  each	  individual’s	  health,	  he	  does	  argue	  that	  basic	  health	  involves	  the	  ability	  to	  transform	  one’s	  being.	  It	  seems	  that	  Nietzsche	  asserts	  that	  being	  basically	  healthy	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  a	  person	  must	  self-­‐overcome,	  but	  that	  they	  can	  become	  healthier	  if	  they	  determine	  to	  do	  so.	  Therefore,	  Nietzsche	  recommends	  becoming	  one’s	  own	  doctor	  only	  for	  people	  who	  are	  basically	  healthy.	  Nietzsche	  states,	  “for	  something	  that	  is	  typically	  healthy,	  sickness	  can	  actually	  be	  an	  energetic	  stimulus	  to	  life,	  to	  being	  more	  alive”	  (EH,	  “Wise”	  76	  §2).	  Only	  if	  you	  are	  already	  essentially	  healthy	  can	  you	  utilize	  your	  sickness	  to	  convalesce	  into	  an	  even	  healthier	  state.	  	  Correspondingly,	  Nietzsche	  explains	  that	  if	  a	  person	  is	  basically	  weak	  then	  sickness	  will	  likely	  make	  them	  even	  sicker	  than	  they	  already	  are.	  He	  says,	  “Something	  with	  a	  typically	  morbid	  nature	  cannot	  become	  healthy,	  much	  less	  make	  itself	  healthy”	  (EH,	  “Wise”	  76	  §2).	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  seems	  that	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  reproach	  people	  who	  are	  not	  convalescing	  because	  maybe	  they	  are	  not	  healthy	  enough	  to	  do	  so.	  If	  certain	  people	  who	  adopt	  decadent	  morality	  are	  essentially	  sick,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  view	  their	  lack	  of	  health	  as	  a	  fault,	  but	  as	  an	  inability.	  In	  other	  words,	  even	  though	  Nietzsche	  opposes	  decadent	  morality,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  he	  does	  not	  blame	  fundamentally	  weak	  people	  who	  ascribe	  to	  decadent	  morality.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  Nietzsche	  seems	  to	  aim	  his	  philosophizing	  towards	  those	  who	  are	  already	  basically	  healthy.	  Therefore,	  if	  a	  person	  who	  is	  basically	  healthy	  falls	  ill,	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophy	  is	  meant	  to	  encourage	  them	  to	  not	  adopt	  decadent	  morality	  and	  to	  instead	  utilize	  their	  sickness	  to	  become	  truly	  healthy.	  If	  this	  basically	  healthy	  person	  does	  adopt	  decadent	  morality,	  then	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophy	  is	  meant	  to	  awaken	  them	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  ascribing	  to	  decadent	  morality	  restricts	  them	  from	  becoming	  healthier.	  Because	  Nietzsche	  
	   131	  
views	  decadent	  morality	  as	  an	  illness,	  Nietzsche	  tries	  to	  show	  this	  basically	  healthy	  person	  that	  they	  can	  convalesce	  from	  out	  of	  the	  disease	  of	  their	  decadent	  morality.	  In	  other	  words,	  Nietzsche	  tries	  to	  reveal	  to	  basically	  healthy	  people	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  utilize	  and	  emerge	  from	  the	  cultural	  sickness	  of	  decadent	  morality	  in	  order	  to	  grow	  into	  stronger	  health	  that	  they	  determine	  on	  their	  own.	  Furthermore,	  because	  health	  transforms	  over	  time	  within	  each	  individual,	  Nietzsche	  encourages	  everyone	  to	  question	  their	  health	  repeatedly	  throughout	  their	  lives.	  Consequently,	  even	  if	  a	  person	  is	  too	  weak	  to	  overcome	  decadent	  morality,	  they	  should	  continue	  to	  reevaluate	  their	  ability	  and	  keep	  considering	  if	  they	  should	  become	  healthier.	  Said	  differently,	  Nietzsche	  wants	  everyone,	  including	  people	  who	  are	  so	  sick	  that	  they	  initially	  adopt	  decadent	  morality,	  to	  continue	  to	  re-­‐ask	  and	  deeply	  question	  the	  health	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  at	  each	  moment.	  	  Given	  that	  Nietzsche	  argues	  that	  health	  is	  temporary	  and	  particular	  to	  each	  individual,	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  prescribe	  a	  set	  form	  of	  health.	  For	  example,	  Nietzsche’s	  Zarathustra	  states,	  “‘This	  –	  is	  now	  my	  way:	  where	  is	  yours?’	  Thus	  I	  answered	  those	  who	  asked	  me	  ‘the	  way’.	  For	  the	  way	  –	  does	  not	  exist!”	  (Z,	  “Gravity”	  213	  §2).	  As	  a	  result,	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophy	  not	  as	  providing	  a	  prescription	  for	  everyone	  like	  a	  moralist	  who	  tells	  people	  to	  follow	  specific	  rules,	  but	  as	  an	  encouragement	  and	  pushing	  of	  those	  who	  are	  capable	  to	  convalesce	  into	  ever-­‐healthier	  life.	  Even	  using	  the	  word	  ‘health’	  instead	  of	  ‘good’	  or	  ‘improvement’	  shows	  that	  Nietzsche	  is	  not	  just	  providing	  another	  moral	  system	  like	  the	  decadent	  morality	  that	  he	  so	  adamantly	  opposes.	  Unlike	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘improvement,’	  a	  person’s	  health	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  betterment	  of	  society.	  Health	  is	  more	  personal	  in	  that	  it	  affects	  the	  very	  root	  of	  every	  individual’s	  life,	  and	  it	  must	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be	  specifically	  evaluated	  within	  each	  individual.	  Like	  a	  friend,	  Nietzsche	  is	  less	  worried	  about	  you	  fulfilling	  moral	  obligations	  to	  others,	  and	  he	  is	  most	  concerned	  about	  and	  wants	  you	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  your	  own	  health.	  	  Also	  like	  a	  friend	  or	  a	  therapist,	  Nietzsche	  supports	  you	  in	  your	  own	  path	  to	  health	  and	  tries	  to	  guide	  you	  to	  guide	  yourself.	  Allison	  says,	  “Like	  a	  true	  friend,	  he	  rarely	  tells	  you	  what	  you	  ought	  to	  do”	  and	  only	  gives	  suggestions	  for	  considerations	  in	  making	  your	  own	  choices	  (vii).	  Despite	  the	  hazard	  of	  harmful	  misinterpretations,	  Nietzsche	  ultimately	  has	  a	  faith	  in	  his	  readers’	  abilities	  to	  best	  know	  what	  their	  own	  health	  consists	  of.	  In	  this	  way,	  Nietzsche’s	  antidote	  to	  the	  pervasive	  addiction	  of	  decadent	  morality	  is	  not	  a	  prescription.	  Rather,	  Nietzsche	  equips	  us	  with	  a	  process	  in	  which	  we	  can	  question	  the	  status	  of	  our	  health,	  consider	  what	  is	  most	  life	  affirming,	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  uproot	  ourselves	  and	  emerge	  into	  greater	  health	  through	  a	  utilization	  of	  our	  sickness.	  	  	  
F.	  Nietzsche’s	  Philosophical	  Therapy	  In	  summary,	  this	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  personal	  philosophical	  therapy	  opposes	  the	  set	  instruction	  of	  decadent	  morality.	  Nietzsche	  holds	  issue	  with	  decadent	  morality,	  which,	  in	  essence,	  is	  contemporary	  society’s	  rejection	  of	  ‘negative’	  experiences.	  Nietzsche	  illustrates	  Christianity	  and	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  as	  prime	  examples	  of	  decadent	  morality	  in	  that	  they	  reject	  ‘negative’	  experiences,	  specifically	  through	  a	  devaluation	  of	  our	  fallible	  bodies	  and	  impermanent	  world.	  Decadent	  morality	  prescribes	  that	  people	  reject	  and	  hate	  their	  pain,	  sickness,	  and	  suffering,	  so	  that	  they	  may	  reach	  an	  absolute	  ideal	  beyond	  state	  void	  of	  these	  ‘negative’	  experiences.	  Nietzsche	  argues	  that	  in	  its	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attempt	  to	  completely	  remove	  the	  pains	  of	  life,	  decadent	  morality	  is	  a	  violent	  opposition	  to	  and	  attack	  on	  life,	  and	  is	  thus	  a	  dangerous,	  life-­‐threatening	  disease.	  In	  contrast,	  Nietzsche	  recognizes	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘negative’	  experiences	  in	  that	  they	  are	  the	  necessary	  preconditions	  of	  health,	  exuberance,	  strength,	  and	  truly	  living.	  Thus,	  Nietzsche	  promotes	  an	  embracing	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  life	  through	  a	  welcoming	  of	  and	  gratitude	  for	  sickness,	  suffering,	  and	  destruction.	  As	  such,	  Nietzsche	  re-­‐conceptualizes	  sickness	  and	  health	  as	  fundamentally	  interconnected	  in	  a	  continuous	  convalescing,	  and	  re-­‐convalescing.	  Nietzsche	  suggests	  that	  if	  we	  are	  capable,	  we	  should	  try	  to	  utilize	  our	  sufferings,	  including	  the	  decadent	  morality	  disease	  of	  contemporary	  society,	  in	  order	  to	  transform	  ourselves	  into	  ever-­‐greater	  health.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  set	  prescription	  of	  decadent	  morality,	  Nietzsche	  therapeutically	  tries	  to	  enable	  and	  encourage	  you	  to	  personally	  decide	  when	  and	  how	  to	  utilize	  your	  ‘negative’	  experiences	  in	  order	  to	  convalesce	  into	  a	  health	  of	  exuberantly	  affirming	  the	  whole	  of	  this	  life.	  Nietzsche	  asserts	  that	  convalescing	  will	  never	  be	  completed,	  will	  never	  be	  simple	  or	  easy,	  and	  we	  must	  tread	  the	  path	  on	  our	  own.	  While,	  for	  some	  people,	  this	  is	  terrifying	  in	  that	  it	  means	  there	  can	  be	  no	  prescription	  for	  an	  absolute	  health	  void	  of	  all	  pain	  as	  decadent	  morality	  claims,	  it	  also	  means	  that	  we	  have	  a	  constant	  potentiality	  to	  become	  healthier	  than	  our	  current	  state.	  	  	  
H.	  	  Promotion	  of	  Death	  in	  Life	  Through	  both	  his	  promotion	  of	  affirmative	  suicide	  and	  his	  encouragement	  of	  a	  utilization	  of	  sickness	  to	  convalesce	  into	  health,	  Nietzsche	  indirectly	  exposes	  how	  he	  conceptualizes	  death	  in	  life.	  In	  particular,	  the	  continually	  made	  decision	  of	  if	  and	  when	  to	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kill	  ourselves,	  either	  physically	  or	  metaphorically,	  is	  a	  striking	  manifestation	  of	  how	  we	  must	  confront	  death	  in	  our	  lives.	  In	  addition,	  our	  dealings	  with	  sicknesses,	  sufferings,	  and	  pains	  are	  also	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  have	  to	  face,	  through	  our	  bodily	  experiences,	  our	  mortality	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis.	  Nietzsche	  views	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  relate	  to	  these	  manifestations	  of	  death	  in	  our	  everyday	  existence	  as	  of	  central	  importance,	  understanding	  both	  affirmative	  suicide	  and	  an	  acceptance	  of	  sickness	  as	  potentially	  in	  the	  service	  of	  life.	  Specifically,	  Nietzsche	  believes	  that	  given	  the	  right	  circumstances,	  neither	  killing	  oneself	  nor	  illness	  are	  an	  opposition	  or	  degradation	  of	  life,	  but,	  rather,	  are	  crucial,	  necessary,	  and	  enhancing	  aspects	  of	  our	  existence.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  can	  be	  indirectly	  apprehended	  that	  Nietzsche	  more	  generally	  understands	  death	  as	  essential	  to	  life.	  In	  other	  words,	  Nietzsche	  likely	  also	  views	  death	  as	  a	  ‘negative’	  aspect	  of	  existence,	  perhaps	  even	  the	  most	  fundamental,	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  embraced	  and	  celebrated	  in	  order	  to	  push	  ourselves	  into	  active	  affirmation.	  As	  such,	  Nietzsche	  strives	  to	  provide	  his	  readers	  with	  a	  renewed	  perspective	  of	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  even	  our	  darkest	  terrors,	  including	  our	  death,	  in	  order	  to	  help	  propel	  us	  forward	  into	  convalescing	  and	  truly	  living.	  Like	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  TMT,	  and	  Heidegger,	  Nietzsche	  explains	  the	  central	  affect	  death	  has	  on	  our	  existence,	  as	  well	  as	  points	  out	  the	  detriment	  and	  dangers	  of	  the	  severe	  denial	  of	  death	  in	  our	  contemporary	  Western	  culture.	  Nietzsche	  also	  supplements	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  TMT,	  and	  Heidegger	  in	  providing	  a	  personal	  therapeutic	  methodology	  so	  that	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  approach	  our	  death	  differently,	  to	  see	  its	  essential	  and	  important	  connection	  to	  life,	  and	  to	  apprehend	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  death	  within	  our	  own	  lives.	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Conclusion	  The	  above	  chapters	  have	  presented	  a	  series	  of	  descriptions	  of	  five	  interdisciplinary	  perspectives	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  a	  pervasive	  concealment	  of	  death	  in	  the	  modern	  West.	  In	  particular	  this	  thesis	  examined	  the	  relevant	  works	  of	  historian	  Phillipe	  Ariès,	  theoretical	  anthropologist	  Ernest	  Becker,	  the	  experimental	  psychologists	  involved	  in	  Terror	  Management	  Theory,	  continental	  philosopher	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  and	  philosophical	  cultural	  therapist	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche.22	  	  
I.	  Ariès	  The	  first	  chapter	  looked	  at	  the	  work	  of	  respected	  historian	  Phillipe	  Ariès	  who	  investigated	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  death	  in	  the	  Western	  world.	  Ariès	  looks	  back	  over	  a	  thousand	  years	  to	  show	  that	  our	  modern	  attitude	  is	  drastically	  different	  than	  the	  way	  death	  had	  been	  perceived	  in	  past	  historical	  epochs.	  In	  particular,	  he	  describes	  death	  in	  its	  contemporary	  Western	  guise	  as	  severely	  rejected,	  silenced,	  and	  covered	  over.	  Modern	  society	  has	  come	  to	  view	  death	  as	  wild	  and	  even	  unnatural,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  it	  can	  barely	  be	  acknowledged	  within	  life.	  While	  it	  may	  feel	  like	  our	  current	  perspective	  is	  instinctive	  and	  absolute,	  and	  all	  humans	  have	  always	  tried	  to	  avoid	  thinking	  about	  their	  ultimate	  demise,	  Ariès	  provides	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  how	  this	  sense	  is	  erroneous.	  Furthermore,	  Ariès	  asserts	  our	  contemporary	  denial	  of	  death	  is	  psychologically	  detrimental.	  While	  he	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  thorough	  prescription,	  he	  lays	  out	  the	  facts	  about	  how	  our	  perspective	  upon	  death	  has	  not	  always	  been	  this	  way	  in	  order	  to	  open	  the	  idea	  that	  maybe	  our	  conception	  should	  not	  actually	  be	  this	  way.	  Using	  a	  historical	  level	  of	  investigation,	  Ariès	  begins	  the	  conversation	  about	  how	  death	  is	  not	  the	  moment	  of	  demise,	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but	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  constantly	  affecting	  us,	  and	  thus,	  that	  we	  need	  to	  question	  how	  we	  can	  and	  should	  confront	  our	  mortality.	  	  	  
II.	  Becker	  The	  second	  chapter	  describes	  the	  work	  of	  Ernest	  Becker,	  a	  theoretical	  anthropologist	  and	  Pulitzer	  Prize	  winner	  who	  has	  been	  able	  to	  translate	  his	  ideas	  regarding	  the	  denial	  of	  death	  to	  a	  broader,	  non-­‐academic	  audience.	  Becker	  postulates	  that	  the	  most	  fundamental	  human	  motivation	  is	  a	  denial	  of	  death,	  or	  that	  what	  we	  do,	  feel,	  and	  believe	  is	  a	  result	  of	  our	  desire	  to	  flee	  from	  the	  awareness	  of	  our	  ultimate	  perishing.	  Becker	  explains	  that	  the	  primary	  way	  in	  which	  we	  flee	  from	  our	  death	  is	  an	  adoption,	  protection,	  and	  bolstering	  of	  our	  culture.	  Specifically,	  Becker	  describes	  that	  our	  culture	  acts	  a	  system	  that	  reduces	  our	  overwhelming	  anxiety	  about	  death	  by	  providing	  us	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  distance	  from	  our	  mortal	  animality	  and	  by	  imbuing	  us	  with	  a	  feeling	  of	  symbolic	  immortality.	  Becker	  also	  argues	  that	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  our	  illusion	  that	  we	  will	  not	  actually	  die,	  we	  must	  reject	  and	  oppose	  all	  cultural	  systems	  that	  threaten	  the	  validity	  of	  our	  cultural	  system.	  As	  a	  result,	  Becker	  proposes	  that	  oftentimes	  this	  preservation	  of	  our	  cultural	  identities	  results	  in	  the	  harming	  of	  others.	  Although	  he	  does	  not	  think	  this	  need	  to	  flee	  from	  our	  death	  can	  be	  eradicated	  from	  human	  being,	  Becker	  does	  think	  certain	  cultural	  systems	  are	  better	  than	  others.	  However,	  Becker	  is	  dangerously	  unclear	  in	  his	  explanation	  of	  the	  religious	  solution,	  what	  he	  proposes	  as	  the	  better	  system	  to	  embrace.	  	  
III.	  Terror	  Management	  Theory	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Becker’s	  discussion	  about	  the	  broad	  impact	  of	  death	  in	  our	  daily	  functioning	  has	  affected	  many	  academics	  in	  different	  fields.	  Of	  note	  is	  the	  formation	  of	  Terror	  Management	  Theory	  within	  experimental	  psychology.	  TMT	  researchers	  use	  the	  scientific	  method	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  widespread	  everyday	  effects	  of	  non-­‐conscious	  death	  denial.	  After	  laying	  out	  the	  basics	  of	  Becker’s	  theory,	  the	  third	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis	  elucidates	  the	  typical	  process	  of	  a	  TMT	  experiment	  and	  describes	  a	  variety	  of	  the	  results	  gathered	  over	  the	  past	  few	  decades.	  It	  is	  shown	  that	  TMT	  as	  an	  experimental	  science	  is	  also	  pointing	  to	  the	  idea	  our	  conception	  of	  death	  plays	  a	  prevalent	  role	  in	  our	  lives.	  Moreover,	  TMT	  research	  is	  beginning	  to	  question	  the	  different	  and	  potential	  beneficial	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  approach	  our	  mortality.	  	  Although	  Becker	  and	  TMT	  researchers	  through	  their	  scientific	  analysis	  are	  able	  to	  report	  and	  postulate	  probable	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  confront	  our	  mortality,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  clearly	  investigate	  how	  we	  can	  and	  should	  approach	  our	  death.	  Ariès	  too,	  as	  a	  historian,	  is	  restricted	  by	  his	  discipline	  in	  the	  depth	  of	  his	  questioning	  the	  health	  of	  our	  modern	  formulations	  and	  in	  proposing	  future	  conceptions.	  These	  social	  scientists	  are	  methodologically	  limited	  to	  describing	  what	  our	  conception	  of	  death	  has	  been	  and	  seems	  to	  be,	  and	  thus	  are	  incapable	  of	  proposing	  possibilities	  and	  asking	  the	  question	  of	  what	  our	  finitude	  means	  in	  our	  everyday	  existence.	  In	  order	  to	  more	  fully	  examine	  how	  death	  is	  in	  our	  everyday	  life,	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  thesis	  looks	  towards	  continental	  philosophy.	  	  	  
IV.	  Heidegger	  More	  precisely,	  the	  fourth	  chapter	  describes	  the	  perspective	  of	  Martin	  Heidegger	  who	  uses	  rigorous	  ontological	  phenomenology	  to	  investigate	  death	  as	  a	  part	  of	  human	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being.	  With	  his	  concept	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  Heidegger	  goes	  beyond	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  in	  defining	  death	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  our	  ontological	  constitution.	  While	  the	  social	  scientists	  explain	  how	  death	  significantly	  affects	  our	  thoughts,	  behaviors,	  and	  beliefs,	  Heidegger	  goes	  farther	  to	  describe	  that	  we	  are	  constantly	  toward	  our	  death—	  we	  are	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  It	  is	  because	  we	  die,	  Heidegger	  maintains,	  that	  we	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  relate	  to	  our	  death	  in	  either	  an	  inauthentic	  or	  authentic	  manner.	  Heidegger	  is	  similar	  to	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  in	  his	  explanation	  that	  we	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  inauthentically	  flee	  from	  our	  death.	  However,	  Heidegger	  also	  asserts	  that	  we	  have	  the	  possibility	  for	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  which	  involves	  embracing	  how	  death	  affects	  our	  very	  being.	  Authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  a	  taking	  hold	  of	  and	  owning	  ourselves	  as	  who	  we	  are,	  as	  beings	  of	  possibility	  because	  of	  our	  very	  finitude.	  Although	  his	  ideas	  are	  complicated	  and	  obscure,	  Heidegger	  illustrates	  that	  we	  can	  authentically	  be-­‐towards-­‐death	  through	  anxious	  resolute	  running	  ahead,	  which	  involves	  grasping	  and	  sustaining	  death	  as	  the	  possibility	  it	  is.	  While	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  concretely	  demonstrate	  how	  one	  can	  accomplish	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  nor	  is	  he	  recommending	  it	  as	  a	  “solution,”	  he,	  unlike	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  researchers,	  is	  able	  to	  show	  us	  a	  possible	  way	  besides	  denial	  in	  which	  we	  can	  approach	  our	  death.	  Heidegger	  ontologically	  describes	  the	  possibilities	  of	  confronting	  and	  assuming	  our	  mortality	  in	  an	  affirmative	  manner,	  which	  have	  real	  implications	  in	  our	  lives.	  	  
V.	  Nietzsche	  This	  thesis	  finishes	  by	  examining	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  a	  philosophical	  therapist	  of	  culture	  who	  indirectly	  focuses	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  relate	  to	  death	  within	  our	  lives.	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Specifically,	  Nietzsche	  examines	  our	  current	  evaluation	  of	  suicide	  and	  sickness.	  Nietzsche	  describes	  that	  in	  our	  contemporary	  society	  we	  consider	  all	  ‘negative’	  experiences,	  including	  suicide	  and	  sickness,	  as	  problems	  that	  need	  to	  be	  eradicated.	  However,	  Nietzsche	  argues	  that	  this	  current	  negative	  evaluation	  of	  our	  human	  fallibility	  and	  impermanence	  is	  a	  dangerous	  life-­‐threatening	  disease.	  Instead,	  Nietzsche	  promotes	  suicide	  when	  it	  affirms	  life	  and	  praises	  sickness	  when	  it	  enhances	  our	  existence.	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  Nietzsche	  views	  not	  truly	  living,	  instead	  of	  death,	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  life.	  As	  a	  result,	  Nietzsche	  opposes	  what	  he	  calls	  slow	  suicide	  and	  decadent	  morality,	  which	  involve	  a	  decaying,	  wasteful,	  hatred	  of	  life.	  Nietzsche	  proposes	  that	  instead	  of	  fleeing	  from	  our	  fallible	  bodies	  and	  impermanent	  worlds,	  we	  need	  to	  fully	  become	  the	  mortal	  creatures	  that	  we	  are	  within	  this	  transitory	  world,	  and	  this	  creates	  real	  strength,	  power,	  health,	  and	  life.	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  argues	  that	  we	  can	  utilize	  our	  ‘negative’	  experiences,	  including	  death,	  in	  order	  to	  convalesce	  into	  a	  healthier	  existence.	  While	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  tend	  to	  comment	  directly	  on	  a	  general	  conception	  of	  death,	  through	  his	  promotion	  of	  affirmative	  suicide	  and	  the	  life-­‐enhancement	  of	  ‘negative’	  aspects	  of	  human	  existence,	  it	  seems	  that	  Nietzsche	  understands	  a	  celebration	  of	  and	  gratitude	  for	  death	  as	  being	  of	  central	  importance	  to	  truly	  living.	  	  	  	  
VI.	  Nietzsche’s	  Supplement	  to	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  TMT,	  and	  Heidegger	  If	  we	  understand	  Nietzsche’s	  conception	  of	  affirmative	  suicide	  and	  convalescing	  as	  representative	  of	  his	  understanding	  of	  death,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  how	  his	  philosophy	  relates	  to	  and	  goes	  beyond	  the	  other	  thinkers	  discussed	  within	  this	  thesis.	  In	  particular,	  Nietzsche	  echoes	  the	  ideas	  of	  Ariès	  and	  Becker	  in	  that	  he	  too	  sees	  this	  rejection	  of	  our	  death	  as	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especially	  extreme	  in	  our	  modern	  world.	  Moreover,	  like	  Heidegger,	  Ariès,	  and	  Becker,	  Nietzsche	  shows	  that	  our	  denial	  of	  death	  is	  detrimental	  to	  our	  lives.	  In	  addition,	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophy	  can	  be	  specifically	  contrasted	  with	  Becker’s	  theorizing.	  Nietzsche	  is	  similar	  to	  Becker	  in	  that	  he	  too	  views	  moral	  systems	  as	  constructed	  through	  the	  ways	  we	  reject	  our	  death.	  Becker	  explains	  that	  moral	  systems,	  what	  he	  calls	  cultural	  heroic	  systems,	  are	  different	  forms	  of	  death	  denial.	  Comparatively,	  Nietzsche	  describes	  that	  decadent	  morality,	  the	  only	  morality	  that	  has	  been	  taught	  thus	  far	  to	  society,	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  our	  mortality.	  However,	  Nietzsche,	  unlike	  Becker,	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  there	  could	  be	  a	  ‘moral’	  system	  that	  does	  not	  deny	  death.	  Because	  Becker	  does	  not	  view	  this	  as	  a	  possibility,	  Becker	  promotes	  the	  religious	  solution	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  deny	  death.	  Nietzsche	  would	  likely	  hold	  issue	  with	  Becker’s	  promotion	  of	  the	  religious	  solution	  in	  that	  it	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  decadent	  morality	  that	  Nietzsche	  adamantly	  opposes.	  Specifically,	  Becker’s	  religious	  solution	  involves	  transcending	  this	  body	  and	  this	  world	  into	  a	  realm	  with	  God,	  thus	  devaluing	  our	  existence	  and	  fundamentally	  opposing	  life.	  While	  Nietzsche	  is	  not	  against	  religion,	  he	  is	  against	  the	  hatred	  of	  life	  of	  religions	  like	  the	  one	  Becker	  promotes.	  	   In	  contrast	  to	  Becker’s	  promotion	  of	  the	  religious	  solution,	  Nietzsche	  seems	  to	  promote	  a	  system	  more	  like	  that	  of	  Becker’s	  creative	  solution.	  In	  his	  striving	  to	  equip	  his	  readers	  with	  a	  way	  in	  which	  they	  themselves	  can	  construct	  their	  own	  system	  of	  health,	  Nietzsche	  promotes	  a	  process	  of	  creation.	  While	  Becker’s	  creative	  solution	  involves	  constructing	  one’s	  own	  system	  to	  deny	  death,	  Nietzsche	  instead	  promotes	  the	  construction	  of	  one’s	  own	  creative	  way	  to	  affirm,	  approach,	  and	  utilize	  death.	  Nietzsche	  understands	  creation	  as	  a	  ‘solution’	  to	  our	  fallible,	  painful	  existence	  in	  that	  it	  helps	  us	  to	  transform	  these	  ‘negative’	  experiences	  into	  greater,	  stronger	  life.	  Nietzsche	  states,	  “Creation	  –	  that	  is	  the	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great	  redemption	  from	  suffering,	  and	  life’s	  easement.	  But	  that	  the	  creator	  may	  exist,	  that	  itself	  requires	  suffering	  and	  much	  transformation.	  Yes,	  there	  must	  be	  much	  bitter	  dying	  in	  your	  life,	  you	  creators!	  Thus	  you	  are	  advocates	  and	  justifiers	  of	  all	  transitoriness”	  (Z,	  “Islands”	  111).	  Similarly,	  Nietzsche	  celebrates	  the	  people	  whom	  he	  calls	  free	  spirits.	  Free	  spirits,	  according	  to	  Nietzsche,	  are	  people	  who	  do	  not	  have	  faith	  or	  desire	  certainty,	  and	  who	  thus	  break	  away	  from	  tradition,	  habituation,	  and	  their	  surroundings	  in	  order	  to	  think	  differently	  (HH,	  “Tokens”	  108	  §225;	  GS	  291	  §347).	  Free	  spirits	  live	  dangerously,	  experiment	  with	  themselves,	  and	  dance	  near	  abysses.	  In	  this	  way,	  Nietzsche’s	  free	  spirits	  seem	  as	  if	  they	  adopt	  Becker’s	  creative	  solution	  in	  that	  they	  reject	  the	  traditional	  forms	  of	  approaching	  death,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  put	  themselves	  in	  risk	  of	  instability.	  While	  Becker	  would	  likely	  view	  these	  free	  spirits	  as	  problematically	  ungrounded,	  which	  is	  why	  it	  seems	  he	  promotes	  the	  religious	  solution	  over	  the	  creative	  solution,	  Nietzsche	  understands	  these	  free	  spirits	  as	  those	  who	  are	  capable	  of	  utilizing	  their	  human	  mortality	  into	  order	  to	  convalesce	  into	  truly	  great	  and	  healthy	  lives.	  As	  a	  result,	  Nietzsche	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  Becker	  in	  that	  Nietzsche	  views	  our	  death	  as	  potentially	  of	  benefit	  to	  life,	  whereas	  Becker	  views	  our	  death	  as	  problematic	  and	  requiring	  a	  “solution”	  for	  us	  to	  deny	  it.	  Furthermore,	  Nietzsche	  contrasts	  free	  spirits	  with	  fettered	  spirits,	  people	  whom	  he	  describes	  as	  being	  habituated	  to	  the	  point	  of	  having	  “faith.”	  Given	  that	  Becker’s	  promotion	  of	  the	  religious	  solution	  involves	  a	  “leap	  of	  faith,”	  Nietzsche’s	  opposition	  to	  “faith”	  further	  exposes	  that	  he	  would	  likely	  have	  severe	  distain	  for	  Becker’s	  religious	  solution.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  promotion	  of	  a	  creative	  approach,	  utilization,	  and	  valuation	  of	  death	  is	  in	  complete	  opposition	  with	  Becker’s	  religious	  rejection	  of	  our	  mortal	  existence.	  
	   142	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  promote	  any	  form	  of	  health,	  including	  a	  creative	  convalescing,	  as	  an	  absolute	  choice	  for	  everyone	  and	  at	  all	  times.	  	  	   Therefore,	  Nietzsche’s	  project	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  that	  of	  Becker’s.	  Becker	  asks	  the	  questions	  of	  how	  we	  deny	  our	  death	  and	  what	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  do	  so.	  However,	  Nietzsche	  asks	  what	  it	  means	  to	  me	  and	  how	  does	  it	  affect	  my	  life	  given	  that	  I	  will	  die	  and	  that	  I	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  deny	  this	  fact.	  In	  this	  way,	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  investigate	  what	  is	  the	  least	  harmful	  general	  way	  to	  deny	  our	  death,	  Nietzsche	  gets	  us	  to	  question	  for	  ourselves	  how	  we	  can	  relate	  to	  our	  death	  in	  a	  way	  to	  affirm	  our	  lives.	  Becker	  prescribes	  a	  universal	  ideal	  of	  transcendent	  religion,	  and	  Nietzsche	  equips	  us	  with	  a	  process	  to	  prescribe	  ourselves	  an	  antidote	  for	  this	  decadent	  morality	  Becker	  promotes.	  	  Another	  way	  in	  which	  to	  understand	  Nietzsche’s	  perspective	  of	  death	  is	  by	  recognizing	  the	  similarity	  with	  Heidegger’s	  conception	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  Specifically,	  like	  Heidegger’s	  concentration	  on	  how	  we	  are	  toward	  our	  death,	  Nietzsche	  makes	  clear	  the	  importance	  of	  how	  a	  person	  relates	  to	  their	  finitude	  within	  their	  existence,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  question	  of	  suicide	  and	  our	  viewpoint	  of	  sickness.	  As	  a	  result,	  both	  Nietzsche	  and	  Heidegger	  declare	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  moment	  of	  demise	  that	  is	  significant,	  but	  how	  I	  relate	  to	  my	  death	  in	  life.	  In	  this	  way,	  Nietzsche	  and	  Heidegger	  understand	  our	  relation	  towards	  death	  as	  a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  human	  existence,	  which	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  social	  scientists	  who	  seem	  to	  assume	  death	  is	  dying	  or	  the	  end	  moment	  of	  perishing.	  Furthermore,	  Nietzsche	  and	  Heidegger	  both	  view	  that	  our	  possibilities	  of	  life	  open	  through	  our	  finitude.	  In	  other	  words,	  Nietzsche	  and	  Heidegger	  understand	  that	  if	  we	  relate	  to	  our	  mortality	  with	  an	  authentic	  embracing	  and	  owning	  of	  our	  death,	  then	  we	  can	  take	  hold	  of	  and	  determine	  the	  possibilities	  in	  our	  life.	  In	  addition,	  Nietzsche	  is	  similar	  to	  Heidegger	  in	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that	  he	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  straightforward,	  explicit	  description	  of	  what	  this	  authentic	  relation	  entails.	  While	  Heidegger	  explains	  this	  authentic	  relation	  with	  his,	  perhaps	  purposefully	  obscured,	  terms	  of	  an	  anxious	  running	  ahead	  resolute	  choice,	  Nietzsche	  asserts	  that	  this	  authentic	  relation	  is	  a	  particular	  life-­‐affirming	  convalescing	  that	  he	  cannot	  provide	  for	  you	  but	  that	  you	  must	  decide	  for	  yourself.	  In	  short,	  Nietzsche	  and	  Heidegger	  both	  seem	  to	  understand	  that	  you	  must	  self-­‐determine	  your	  authentic	  relation	  to	  death.	  	  However,	  while	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  promote	  an	  authentic	  relation	  to	  death	  as	  superior	  to	  other	  modes	  of	  relating	  to	  death,	  Nietzsche	  does	  champion	  this	  understanding	  of	  death	  as	  especially	  healthy	  and	  life	  affirming.	  Furthermore,	  Nietzsche	  is	  also	  different	  than	  Heidegger	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  bring	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  different	  ways	  to	  relate	  to	  our	  death	  onto	  a	  more	  personal	  level.	  Nietzsche	  uses	  his	  methodology	  to	  try	  to	  get	  his	  readers	  to	  embody	  his	  ideas	  and	  actually	  begin	  to	  experience,	  confront,	  and	  sometimes	  even	  embrace	  impermanence.	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  might	  even	  be	  thought	  that	  Nietzsche	  assists	  his	  readers	  in	  embodying	  the	  anxious	  running	  ahead	  resoluteness	  of	  Heidegger’s	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  Regardless,	  Nietzsche	  surpasses	  the	  complex	  ontological	  explanations	  of	  Heidegger	  in	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  experiential	  methodology	  enables	  me	  to	  begin	  to	  grapple	  with	  what	  my	  death	  means	  to	  my	  everyday	  life.	  Therefore,	  in	  total,	  through	  his	  promotion	  of	  affirmative	  suicide	  and	  life-­‐enhancing	  sickness,	  Nietzsche	  goes	  beyond	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  and	  TMT	  in	  that	  he	  proposes	  potential	  other	  ways	  besides	  denial	  in	  which	  to	  confront	  our	  morality,	  and	  he	  also	  goes	  beyond	  Heidegger	  in	  that	  his	  explanation	  can	  be	  understood	  within	  my	  personal,	  everyday	  life.	  	  	  
VII.	  Death	  in	  Life	  through	  Theoretical	  &	  Experimental	  Psychology	  and	  Continental	  Philosophy	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While	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  give	  a	  full	  description	  of	  all	  conceptions	  of	  death,	  it	  is	  the	  hope	  that	  utilizing	  an	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  within	  this	  thesis	  enables	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  conversation	  about	  how	  our	  mortality	  is	  not	  just	  the	  moment	  of	  our	  demise	  but	  is	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  our	  entire	  existence.	  Where	  one	  methodology	  excels	  at	  describing	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  death	  over	  time,	  another	  is	  better	  at	  describing	  how	  death	  is	  a	  distinct	  part	  of	  our	  unique	  being.	  Where	  one	  methodology	  is	  especially	  comprehensive	  at	  postulating	  how	  death	  affects	  our	  beliefs,	  behaviors,	  and	  emotions	  in	  our	  everyday	  lives,	  another	  is	  better	  at	  getting	  us	  to	  emotionally	  embody	  what	  this	  means	  and	  what	  we	  could	  do	  about	  it.	  	  All	  of	  the	  thinkers	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  describe	  the	  dangers	  involved	  in	  our	  severe	  contemporary	  rejection	  of	  death.	  Ariès	  argues	  that	  the	  contemporary	  denial	  of	  our	  mortality	  detrimentally	  affects	  how	  we	  conceptualize	  our	  existence.	  Becker	  and	  TMT	  show	  that	  our	  fleeing	  from	  death	  results	  in	  the	  harming	  of	  others	  who	  are	  different	  from	  us.	  Heidegger	  ontologically	  describes	  that	  our	  denial	  prevents	  us	  from	  owning	  ourselves,	  from	  taking	  hold	  of	  our	  possibilities.	  Nietzsche	  explains	  that	  our	  rejection	  of	  these	  crucial,	  impermanent	  aspects	  of	  our	  being	  are	  a	  life-­‐threatening	  illness	  that	  keep	  us	  from	  emerging	  and	  re-­‐emerging	  into	  ever-­‐healthier,	  joyful	  life.	  While	  Becker	  and	  TMT	  seem	  to	  hold	  steadfast	  onto	  a	  belief	  in	  a	  universal	  human	  nature	  of	  death	  denial,	  Ariès,	  Nietzsche,	  and	  Heidegger	  assert	  that	  we	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  not	  flee	  from	  our	  death.	  Ariès	  exposes	  that	  we	  have	  not	  always	  so	  adamantly	  rejected	  our	  death	  as	  we	  do	  in	  our	  modern	  era,	  and	  he	  explains	  that	  not	  so	  many	  hundreds	  of	  years	  ago	  we	  understood	  that	  death	  was	  a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  life.	  Nietzsche	  and	  Heidegger	  describe	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  completely	  reject	  our	  death,	  and	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  death	  as	  what	  enables	  us	  to	  be	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extraordinarily	  human.	  By	  tapping	  into	  these	  impermanent	  aspects	  of	  who	  we	  are	  and	  facing	  our	  death	  authentically,	  our	  possibilities	  open	  and	  we	  can	  become	  healthier,	  stronger,	  and	  exuberant.	  Through	  unfolding	  the	  interdisciplinary	  work	  of	  Ariès,	  Becker,	  TMT	  researchers,	  Heidegger,	  and	  Nietzsche,	  it	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  show	  humans,	  in	  our	  contemporary	  Western	  era,	  tend	  to	  deny	  their	  death,	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  greatly	  affects	  our	  lives	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  detrimental	  and	  dangerous,	  and	  suggest	  there	  could	  be	  other,	  healthier	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  approach	  our	  impermanence.	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Notes	  	   1	  Ariès	  point	  is	  also	  made	  by	  Heidegger,	  which	  will	  be	  described	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	  Just	  as	  Ariès	  explains	  that	  in	  current	  times	  people	  tell	  the	  dying	  they	  are	  not	  actually	  dying,	  Heidegger	  similarly	  describes	  that	  we	  use	  specific	  language	  to	  talk	  to	  the	  dying	  in	  order	  to	  remove	  death’s	  character	  of	  possibility.	  
2	  Going	  further	  than	  Becker,	  Nietzsche	  argues	  that	  our	  denial	  of	  death	  is	  not	  the	  only	  necessary	  fiction.	  Nietzsche	  asserts	  that	  all	  of	  our	  conceptions,	  and	  thus	  ‘truth’	  in	  general,	  is	  a	  vital	  lie.	  However,	  in	  a	  way,	  Becker	  too	  sees	  every	  moment	  of	  our	  lives	  permeated	  by	  necessary	  illusion	  because	  he	  views	  our	  denial	  of	  death	  effecting	  our	  everyday	  thoughts,	  behaviors,	  and	  beliefs.	  Nietzsche’s	  perspective	  will	  be	  discussed	  furhter	  in	  Chapter	  Five.	  
3	  Remember	  that	  Ariès	  too	  saw	  the	  modern	  denial	  of	  death	  linked	  with	  a	  denial	  of	  life.	  Coinciding	  with	  Becker’s	  description	  of	  the	  depressed	  automatic	  cultural	  man,	  Ariès	  suggests	  that	  contemporary	  Western	  people	  recoil	  from	  living	  in	  attempt	  to	  deny	  their	  death.	  	  	  
4	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Becker’s	  perspective	  of	  mental	  illness	  is	  only	  for	  modern	  day	  Westerners.	  Becker	  believes	  those	  who	  modern	  day	  Westerners	  would	  consider	  mentally	  ill	  would	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  heroes	  in	  other	  cultures	  (BDM	  131).	  
5	  By	  using	  the	  term	  ‘evil,’	  Becker	  dangerously	  places	  himself	  in	  an	  ethical	  debate.	  He	  seems	  to	  momentarily	  forget	  that	  using	  the	  word	  ‘evil’	  exposes	  his	  own	  cultural	  heroic	  system.	  If	  we	  listen	  to	  his	  theory,	  Becker	  himself	  appears	  to	  be	  battling	  against	  the	  ‘evil’	  protection	  of	  cultural	  systems,	  so	  that	  he	  himself	  may	  play	  the	  role	  of	  the	  hero	  in	  order	  to	  flee	  from	  his	  own	  personal	  terror	  of	  mortality.	  However,	  it	  is	  possible	  Becker	  uses	  this	  weighty	  word	  in	  attempt	  to	  ruffle	  his	  thinkers	  into	  more	  deeply	  questioning	  the	  value	  of	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  uncritically	  supporting	  one’s	  cultural	  system.	  Nevertheless,	  using	  the	  term	  “evil”	  inadvertently	  seems	  to	  be	  guiding	  his	  readers	  towards	  one	  particular	  cultural	  system,	  which	  may	  not	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  get	  them	  to	  critically	  think	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  own	  cultural	  system.	  If	  we	  substitute	  Becker’s	  misleading	  term	  “evil”	  for	  “harming	  others”	  which	  is	  what	  he	  seems	  to	  actually	  be	  implying,	  then	  we	  can	  continue	  to	  seriously	  consider	  the	  general	  ideas	  Becker	  proposes.	  While	  there	  are	  problems	  with	  Becker’s	  argument,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  Becker	  was	  treading	  into	  fairly	  uncharted	  territory	  in	  his	  attempt	  to	  scientifically	  speak	  about	  existential	  truths.	  	  
6	  The	  term	  “fundamental	  attribution	  error”	  was	  first	  proposed	  in	  E.E.	  Jones	  and	  V.A	  Harris’	  “The	  Attribution	  of	  Attitudes”	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Social	  Psychology	  (3.1)	  published	  in	  1967.	  	  
7	  For	  more	  information	  on	  cognitive	  dissonance	  see	  Leon	  Festinger’s	  A	  Theory	  of	  
Cognitive	  Dissonance	  published	  by	  Stanford	  University	  Press	  in	  1957.	  
8	  Heidegger,	  like	  Becker,	  also	  points	  to	  ways	  in	  which	  distraction	  assists	  in	  the	  denial	  of	  our	  death.	  Specifically,	  Heidegger	  illustrates	  that	  we	  preoccupy	  ourselves	  with	  things	  within	  the	  world	  and	  become	  absorbed	  into	  an	  anonymous	  public,	  which	  lead	  us	  to	  an	  inauthentic	  relation	  to	  our	  death.	  This	  idea	  will	  be	  explained	  more	  precisely	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	  	  
9	  For	  an	  interesting	  take	  on	  the	  creative	  solution	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  religious	  solution	  see	  Fred	  C.	  Alford’s	  “Inflicting	  Evil	  as	  an	  Alternative	  to	  the	  Dread	  of	  Dying:	  An	  Independent	  Test	  of	  Generative	  Death	  Anxiety”	  in	  Death	  and	  Denial:	  Interdisciplinary	  
Perspectives	  on	  the	  Legacy	  of	  Ernest	  Becker	  edited	  by	  Daniel	  Liechty	  and	  published	  in	  2002.	  Alford	  suggests	  that	  Becker’s	  lack	  of	  clarity	  regarding	  creativity	  is	  the	  fundamental	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  weakness	  in	  Becker’s	  theory.	  Alford	  believes	  that	  instead	  of	  directly	  promoting	  religion,	  Becker	  should	  have	  instead	  championed	  creativity,	  both	  in	  the	  arts	  and	  in	  religion	  (27).	  In	  particular,	  Alford	  argues	  creativity	  leads	  to	  the	  least	  harming	  of	  others	  in	  that	  it	  provides	  an	  alternative,	  non-­‐living	  entity	  that	  a	  person	  can	  oppose	  in	  order	  to	  necessarily	  feel	  they	  are	  protecting	  their	  denial	  of	  death.	  Alford	  states,	  “Instead	  of	  expressing	  our	  doom,	  our	  dread	  in	  the	  face	  of	  our	  own	  vulnerability	  and	  mortality,	  in	  and	  through	  the	  bodies	  and	  minds	  of	  others,	  we	  express	  it	  in	  abstract	  form,	  in	  words	  rather	  than	  deeds,	  in	  images	  rather	  than	  actions	  on	  the	  bodies	  of	  others”	  (22).	  More	  specifically,	  Alford	  illustrates	  “In	  creative	  work,	  the	  body	  is	  projected	  into	  an	  artifact,	  where	  it	  can	  be	  transformed,	  enhanced,	  played	  with,	  even	  used	  ruthlessly	  because	  it	  is	  not	  really	  the	  human	  body	  but	  a	  body	  of	  work”	  (22).	  Through	  creativity,	  Alford	  believes	  we	  can	  transfer	  our	  mortality	  onto	  the	  work,	  and	  come	  to	  face,	  understand,	  and	  deal	  with	  our	  finitude	  through	  our	  creation	  instead	  of	  another	  person.	  In	  this	  way,	  Alford	  is	  able	  to	  elucidate	  creativity	  as	  less	  harmful	  than	  other	  forms	  of	  death	  denial	  as	  well	  as	  describe	  the	  relation	  between	  creativity	  and	  religion	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  Becker	  was	  unable	  to	  do.	  	  
10	  	  Even	  though	  Becker	  does	  not	  himself	  provide	  an	  adequate	  explanation	  of	  his	  religious	  solution	  in	  order	  to	  guide	  a	  person	  through	  the	  process	  of	  dealing	  with	  their	  existential	  tension,	  he	  criticizes	  psychotherapy	  for	  doing	  the	  same	  thing.	  Becker	  states,	  “All	  the	  [psychological]	  analysis	  in	  the	  world	  doesn’t	  allow	  the	  person	  to	  find	  out	  who	  he	  is	  and	  why	  he	  is	  here	  on	  earth,	  why	  he	  has	  to	  die,	  and	  how	  he	  can	  make	  his	  life	  a	  triumph”	  (DD	  193).	  Becker	  argues	  that	  even	  if	  therapy	  could	  successfully	  uncover	  existential	  aspects	  of	  our	  lives,	  and	  even	  though	  it	  sometimes	  provides	  moments	  of	  joy	  and	  growth,	  psychotherapy	  cannot	  give	  patients	  a	  sustained	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  exposed	  problems	  
	   149	  
	  (DD	  270).	  Therefore,	  Becker’s	  promotion	  of	  religion	  can	  be	  criticized	  for	  the	  same	  thing	  he	  finds	  fault	  with	  in	  modern	  psychotherapy	  because	  he	  himself	  does	  not	  clearly	  describe	  how	  a	  person	  participates	  in	  the	  religious	  solution	  to	  best	  deny	  their	  death.	  	  
11	  SZ	  refers	  to	  the	  page	  numbers	  of	  Sein	  und	  Zeit,	  Heidegger’s	  original	  German	  Being	  
and	  Time.	  	  
12	  While	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  is	  described	  in	  more	  depth	  later	  in	  Chapter	  Four,	  in	  general,	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  involves	  understanding	  death	  as	  one’s	  most	  own	  possibility,	  as	  owning	  one’s	  death.	  These	  phrases	  resonate	  with	  “one’s	  own	  death,”	  which	  is	  the	  title	  Ariès	  gives	  for	  the	  second	  period	  of	  his	  history	  of	  the	  Western	  concept	  of	  death.	  Within	  this	  period	  of	  “one’s	  own	  death,”	  Ariès	  explains	  that	  death	  was	  accepted	  as	  a	  basic	  aspect	  of	  life	  much	  more	  than	  it	  is	  today.	  This	  historical	  description	  of	  “owning”	  one’s	  “own”	  death	  as	  a	  part	  of	  life	  is	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  Heidegger’s	  conception	  of	  owning	  one’s	  death	  in	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  
13	  This	  cycling	  back	  movement	  of	  running	  ahead	  in	  order	  to	  come	  back	  to	  oneself	  occurs	  throughout	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy,	  especially	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  Temporality	  in	  Part	  II	  of	  Being	  and	  Time.	  Specifically,	  Heidegger	  explains	  that	  Dasein	  is	  primarily	  futural,	  but	  in	  its	  being	  futural	  it	  is	  coming	  back	  to	  its	  having-­‐been,	  which	  is	  what	  enables	  a	  making-­‐present.	  In	  this	  way,	  Heidegger	  understands	  time	  as	  ekstatic	  Temporality	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  traditional	  conception	  of	  time	  as	  a	  linear	  sequence	  of	  nows.	  Furthermore,	  Heidegger	  opens	  up	  Part	  II	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  with	  his	  description	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  as	  the	  introduction	  to	  his	  unfolding	  of	  ekstatic	  Temporality.	  We	  can	  see	  the	  connection	  between	  death	  and	  ekstatic	  Temporality	  when	  Heidegger	  states,	  “Only	  an	  entity	  which,	  in	  its	  Being,	  is	  
essentially	  futural	  so	  that	  it	  is	  free	  for	  its	  death	  and	  can	  let	  itself	  be	  thrown	  back	  upon	  its	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factical	  ‘there’	  by	  shattering	  itself	  against	  death-­‐	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  only	  as	  an	  entity	  which,	  as	  
futural,	  is	  equiprimordially	  in	  the	  process	  of	  having-­‐been,	  can,	  by	  handing	  down	  to	  itself	  the	  
possibility	  it	  has	  inherited,	  take	  over	  its	  own	  thrownness	  and	  be	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  vision	  for	  
‘its	  time.”	  (BT	  [MR]	  437/SZ	  385).	  This	  quote	  begins	  to	  show	  the	  complicated	  centrality	  of	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  in	  Heidegger’s	  understanding	  of	  Dasein,	  Being,	  and	  Temporality.	  	  
14	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  again	  mention	  conscience	  after	  his	  description	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  Heidegger’s	  discussion	  of	  conscience	  is	  included	  in	  this	  thesis	  because	  within	  Being	  and	  Time	  conscience	  is	  deeply	  connected	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death.	  However,	  given	  his	  lack	  of	  further	  formulation,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  Heidegger	  eventually	  saw	  some	  issue	  with	  the	  way	  he	  conceptualized	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  connected	  to	  conscience.	  	  
15	  Art	  may	  be	  one	  possible	  example	  of	  how	  Dasein	  can	  concretely	  authentically	  be-­‐towards-­‐death.	  In	  other	  words,	  art	  may	  be	  one	  way	  Dasein	  can	  experientially	  anxiously	  anticipate	  its	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  and	  thus	  authentically	  set	  free	  itself	  as	  possibility.	  After	  writing	  Being	  and	  Time,	  at	  a	  point	  in	  Basic	  Problems	  of	  Phenomenology,	  Heidegger	  argues,	  “Poetry,	  creative	  literature,	  is	  nothing	  but	  the	  elementary	  emergence	  into	  words,	  the	  becoming-­‐uncovered,	  of	  existence	  as	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world”	  (BPP	  171).	  That	  is,	  Heidegger	  understands	  poetry	  as	  a	  way	  in	  which	  Dasein’s	  being	  is	  disclosed	  to	  itself.	  Later	  in	  his	  career,	  Heidegger	  also	  wrote	  “Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art”	  in	  which	  he	  explains	  the	  disclosure	  of	  Being	  happens	  in	  the	  work	  of	  art.	  Within	  this	  essay,	  he	  explains	  that	  a	  work	  of	  art,	  “opens	  up	  in	  its	  own	  way	  the	  Being	  of	  beings.	  This	  opening	  up,	  i.e.,	  the	  truth	  of	  beings,	  happens	  in	  the	  work”	  (Poetry,	  Language,	  Thought	  Trans.	  Hofstadter	  38).	  In	  this	  way,	  Heidegger	  describes	  art	  and	  poetizing	  as	  concrete	  ways	  in	  which	  Dasein	  can	  uncover	  its	  being	  as	  a	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  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  that	  is	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  and	  also	  possibly	  reveal	  Being	  more	  generally.	  In	  addition,	  within	  “Origin	  of	  the	  Work	  of	  Art,”	  Heidegger	  speaks	  about	  the	  silence	  of	  poetry	  exposing	  the	  Being	  of	  beings.	  This	  description	  of	  art	  as	  a	  silent	  revealing	  of	  Being	  coincides	  greatly	  with	  the	  silent	  call	  of	  conscience	  that	  reveals	  to	  Dasein	  its	  being,	  described	  as	  the	  existentiell,	  ontic	  mechanism	  of	  authentic	  being-­‐toward-­‐death	  in	  Being	  
and	  Time.	  This	  similarity	  of	  silence	  is	  yet	  another	  way	  in	  which	  it	  seems	  that	  Heidegger	  sees	  a	  connection	  between	  art	  and	  authentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death,	  perhaps	  making	  art	  one	  way	  in	  which	  we	  can	  experientially	  anxiously	  run	  ahead	  resolutely	  into	  our	  death.	  	  
16	  	  While	  the	  phrase	  “appealing	  way	  to	  confront	  death”	  is	  awkward,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  use	  this	  description	  because	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  conceive	  of	  authenticity	  as	  better	  than	  inauthenticity.	  However,	  given	  his	  description	  of	  inauthentic	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  as	  involving,	  for	  example,	  “falling”	  and	  being	  “pre-­‐determined,”	  it	  seems	  to	  the	  reader	  that	  authenticity,	  which	  involves	  “liberation”	  and	  “owning	  oneself,”	  is	  a	  more	  appealing	  way	  to	  confront	  mortality.	  	  
17	  See	  Nietzsche	  as	  Cultural	  Physician	  by	  Daniel	  R.	  Ahern.	  	  
18	  Nietzsche’s	  brief	  genealogical	  explanations	  of	  our	  current	  rejection	  of	  pain	  and	  suicide	  coincide	  with	  Ariès	  historical	  work	  illustrating	  our	  contemporary	  denial	  of	  death,	  including	  suicide,	  and	  everything	  related	  to	  death,	  including	  bodily	  pain.	  	  
19	  Ariès	  echoes	  Nietzsche’s	  understanding	  of	  Christianity	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  remove	  sickness,	  suffering,	  and	  pain	  from	  life.	  Ariès	  explains	  that	  it	  seems,	  “a	  vague	  but	  powerful	  belief	  in	  the	  continuity	  and	  goodness	  of	  nature	  has	  penetrated	  religious	  and	  moral	  practices	  in	  English-­‐speaking	  countries	  and	  popularized	  the	  idea	  that	  suffering,	  poverty,	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  and	  death	  should	  and	  could	  be	  eliminated”	  (HOC	  595).	  Ariès	  points	  out	  that	  death	  too	  is	  included	  in	  the	  religious	  list	  of	  rejected	  ‘negative’	  experiences,	  something	  that	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  directly	  say	  but	  also	  seems	  to	  believe.	  	  
20	  Dastur,	  like	  Ariès	  and	  Nietzsche,	  also	  understands	  religion	  as	  involving	  a	  belief	  that	  death	  is	  an	  imperfection.	  Dastur	  notes	  monotheistic	  religions	  who	  view	  God	  as	  infinite	  and	  perfect,	  come	  to	  understand	  the	  finite	  as	  imperfect	  (43).	  Furthermore,	  Dastur	  also	  believes	  that	  this	  view	  of	  an	  imperfect	  mortality	  is	  furthered	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  from	  Descartes	  to	  Kant.	  In	  this	  way,	  Dastur	  understands,	  like	  Nietzsche,	  both	  Christianity	  and	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  as	  a	  severe	  rejection	  of	  the	  impermanent	  ‘negative’	  aspects	  of	  our	  humanity.	  
21	  Although	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  unpack	  Nietzsche’s	  doctrine	  of	  Eternal	  Recurrence,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  when	  discussing	  Nietzsche’s	  concept	  of	  the	  affirmation	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  life.	  Nietzsche	  understands	  his	  doctrine	  of	  Eternal	  Recurrence	  as	  “the	  highest	  possible	  formula	  of	  affirmation”	  (EH,	  “Zarathustra”	  123	  §1).	  While	  there	  are	  many	  interpretations	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  doctrine	  of	  Eternal	  Recurrence,	  one	  way	  in	  which	  to	  view	  the	  doctrine	  is	  as	  an	  experiential	  way	  in	  which	  we	  are	  tested	  to	  affirm	  the	  whole	  of	  life.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  first	  declaration	  of	  the	  doctrine,	  Nietzsche	  asks	  the	  question	  what	  you	  would	  do	  if	  a	  demon	  proclaimed,	  “This	  life	  as	  you	  now	  live	  it	  and	  have	  lived	  it,	  you	  will	  have	  to	  live	  once	  more	  and	  innumerable	  times	  more	  […Every]	  pain	  and	  every	  joy	  […]	  will	  return	  to	  you,	  all	  in	  the	  same	  succession	  and	  sequence”	  (GS	  273	  §341).	  In	  this	  way,	  at	  least	  in	  this	  specific	  declaration,	  it	  seems	  that	  Nietzsche	  proposes	  the	  world,	  everyone,	  and	  everything	  will	  recur	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  details	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  way	  over	  and	  over	  again	  for	  eternity.	  In	  addition,	  within	  this	  aphorism,	  Nietzsche	  wonders	  specifically	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  whether	  you	  would	  loathe	  and	  curse	  or	  praise	  and	  celebrate	  what	  the	  demon	  told	  you.	  As	  a	  result,	  what	  seems	  most	  important	  about	  Eternal	  Recurrence	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  one	  relates	  to	  what	  it	  proposes,	  the	  attitude	  one	  has	  regarding	  this	  possibility.	  A	  person	  can	  understand	  the	  eternal	  repetition	  of	  all	  events	  as	  imbuing	  life	  with	  meaninglessness	  and	  then	  that	  nothing	  matters,	  or	  meaningfulness	  and	  that	  everything	  matters	  (see	  Heidegger’s	  
Nietzsche	  “The	  Eternal	  Recurrence	  of	  the	  Same”	  §24).	  If	  a	  person	  is	  able	  to	  view	  the	  doctrine	  as	  proclaiming	  the	  latter,	  that	  every	  aspect	  of	  life	  has	  meaning,	  then	  they	  come	  to	  understand	  even	  the	  ‘negative’	  aspects	  of	  life	  as	  essential.	  Moreover,	  affirming	  Eternal	  Recurrence	  does	  not	  simply	  involve	  a	  cognitive	  acceptance,	  but	  an	  exuberant	  love	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  existence,	  what	  Nietzsche	  calls	  amor	  fati	  (see	  EH,	  “Clever”	  99	  §10).	  Therefore,	  an	  affirmation	  of	  Eternal	  Recurrence	  involves	  an	  acceptance	  for	  and	  celebration	  of	  all	  the	  joy	  
and	  the	  pain	  of	  life.	  Consequently,	  the	  affirmation	  of	  Eternal	  Recurrence	  is	  in	  opposition	  to	  decadent	  morality’s	  devaluation	  and	  rejection	  of	  pain,	  suffering,	  sickness,	  and	  death.	  In	  this	  way,	  an	  affirmation	  of	  Eternal	  Recurrence	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  medicine	  to	  convalesce	  from	  out	  of	  the	  life-­‐threatening	  disease	  of	  decadent	  morality,	  to	  come	  embrace	  all	  the	  aspects	  of	  our	  lives,	  including	  our	  death.	  	  
22	  There	  is	  an	  interesting	  historical	  connection	  between	  many	  of	  the	  thinkers	  discussed	  within	  this	  thesis.	  Franz	  Brentano	  (1838-­‐1917),	  considered	  both	  a	  psychologist	  and	  a	  philosopher,	  studied	  intentionality,	  that	  consciousness	  is	  always	  consciousness	  of	  something.	  Sigmund	  Freud	  and	  Edmund	  Husserl	  were	  both	  students	  of	  Brentano.	  	  Eventually,	  Freud	  moved	  his	  focus	  from	  consciousness	  to	  instead	  highlight	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  unconscious.	  Freud	  was	  also	  highly	  influenced	  by	  Nietzsche.	  Otto	  Rank	  was	  a	  thinker	  in	  the	  Freudian	  Circle,	  undoubtedly	  influenced	  by	  Freud,	  and	  subsequently	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